The Council on Security and Defense Capability ReportThe Council on Security and Defense Capability Report
Executive Summary
Chapter 1 JAPAN’S NEW SECURITY STRATEGY
Section 1 Philosophy and Goals of Security Strategy: A World that Japan Strives for
In the world that Japan strives for, Japan’s own security must be protected. Safety of the Japanese people must be achieved wherever they may be, inside and outside of Japan. To maintain free and affluent lives of the Japanese people, free economic activities and freedom of transportation should be ensured under an international system that is free and open.
In order to maintain Japan’s security and its prosperity, stability of Japan’s neighbors, the region and the global society are prerequisite. Secure supply of food and materials, access to markets, the safety of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) are all necessary to sustain Japan’s prosperity. Maintaining stability of important trading partners is also indispensable.
Material well-being is not the only objective. Free and democratic values should be promoted, basic human rights advocated, both domestically and internationally. States sometimes disagree over their national interests, but the international community, though still imperfect, has adopted rules to mitigate disputes. Japan should contribute to further strengthen international organizations and help establish international norms. Japanese people renounce use of force as means of settling international disputes, and it is a goal of Japan that this idea prevails in the world.
Since we cannot build walls between people, it follows that the whole world be peaceful to sustain Japan’s own security.
Section 2 Security Environment surrounding Japan
(1) Basic Trends
Globalization of economies and societies is proceeding and interdependency among the states is deepening. This has resulted in stability among the major powers and the possibility of large-scale war among them is small. On the other hand, globalization has also allowed threats to spread worldwide. A problem in a distant area has come to affect Japan’s and international security.
Transnational challenges are increasing. International terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and piracy are some of those challenges we face. To solve these problems, international cooperation is vital and a robust international system is needed to spur such cooperation. There are signs that the international system itself may be undergoing a change caused by emergence of rising powers and other factors.
(2) Global Challenges
Challenges in the Post-Cold War security environment include the issue of civil wars. Civil wars can result in a failed state, and the fragile governance not only leads to deprivation of individual rights and security but could also offer a sanctuary to international terror and crime groups. Impacts of these threats could reach everywhere in the world. International community must cooperate in restoring governance in affected areas, and military organizations are expected to play greater roles.
Proliferation of WMDs, especially that of nuclear weapons, constitutes a serious threat to international security. Proliferation of nuclear weapons could result in a nuclearization domino and increase the risk of acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups.
The United States has been the leader and provider of global security. The United States has controlled the international public space known as the “Global Commons,” which has enabled it to provide such international public goods as freedom of navigation in the high seas. Today, the United States enjoys absolute superiority and U.S. primacy seems to remain unchallenged into the foreseeable future. If the U.S. commitment to the world declines, this could result in an erosion of global and regional security. Regardless of strong U.S. will, if a perception were to occur among the countries in the Asia-Pacific region that U.S. commitment to the region was in decline, it could destabilize the region and lower the deterrent capability of the Japan-U.S. alliance.
In order to maintain a current cooperative international system, it is important for major powers such as EU members and Japan to tackle the international problems together with the United States. At the same time, it is important to encourage emerging powers to be responsible members actively upholding the international system.
(3) Security Environment of Japan’s Neighborhood
North Korea continues its nuclear and missile development. This is a serious threat to international peace and security. From Japan’s point of view, in addition to nuclear and missile threats, subversive activity by North Korea’s special operation forces (SOF) is another threat. The future of North Korea’s regime is uncertain and the collapse of the regime is a possibility.
China is undergoing numerous changes. Many of these changes are favorable to Japan. The two countries are continuing efforts to build a “ Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests.” On the other hand, rapid reinforcement of its military power while lacking transparency in purpose and size, is a concern for Japan and the region. It is Japan’s expectation that China chooses to be a responsible power, and Japan should work hard to provide an environment that facilitates such a choice.
Russia, a member of the G8, is one of the key players who can influence security in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia’s military is less active than during the Cold War era, but still maintains its potential capability. While there is an unresolved territorial issue between Japan and Russia, in order to improve the security environment in the neighborhood, Japan should enhance confidence with Russia in the region.
In the Asia-Pacific region, a bundle of bilateral alliances with the United States has played an important role in guaranteeing regional security and order, but regional security frameworks are still weak. It is necessary to develop cooperation on individual agendas such as counter-terrorism and infectious disease control into regional cooperation on security.
Japan’s relations with the Republic of Korea are very important. We hope that the Japan-ROK security cooperation, which has been growing recently, will be further deepened.
Section 3 The “Multilayered Cooperative Security Strategy”
The “Multilayered Cooperative Security Strategy” proposes a way to realize three goals by combining four approaches. The three goals are maintaining Japan’s security, preventing threats from materializing, and maintaining and constructing an international system. The four approaches are Japan’s own efforts, cooperation with its ally, cooperation with countries in the region and cooperation with the international society. In today’s security environment, compared to that of 2004 when the current “National Defense Program Guidelines” was adopted, threats to international systems are increasing and the U.S. influence that has underpinned the international system seems to be changing. Japan shares many security interests with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, but unlike in Europe, the region lacks an effective regional security framework. Therefore, this Strategy sets a new goal, “maintenance and construction of international system,” and adds a new approach, “cooperation with countries in the region.” These three targets overlap with each other in many ways and are mutually reinforcing. In addition, today’s security environment is less characterized by geographical notions and there is less clear distinction between peace time and war time. Hence, it is important to combine four approaches in synergy and make them function multilayeredly and seamlessly.
(1) Japan’s Security – Threats and Challenges that Face Japan
To prevent threats that vary in kind and quality from harming Japan’s security directly, Japan should respond to these threats and challenges seamlessly. Hardware and software must be combined to bring about the maximum result. Means to achieve the goals include: building up Multifunctional and Flexible Defense Force while defining priorities among threats and risks; to set up a web of multilayered deterrence to counter the threat of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; and strengthen the alliance with the U.S. through identifying both strategic and tactical common objectives.
In the new era of Japan-U.S. alliance, Japan should not always be led by its ally, but take its own initiatives proactively for Japan’s own security in particular, and cooperate with the United States for agendas which Japan cannot address or solve alone.
To realize abandonment of nuclear and missile development of North Korea through diplomacy, Japan should make multilayered efforts, including implementation of sanction imposed by UNSC resolutions, and diplomatic appeals to the countries concerned.
International terrorism should be suppressed through regulatory activities by law enforcement agencies and other organizations.
An integrated approach that requires relevant ministries and agencies’ involvement is highly important to address emergencies such as intrusion to territorial waters, large-scale disasters, and so on. Other important elements include intelligence function with which Japan can gather and analyze information by itself to make policy decisions, and civilian control that enables wide-ranging use of the SDF in order to achieve political goals.
(2) Preventing Threats from Materializing
To prevent threats from materializing, a “seed” of threat must be addressed to prevent it from becoming a real “threat.” To achieve this goal, overall security environment must be improved through indirect means and by increasing mutual understanding.
U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is vital to ensure stability of this region. Realignment of U.S. forces and transformation of the Japan-U.S. alliance should be implemented steadily. In addition, Japan and the United States should cooperatively maintain a stable regional security environment through international peace cooperation activities and multinational military exercises.
In order to keep a regional problem from growing into a destabilizing factor for the region, countries in the region should strengthen relationship based on mutual confidence. For this purpose, such measures as institutionalization of the relationship and establishment of a code of conduct are beneficial. Japan has already contributed to this in the field of maritime security, and should continue such efforts. Japan should contribute to the stability of the region by strengthening security cooperation with ROK and Australia. Japan shares many common security interests with the two countries, both of which are allies of the United States.
Once becoming a failed state, comprehensive support should be given to the country until it accomplishes its reconstruction. Japan should participate in the peace building activities from immediate post-conflict stage. Japan should also contribute more actively to the U.N. peacekeeping operations. Moreover, Japan should commit more positively to arms control regimes aimed at non-/counter-proliferation of WMDs as well as efforts in nuclear disarmament.
Confidence-building measures result in improving Japan’s security level. Based on an understanding that defense exchanges and military deterrence work together inseparably, Japan should engage in defense exchanges programs earnestly. At the same time, Japan should envision a new “Comprehensive Security” that increases effectiveness by combining defense power with other powers such as diplomacy, economy and cultural attractiveness.
(3) Maintenance and Construction of International System
In order to realize the world Japan strives for, the current open and free international system should be maintained. At the same time, it is important to establish a complementary system in order to better counter new and transnational challenges. Japan should devote itself to maintaining and building such system. In its endeavor to contribute to the international community, Japan should make efforts not to allow the so-called “historical” issue to hinder Japan’s initiatives in foreign policy.
To play a more active role in establishing and maintaining the international system, a variety of initiatives should be implemented multilayeredly. Firstly, Japan should work harder to realize UN reform. Japan should make more efforts to attain the permanent membership of the Security Council in order to contribute to the UN decision making process more actively.
Additionally, more Japanese citizens are encouraged to join and work for the international organizations.
Since it is not easy to establish a comprehensive regional security framework in the Asia-Pacific region, one should begin with cooperation in an achievable area. To integrate China into regional frameworks as a constructive member is of great importance for a stable regional order. As the first step toward a regional framework, Japan should make efforts to network allies and partners of the U.S., and upgrade the cooperative relationship with ROK.
Japan should envision establishment of a robust framework which is empowered to resolve conflicts as a long-term target, being premised on effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. alliance.
Multilayered regional frameworks should be taken shape based on the ARF, ASEAN+3, Japanese-Indian cooperation, association among G20 member states, and so on. Furthermore, Japan should pursue organizing a cooperative structure in the field of disaster relief.
Japan has underpinned the international system with the U.S. in such spheres as economy and finance. Hereafter, Japan, cooperating with other states, should complement the roles that the U.S. has undertaken in order to secure the global commons. Many security issues of today require prompt decision making and action. A “core group” of states including Japan, the United States and other states should be organized to achieve such an end.
Chapter 2 THE MODALITY OF JAPAN’S DEFENSE FORCE
Section 1 The Roles of Japan’s Defense Force
a) Deterrence and Effective Response to Contingencies Within and Around Japan’s Territory
One of the features of the current security environment is the growing importance of situations in gray spectrum between peace time and war time due to less warning time allowed in certain contingencies. Japan should put its priority on “deterrence by operations” –dynamic deterrence as opposed to static deterrence – through activities under normal circumstances. SDF units must have the hardware and software that enables them to respond seamlessly to a situation as it develops. If an invasion to Japan were to occur, Japan would need to expel it by exerting its defense force. Japan should steadily build up a defense force that is able to cope effectively with presumable contingencies.
To counter the threat of North Korea’s ballistic missiles, deterrence is the most important tool. Japan relies on the United States for nuclear deterrence by punishment. While Japan expects the United States to contribute its strike capability as a second layer of deterrent, Japan should also conduct operational collaboration and cooperation with the United States.
In addition, denial by missile defense system and consequence management contribute to forming another layer of deterrence. To make such multilayered deterrence work more effectively, Japan-U.S. bilateral coordination is important. To defend against missiles, Japan should steadily continue its build-up program of Missile Defense system and promote the Japan-U.S. joint development program for a new-type interceptor missile. As for strike capability, Japan should conduct studies of possible weapons systems, etc., premised that operations be executed together with the United States. Japan should also build up its information gathering capability that is mutually supplementary to the two countries.
Japan should be able to sense indications of subversive activities by North Korean SOF and international terror groups, and cope promptly with them. While assisting law enforcement agencies in earlier stage, the SDF should assume the central role in operations such as protection of important national assets.
In relation to the issues of territories in surrounding waters and of delimitation of EEZ, while practicing continuous surveillance activities, Japan should maintain its qualitative superiority in operational capability. Moreover, Japan should consider posting of new SDF units to offshore islands and enhance maneuvering capability in contingencies.
Recognizing the high frequency of natural disasters in Japan, the SDF is expected to assume an important role in large-scale disasters. The SDF, as the source of relief and security for Japanese people, should also strengthen its ties with local communities whose capability for countering disaster is deteriorating due to such factors as aging population.
A full-scale invasion against Japan is unlikely in the current international situation. A state, however, must remain prepared to defend itself from a possible invasion as a basic function of an independent nation. Japan should continue to possess a minimum level of capability necessary to counter this type of invasion as a precaution for an unforeseeable change in international situation.
b) Further Stabilization of Regional Environment and Order
Since it is necessary to pay attention to increased activities of China and Russia in Japan’s surrounding areas, Japan should establish its intelligence supremacy by ascertaining neighboring countries’ military movements through ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) activities.
Recent defense exchanges place importance on international cooperation aimed at solving common challenges. Japan-China cooperation in such fields as maritime security will bring about a positive impact on the whole region. At the same time, Japan, with ROK and Australia, must take initiatives in a variety of issues in the region. Japan should take concrete steps to cooperate with the two countries in intelligence and logistics. Japan should consider overseas dispatch of SDF units more actively to places where it can cooperate with the two countries in international peace cooperation activities.
Japan should also contribute to efforts toward regional stability through regional security frameworks including ASEAN. Japan should actively support multilateral exercises, particularly for such purposes as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
c) Improvement of the Global Security Environment
Countering international terrorism is an important security objective for Japan. Japan should make long-term contribution in international efforts, including its support activity for maritime interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean.
In participating in reconstruction efforts in failed states, the SDF should place greater emphasis on protection of civilians and support for improving capability of security sector in addition to humanitarian assistance and support for economic and social recovery. It is also necessary to prepare conditions that pave the way for a more active participation in the PKO.
As the importance of disaster relief is likely to increase in the future, the SDF’s international disaster relief activities will also be important.
Japan should assign the SDF actively in efforts such as PSI to prevent proliferation of WMDs and their delivery means. Japan should also more keenly promote exchanges and cooperation with NATO and European countries.
Section 2 New Functions and Structure of the Defense Force
(1) Guiding Principles for Buildup of Defense Structure
Recently, roles of Japan’s defense force in ensuring Japanese nationals’ security is widening. In addition, the defense force is requested to conduct law enforcement activities.
Today’s defense force should develop into a “multifunctional force” that is able to take part in various missions, and one that can react to a sudden crisis quickly and appropriately, thus in a “flexible” manner. From this viewpoint, the current SDF needs further structural transformation.
Because required skill level of units and personnel is becoming higher and more professional, a SDF unit must react to contingency with its usual line-up, not relying on wartime call-up. Therefore, personnel fill rate of the SDF should be kept high even in peace time.
In pursuing structural transformation, the Japanese government must allocate appropriate resources to defense sector so that it can maintain necessary equipments and personnel and operate them, while setting clear priorities and efficiently using defense expenditure.
(2) Common Requirements for the Defense Force to Function Fully
Japan should build up its defense force with high cost-performance prioritizing quality and software. Listed below are common requirements for pursuing this objective.
- Establishing intelligence superiority: introduce ISR assets such as aircrafts and vessels and link them into a network; utilize outer space effectively and efficiently.
- Enhancing C4 and information security: as a basis of both seamless response to an aggravating situation and further participation in international peace cooperation activities.
- Utilizing Japanese high-quality science and technology: Japan should move away from increasing quantity and improve the quality of the defense force being attentive to trends in military technology.
- Considering geographical conditions: improve maneuvering capability, and seek to take advantage of offshore islands for ISR and other operations.
(3) Enhancement of Joint Operations and Increasing Jointness
Based on lessons learned after Joint Staff centralized operations function, the SDF should continue to improve its joint operations capability, and establish methods for education/training and unit composition that contribute to joint operations. Also important is for the Joint Staff to have authority to recommend on defense build-up, based on judgment of priorities from operational perspective.
(4) Defense Build-up that contributes to strengthening Japan-U.S. alliance
To add specificity in roles and missions sharing between Japan and the United States in contingencies provides basis for considering mutual complementarities of capabilities of both countries. Whenever Japan thinks of building up its defense force, it is important to take into consideration roles and missions sharing and improvement of interoperability with the United States.
(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities
Though international peace cooperation activities became one of the SDF’s primary missions, recent record of participation is not satisfactory. The SDF should sustain a posture with which it is always able to dispatch troops to plural large-scale and multidimentional PKO missions.
Section 3 Infrastructures that Bolster the Defense Force
(1) Personnel Infrastructure (Response to Decline in Number of Youths and Other Issues)
The SDF is facing two challenges with regard to personnel infrastructure: decline in the number of youths; and maladjustment in age structure and rank promotion system. To respond to the decline in the number of youths, the SDF should expand recruitment of female personnel and open more occupational specialties to them, and change its hiring condition to one with longer terms of contract. To adjust the age structure, the SDF should reduce the number of officers promoted from NCOs, as well as try to motivate and revitalize the NCOs.
Introduction of early retirement system should be considered, and government-wide efforts to help retired personnel earn new jobs would be the key to making the new system work.
Establishing professionalism among the SDF personnel is another important issue.
The Council expects the Japanese government to consider this matter and take necessary measures, in view of the significance of human infrastructure from security perspective.
(2) Materiel Infrastructure (Defense Production and Technology Infrastructure)
Prices of SDF equipment are getting more expensive while the defense expenditure continues to decrease gradually. There are trends toward international joint development programs in other advanced countries. Japanese defense production and technology infrastructure are now at the juncture of whether or not they can bear these changes of outside environment.
Japan should continue reforms of defense programming and procurement including promotion of IPT (Integrated Project Team) concept. In addition, it should spell out a comprehensive defense industrial policy that decides which part of the infrastructure is priority for Japan and to be sustained and developed, and pursue realization of an infrastructure from which the Japanese government would be able to acquire state-of-the-art equipments with moderate costs. Also important is to decide to join the international joint development programs.
(3) Social Infrastructure (Support from Japanese Nationals, and Local Cooperation)
Japan has had a tendency of evading from arguing on security and defense issues usually, and being unable to discuss calmly in time of need. There should be broad discussions on various aspects of Japan’s security policy, and for that reason accurate information from the Government should be provided.
The SDF’s disaster relief operations and support for civilian activities are highly expected by Japanese nationals and local residents. Thanks to improvement in deployment capability of units, today the Japanese government can think location of each unit more flexibly. When the Japanese government decides stationing of units, it should take into account whether the location is convenient for daily training, and whether the location ensures strong ties with local communities.
We should recognize that Japanese public’s understanding and support for the SDF, and cooperation of local communities become important elements that compose Japan’s defense capability.
Chapter 3: REVIEWS ON BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JAPAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY
Section 1 Guiding Principles for National Security Policy
Since the “Basic Policy for National Defense” was adopted more than 50 years ago, there has not been a single modification of the document. The Basic Policy lacks specificity to provide substantial guidance to Japan’s national security policies.
There is a set of principles that has been regarded as Japan’s “basics of defense policy.”
- “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy”
- “Not Becoming a Military Power” which threatens other countries
- “Ensuring Civilian Control”
- “The Three Non-Nuclear Principles”
These principles have been significant as a brake, but explain little on what Japan should do.
“Ensuring Civilian Control” and “Not Becoming a Military Power” have not lost their importance. Due to changing security circumstances, however, the world is now quite different from the one the “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” originally assumed.
We should decide the basic principles on national security policy, and explain them at home and abroad. We should also examine the concepts which represent Japan’s basic stance such as “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” from today’s viewpoint.
Section 2 Guidelines and Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities
Japan’s commitment to U.N. peacekeeping operations has not been very active recently. In order to increase Japan’s participation in U.N. PKO, it is necessary to review legal and political criteria which are used to decide whether or not to dispatch the SDF to a PKO mission.
The “Five Principles” that is the legal standard contains several ideas to be reviewed such as scope of “parties in conflict” and the way of use of weapons. The “Five Principles” and the International Peace Cooperation Law, which are two sides of the same coin, should be revised. Japan’s new political standards should include estimate of legitimacy of the mission, security level and whether Japan’s potential is performed in a suitable manner. Based on the estimate, Japan should decide whether the participation in the mission is consistent with Japan’s national interest or not.
To manage needs for international peace cooperation activities by making individual special measures laws is problematic. Early enactment of a so-called “permanent law” is necessary for Japan to more keenly conduct international peace cooperation activities.
The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (“The Panel on Security Legislation”) recommended that international peace cooperation activities should not be understood as “use of force as means of settling international disputes” and that the concept of “ittaika” (“form an integral”) is far away from the real world situations, thus it has to be corrected. The Council expects the Japanese government to reflect the conclusion of the Report into Japanese legal system in the future.
Section 3 Policies for Response to a Ballistic Missile Attack
To defend Japan against a ballistic missile attack, while Japan relies on the U.S. for deterrent by retaliation, Japan should play its own role in interception of the missile and consequence management.
The Panel on Security Legislation made recommendations on interception of a ballistic missile on its way to the U.S. and defense of U.S. vessels in time of Japan-U.S. bilateral operations, and the Council strongly supports them.
Advancement of capability of North Korea’s ballistic missiles makes Japan and the U.S. to confront the common threat. For its security purpose, Japan is required to intercept a missile on its way to the U.S. By reviewing traditional constitutional interpretation on the right of collective self-defense, Japan should interpret such an interception as lawful.
If SDF vessels could not defend U.S. vessels which are engaged in warning and surveillance for missiles, the confidence in bilateral relations would fall, and subsequently security of Japan would be damaged considerably. In order for the SDF to defend the U.S. vessels in such a situation, it is necessary to examine and establish an appropriate legislation by taking such measures as review of the traditional constitutional interpretation on the right of collective self-defense.
Section 4 The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.
The United States and European countries are now trying to acquire high-end technology and equipment by setting up international division of labor. If Japan could not participate in such a framework of international joint research and development (R&D) and production owing to restriction of the Three Principles on Arms Export, etc., risk is becoming greater for Japan to be left behind the international technological development. In addition, if a Japanese enterprise is allowed to sell the United States certain equipment which is originally licensed by the U.S. and now produced in Japan, such a way of Japan-U.S. equipment cooperation could lead to a deepened bilateral relationship, but for now the Three Principles hinder such initiatives.
After 2004 the Japanese government has taken a stance of examining on a case-by-case basis and deciding whether to ease the Three Principles on Arms Export, etc. for certain equipment related to support of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. However, this method of examining on a case-by-case basis is, in fact, a hurdle at the entrance stage.
Unless Japan addresses these issues, Japan’s defense capability would possibly decline. The Council considers it appropriate to set a new guideline that directs arms export control policy. However, even if the present policy frame survives for a while, abovementioned individual issues must be exempted application of the Three Principles on Arms Export, etc. on the condition that each case earns strict management, at the least.
Section 5 Foundation for Realizing the New Security Strategy
(1) Strengthening Function of the Kantei
To implement integrated national security policy, it is important to strengthen function of the Kantei as a commanding post. Recommended measures stated by “the Council on the Strengthening of the Function of the Prime Minister’s Office Regarding National Security” and “the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense” have not been fully implemented. The Japanese government should implement as soon as possible measures that are executable within the current constraint, as well as continue to consider establishing a permanent secretariat that can support ministerial meeting body.
(2) Strengthening Function of Intelligence and Intelligence Security
In order to appropriately address expanding needs for intelligence, Japan should strengthen and improve human intelligence (HUMINT), function of Information Gathering Satellites, frameworks of intelligence cooperation and intelligence security with foreign countries, and bases of open source intelligence (OSINT).
Strong intelligence function is supported by firm framework of intelligence security.
It's necessary to develop integrated legal system that stipulates handling of important secret information of Japan and to strengthen countermeasures against illegal access and a leak of information through computer network.
(3) Strengthening Civilian Control
Under the so-called “1955 regime” in Japanese politics, debates among Diet members tended to lack strategic perspectives and ideas about actively utilizing the SDF capabilities to realize a political end. It is of importance that the Diet, through substantial policy debates, offers a guideline for national security policy. This will lead to strengthened civilian control by the Diet. It is also desirable to discuss the procedures to hold secret sessions and setting rules for handling secret information in the Diet.
