U.S.-Chinese relations are already inescapably-tied to each other. Cheers, Kosuke
US, China defense chiefs to meet amid thaw in ties
The Associated Press
BEIJING -- China's defense minister will meet his U.S. counterpart at an international gathering in Vietnam next week as the two nations move to end an eight-month freeze on military exchanges, state media said Wednesday.
Gen. Liang Guanglie will meet Defense Secretary Robert Gates at a gathering of defense chiefs from the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations that starts Tuesday in the Vietnamese capital of Hanoi, Xinhua News Agency quoted Defense Ministry spokesman Guan Youfei as saying.
Xinhua quoted Guan as saying the meeting between the two men would be "short but significant."
China suspended such contacts in January to protest a $6.4 billion U.S. arms package for Taiwan, the self-governing island that China claims as its own territory. Beijing pointedly refused to invite Gates to visit during his trip to the region in June, leading U.S. officials to complain that the Chinese military was ignoring the importance of such contacts.
China signaled an end to the freeze last week when the Defense Ministry's head of foreign affairs, Maj. Gen. Qian Lihua, told visiting U.S. Assistant Deputy Defense Secretary Michael Schiffer that regular dialogue and exchanges on military safety at sea and other issues would be resumed.
Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said Tuesday the two nations are looking for a mutually convenient time for Gates' long-delayed visit - probably early in 2011.
The last significant exchange took place late last year when Gates invited Gen. Xu Caihou to the United States for a tour of the Pentagon and U.S. military installations. As one of two vice chairmen of the Communist Party committee that controls the military, Xu technically ranks higher than Liang, who is merely one of the 11-strong committee's eight ordinary members.
Regional tensions and heated rhetoric have underscored the importance of regular contacts between the two militaries, much to the frustration of U.S. officers who complain of the lack of access to their Chinese counterparts.
China has been especially strident about U.S. involvement in territorial disputes in the South China Sea - which Beijing claims in its entirety - along with joint U.S.-South Korean anti-submarine drills in the Yellow Sea, part of which lies within Chinese sovereign waters.
Beijing has also angered Seoul by refusing to verify the findings of a study blaming North Korea for the sinking a South Korean navy ship in March that ratcheted up tensions across northeast Asia.
While U.S.-China military exchanges appear to be on the mend, they could soon face further Taiwan-related challenges.
A Taiwanese Defense Ministry spokesman said Wednesday the island was allocating money for possible U.S. help to upgrade its fleet of F-16 fighter jets. The statement came amid Taiwanese media reports that the Obama administration has agreed to upgrade the island's fleet of American-made 146 F-16A/Bs, which it received more than a decade ago.
Taiwan is also hoping to buy an entirely new version of the F-16, the more advanced C/Ds, because the aircraft better suits Taiwan's strategy for defending against Chinese threats to use force if necessary to bring the island under its control.
Friday, October 8, 2010
Thursday, October 7, 2010
(IHT) U.S. tries to forge closer military ties with China
The International Herald Tribune carried an excellent article on thaw in US-China military ties. Cheers, Kosuke
U.S. tries to forge closer military ties with China;
Pentagon reaching out to a generation of officers who see it as the enemy
BY MICHAEL WINES
BEIJING
(ABSTRACT)
One reason the Pentagon has persistently sought closer relations with the People's Liberation Army is that it does not want U.S. forces to remain unknown to their up-and-coming Chinese counterparts.
(FULL TEXT)
The United States pronounced its military relationship with China ''back on track'' last week after a meeting here between ranking officials of the Pentagon and the People's Liberation Army.
Tell that, however, to Lt. Cmdr. Tony Cao.
Commander Cao is an officer of the People's Liberation Army Navy. Days before the Pentagon's top Asia official arrived for talks last week in Beijing, Commander Cao was aboard a frigate in the Yellow Sea, conducting China's first-ever war games with the Australian Navy - and noting, pointedly, that the Americans were not invited. Nor are they likely to be, he told Australian journalists in slightly bent English, until ''the United States stops selling the weapons to Taiwan and stopping spying us with the air or the surface.''
As the often-frigid relations between the U.S. and Chinese militaries again warm ever so slightly, it is officers like Commander Cao, rising through the ranks of China's armed forces, who are drawing new attention from Washington.
While China's top military leaders are known quantities, its future leaders remain unknowns. One reason the Pentagon has persistently sought closer relations with the People's Liberation Army, often in the face of rebuffs, is that it does not want U.S. forces to remain unknown to their up-and-coming Chinese counterparts.
Older P.L.A. officers may remember a time, before the Tiananmen Square protests set relations back, when the U.S. and Chinese forces made common cause against the former Soviet Union. Younger officers have only known an anti-U.S. military.
''The P.L.A. combines an odd combination of deep admiration for the U.S. armed forces as a military, but equally harbors a deep suspicion of U.S. military deployments and intentions towards China,'' David Shambaugh, a leading expert on the Chinese military at George Washington University in Washington, said in an e-mail.
The stakes rise as China's armed forces, once a fairly ragtag group, steadily become more capable and take on bigger tasks. The navy, the centerpiece of China's military expansion, has added dozens of surface ships and submarines in the last decade and is widely reported to be planning construction of an aircraft carrier, the most potent weapon in the naval arsenal. The maneuvers with Australia in the Yellow Sea last month were but the most recent in a series of Chinese excursions to places as diverse as New Zealand, Britain and Spain.
China is also reported to be building an anti-ship ballistic missile base in the southern province of Guangdong, with missiles capable of reaching the Philippines and Vietnam. The base is regarded as an effort to enforce China's territorial claims to vast areas of the South China Sea claimed by other nations - and to threaten U.S. aircraft carriers that now patrol the area unmolested.
Even improved Chinese forces pose little threat to a far more capable U.S. military. But their increasing range and ability - and the certainty that they will strengthen further - make it crucial to help lower-level officers become more familiar with the Americans, experts say, before a chance encounter blossoms into a crisis.
''These past few years are part of a process where a group of young officers in China are beginning to rise up to a more senior position,'' said Huang Jing, a scholar of China's military and leadership at the National University of Singapore. ''All militaries need a straw man, a perceived enemy, for solidarity. And as a young officer or soldier, you always take the strongest of straw men to maximize the effect. Chinese military men, from the soldiers and platoon captains all the way up to the army commanders, were always taught that America would be their enemy.''
From the Chinese military's view, this year has offered ample evidence of the United States' ill will.
The Chinese effectively suspended official military relations early this year after President Barack Obama held a meeting with the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan religious leader, and approved a $6.7 billion arms sale to Taiwan, which China regards as its territory.
Since then, the P.L.A. has bristled as the U.S. State Department offered to mediate disputes between China and its neighbors over ownership of Pacific islands and valuable seabed mineral rights. And when the U.S. Navy conducted war games with South Korea last month in the Yellow Sea, not 640 kilometers, or 400 miles, from Beijing, the rhetoric from senior Chinese officers was apoplectic.
The United States ''is engaging in an increasingly tight encirclement of China and constantly challenging China's core interests,'' Rear Adm. Yang Yi, a naval commander, wrote last month in two hawkish articles in The P.L.A. Daily, the military newspaper. ''Washington will inevitably pay a costly price for its muddled decision.''
In truth, little in the U.S. actions is new. Mr. Obama's predecessor, George W. Bush, not only hosted the Dalai Lama, but awarded him Congress's highest civilian honor in 2007. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were mandated by Congress in 1979 and were a fixture of U.S. policy for years before that. U.S. warships regularly ply the waters off China's coast and frequently practice with South Korean ships.
But a confluence of factors appears to be dictating the P.L.A.'s sharp response.
One is the impending change of China's government leaders in 2012. In the jockeying for advantage before that turnover, no politician is willing to be seen as weak, and the military has gained new leeway to publicly push its more aggressive views on foreign policy.
Another is the new assertiveness that has followed China's rise to global prominence.
''Why do you sell arms to Taiwan? We don't sell arms to Hawaii,'' said Liu Mingfu, a professor at National Defense University in Beijing and the author of ''The China Dream,'' a nationalistic call to succeed the United States as the world's leading power.
''In the past China simply tolerated this silently for the sake of the overall situation of U.S.-China relations,'' Mr. Liu said. ''But now times have moved on, the world is more civilized, and China is stronger. The Chinese people have a higher requirement for national dignity and demand more respect. Americans should understand this.''
That official military relations are resuming despite the P.L.A.'s sharp language is likely a function of international diplomacy. President Hu Jintao of China is scheduled to visit Washington soon, perhaps as early as January, and U.S. experts had predicted that China would resume military ties as part of a general effort to smooth over rough spots before the state visit.
Chinese military leaders, who earlier this year snubbed a proposal by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to visit Beijing, signaled last week that that visit would be scheduled soon. And Wednesday, the state-run news agency, Xinhua, said Defense Minister Liang Guanglie would meet with Mr. Gates next week at a security conference in Hanoi.
None of that seems to signal any basic change in the Chinese military view of the Pentagon.
A leading Chinese expert on international security, Zhu Feng of Peking University, said that the Chinese military's hostility toward the United States was not new, just more open. And that, he said, was not only the result of China's new assertiveness, but its military's inexperience on the world stage.
China's military has had a strictly domestic mission - until now. ''Chinese officers' international exposure remains very limited,'' Mr. Zhu said.
October 7, 2010
U.S. tries to forge closer military ties with China;
Pentagon reaching out to a generation of officers who see it as the enemy
BY MICHAEL WINES
BEIJING
(ABSTRACT)
One reason the Pentagon has persistently sought closer relations with the People's Liberation Army is that it does not want U.S. forces to remain unknown to their up-and-coming Chinese counterparts.
(FULL TEXT)
The United States pronounced its military relationship with China ''back on track'' last week after a meeting here between ranking officials of the Pentagon and the People's Liberation Army.
Tell that, however, to Lt. Cmdr. Tony Cao.
Commander Cao is an officer of the People's Liberation Army Navy. Days before the Pentagon's top Asia official arrived for talks last week in Beijing, Commander Cao was aboard a frigate in the Yellow Sea, conducting China's first-ever war games with the Australian Navy - and noting, pointedly, that the Americans were not invited. Nor are they likely to be, he told Australian journalists in slightly bent English, until ''the United States stops selling the weapons to Taiwan and stopping spying us with the air or the surface.''
As the often-frigid relations between the U.S. and Chinese militaries again warm ever so slightly, it is officers like Commander Cao, rising through the ranks of China's armed forces, who are drawing new attention from Washington.
While China's top military leaders are known quantities, its future leaders remain unknowns. One reason the Pentagon has persistently sought closer relations with the People's Liberation Army, often in the face of rebuffs, is that it does not want U.S. forces to remain unknown to their up-and-coming Chinese counterparts.
Older P.L.A. officers may remember a time, before the Tiananmen Square protests set relations back, when the U.S. and Chinese forces made common cause against the former Soviet Union. Younger officers have only known an anti-U.S. military.
''The P.L.A. combines an odd combination of deep admiration for the U.S. armed forces as a military, but equally harbors a deep suspicion of U.S. military deployments and intentions towards China,'' David Shambaugh, a leading expert on the Chinese military at George Washington University in Washington, said in an e-mail.
The stakes rise as China's armed forces, once a fairly ragtag group, steadily become more capable and take on bigger tasks. The navy, the centerpiece of China's military expansion, has added dozens of surface ships and submarines in the last decade and is widely reported to be planning construction of an aircraft carrier, the most potent weapon in the naval arsenal. The maneuvers with Australia in the Yellow Sea last month were but the most recent in a series of Chinese excursions to places as diverse as New Zealand, Britain and Spain.
China is also reported to be building an anti-ship ballistic missile base in the southern province of Guangdong, with missiles capable of reaching the Philippines and Vietnam. The base is regarded as an effort to enforce China's territorial claims to vast areas of the South China Sea claimed by other nations - and to threaten U.S. aircraft carriers that now patrol the area unmolested.
Even improved Chinese forces pose little threat to a far more capable U.S. military. But their increasing range and ability - and the certainty that they will strengthen further - make it crucial to help lower-level officers become more familiar with the Americans, experts say, before a chance encounter blossoms into a crisis.
''These past few years are part of a process where a group of young officers in China are beginning to rise up to a more senior position,'' said Huang Jing, a scholar of China's military and leadership at the National University of Singapore. ''All militaries need a straw man, a perceived enemy, for solidarity. And as a young officer or soldier, you always take the strongest of straw men to maximize the effect. Chinese military men, from the soldiers and platoon captains all the way up to the army commanders, were always taught that America would be their enemy.''
From the Chinese military's view, this year has offered ample evidence of the United States' ill will.
The Chinese effectively suspended official military relations early this year after President Barack Obama held a meeting with the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan religious leader, and approved a $6.7 billion arms sale to Taiwan, which China regards as its territory.
Since then, the P.L.A. has bristled as the U.S. State Department offered to mediate disputes between China and its neighbors over ownership of Pacific islands and valuable seabed mineral rights. And when the U.S. Navy conducted war games with South Korea last month in the Yellow Sea, not 640 kilometers, or 400 miles, from Beijing, the rhetoric from senior Chinese officers was apoplectic.
The United States ''is engaging in an increasingly tight encirclement of China and constantly challenging China's core interests,'' Rear Adm. Yang Yi, a naval commander, wrote last month in two hawkish articles in The P.L.A. Daily, the military newspaper. ''Washington will inevitably pay a costly price for its muddled decision.''
In truth, little in the U.S. actions is new. Mr. Obama's predecessor, George W. Bush, not only hosted the Dalai Lama, but awarded him Congress's highest civilian honor in 2007. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were mandated by Congress in 1979 and were a fixture of U.S. policy for years before that. U.S. warships regularly ply the waters off China's coast and frequently practice with South Korean ships.
But a confluence of factors appears to be dictating the P.L.A.'s sharp response.
One is the impending change of China's government leaders in 2012. In the jockeying for advantage before that turnover, no politician is willing to be seen as weak, and the military has gained new leeway to publicly push its more aggressive views on foreign policy.
Another is the new assertiveness that has followed China's rise to global prominence.
''Why do you sell arms to Taiwan? We don't sell arms to Hawaii,'' said Liu Mingfu, a professor at National Defense University in Beijing and the author of ''The China Dream,'' a nationalistic call to succeed the United States as the world's leading power.
''In the past China simply tolerated this silently for the sake of the overall situation of U.S.-China relations,'' Mr. Liu said. ''But now times have moved on, the world is more civilized, and China is stronger. The Chinese people have a higher requirement for national dignity and demand more respect. Americans should understand this.''
That official military relations are resuming despite the P.L.A.'s sharp language is likely a function of international diplomacy. President Hu Jintao of China is scheduled to visit Washington soon, perhaps as early as January, and U.S. experts had predicted that China would resume military ties as part of a general effort to smooth over rough spots before the state visit.
Chinese military leaders, who earlier this year snubbed a proposal by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to visit Beijing, signaled last week that that visit would be scheduled soon. And Wednesday, the state-run news agency, Xinhua, said Defense Minister Liang Guanglie would meet with Mr. Gates next week at a security conference in Hanoi.
None of that seems to signal any basic change in the Chinese military view of the Pentagon.
A leading Chinese expert on international security, Zhu Feng of Peking University, said that the Chinese military's hostility toward the United States was not new, just more open. And that, he said, was not only the result of China's new assertiveness, but its military's inexperience on the world stage.
China's military has had a strictly domestic mission - until now. ''Chinese officers' international exposure remains very limited,'' Mr. Zhu said.
October 7, 2010
The Australian quotes my comments on Sino-Japanese relations
The Australian, Australia's national daily newspaper, quoted my comments on Sino-Japanese relations. Thanks much, The Australian! Cheers, Kosuke
US, Asia unite against Chinese provocation
By Rick Wallace and Michael Sainsbury
The Australian October 02, 2010
OKINAWA Governor Hirokazu Nakaima announced this week he planned to visit the uninhabited and rocky Senkaku Islands.
The outcrops have been the subject of the bitter recriminations between Tokyo and Beijing.
His provocative trip is best seen as populist domestic politics from a man who is facing re-election. The trouble is, the visit could reignite the bitter clash between China and Japan that has seen an icy tension spread throughout East Asia these past two weeks.
The long disputed rocky islets 400km west of Okinawa shot to prominence on September 8 when Japan arrested a Chinese skipper caught fishing illegally in nearby waters.
China, which also lays claim to the islands, exploded over the arrest, ratcheting the pressure on Japan up to unspecified threats of "further action" from Premier Wen Jiabao, which eventually secured the captain's release by a cowed Japanese government.
But while China rejoiced in a successful display of its increasing strength, the spat has given the US and its allies a clear picture of the kind of belligerence it can expect from Beijing.
Kosuke Takahashi, a correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly and specialist on Sino-Japanese security issues, said China's reaction was excessive and Japan's capitulation was weak.
But he said the net result was that while China won the domestic battle, Japan got the better of the dispute in the international sense because it had established a fresh anti-China consensus in the Asia Pacific.
"If you look at the editorials in Southeast Asia and the US in major newspapers, you can see China overreacted," he said. "South Korea also has issues with China over the Socotra Rock. The Philippines and Vietnam have territorial issues with China. Those countries look at the Chinese reaction and they are worried."
Mr Takahashi said China's move would also draw the US and Japan closer together. He said Japan could not afford to increase defence spending and China's aggression over the Senkaku Islands had effectively guaranteed the presence of US troops on Okinawa despite local resistance.
China estimates the trough basin under the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea holds nearly 17.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 20 million barrels of oil. Talks on joint development of the resource have broken down.
The head of the East Asia program at the Lowy Institute, Malcolm Cook, said China's disproportionate response was part of a broader pattern of behaviour.
"It's certainly given an example of China's actions that don't fit a 'peaceful rise' narrative or a 'harmonious world' one," he said.
Dr Cook said the change in China's posture could also be seen in the Yellow Sea, where Beijing criticised US-South Korean exercises and conducted its own war games, and in the South China Sea, where it continues to press a hard line in a territorial dispute with Vietnam. He agreed it would boost ties among US allies in the Asia Pacific.
University of NSW professor Carl Thayer wrote in Southeast Asia: Patterns of Defence, a paper released this week, that China's emergence as a great power could make it a potential strategic competitor of the US across the Asia Pacific and in Southeast Asia. "The dynamics of Sino-American relations will have a major impact on the security environment in Southeast Asia," he wrote.
Mr Nakaima's proposed visit will again test the mettle of both sides.
Additional reporting: AFP
US, Asia unite against Chinese provocation
By Rick Wallace and Michael Sainsbury
The Australian October 02, 2010
OKINAWA Governor Hirokazu Nakaima announced this week he planned to visit the uninhabited and rocky Senkaku Islands.
The outcrops have been the subject of the bitter recriminations between Tokyo and Beijing.
His provocative trip is best seen as populist domestic politics from a man who is facing re-election. The trouble is, the visit could reignite the bitter clash between China and Japan that has seen an icy tension spread throughout East Asia these past two weeks.
The long disputed rocky islets 400km west of Okinawa shot to prominence on September 8 when Japan arrested a Chinese skipper caught fishing illegally in nearby waters.
China, which also lays claim to the islands, exploded over the arrest, ratcheting the pressure on Japan up to unspecified threats of "further action" from Premier Wen Jiabao, which eventually secured the captain's release by a cowed Japanese government.
But while China rejoiced in a successful display of its increasing strength, the spat has given the US and its allies a clear picture of the kind of belligerence it can expect from Beijing.
Kosuke Takahashi, a correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly and specialist on Sino-Japanese security issues, said China's reaction was excessive and Japan's capitulation was weak.
But he said the net result was that while China won the domestic battle, Japan got the better of the dispute in the international sense because it had established a fresh anti-China consensus in the Asia Pacific.
"If you look at the editorials in Southeast Asia and the US in major newspapers, you can see China overreacted," he said. "South Korea also has issues with China over the Socotra Rock. The Philippines and Vietnam have territorial issues with China. Those countries look at the Chinese reaction and they are worried."
Mr Takahashi said China's move would also draw the US and Japan closer together. He said Japan could not afford to increase defence spending and China's aggression over the Senkaku Islands had effectively guaranteed the presence of US troops on Okinawa despite local resistance.
China estimates the trough basin under the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea holds nearly 17.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 20 million barrels of oil. Talks on joint development of the resource have broken down.
The head of the East Asia program at the Lowy Institute, Malcolm Cook, said China's disproportionate response was part of a broader pattern of behaviour.
"It's certainly given an example of China's actions that don't fit a 'peaceful rise' narrative or a 'harmonious world' one," he said.
Dr Cook said the change in China's posture could also be seen in the Yellow Sea, where Beijing criticised US-South Korean exercises and conducted its own war games, and in the South China Sea, where it continues to press a hard line in a territorial dispute with Vietnam. He agreed it would boost ties among US allies in the Asia Pacific.
University of NSW professor Carl Thayer wrote in Southeast Asia: Patterns of Defence, a paper released this week, that China's emergence as a great power could make it a potential strategic competitor of the US across the Asia Pacific and in Southeast Asia. "The dynamics of Sino-American relations will have a major impact on the security environment in Southeast Asia," he wrote.
Mr Nakaima's proposed visit will again test the mettle of both sides.
Additional reporting: AFP
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
(Korea Times) China as a superpower
Here is also an excellent article about China. Cheers, Kosuke
China as a superpower
By Joschka Fischer
YALTA ― Given its rapid and successful development, there can be no doubt that the People’s Republic of China will become one of the dominant global powers of the 21st century. Indeed, despite the massive problems that the country is confronting, it could even emerge as the global power.
But it would be a mistake to assume that the reemergence of so-called “XXL powers” like China and India will simply bring a continuation of Western traditions. We will have to deal with a different type of superpower.
Ever since the European powers set sail at the end of the 15th century to conquer the world, historiography and international politics have become accustomed to a certain pattern: military, economic, and technological power is translated into the exercise of influence over other countries, conquest, and even global dominance and empire.
This was particularly true in the 20th century, when, in the wake of two world wars, the United States and the Soviet Union replaced the European world powers on the global stage. The Cold War and the period of U.S. global dominance after 1989/1990 followed this pattern as well.
But China’s rise to global power, I believe, will not, owing to its massive population of 1.2 billion people, which threatens to overstretch the structures of any kind of government system and its decision-makers. This is all the more true in times of rapid fundamental change, as is occurring in China now.
The permanent danger of overstretching the country’s internal political structures is unlikely to permit any imperial foreign-policy role. Insofar as this is true, the United States won’t be replaced as the dominant power unless and until it abdicates that role. This may sound simple, but it will have far-reaching consequences for the coming century’s international order.
The vital interests guiding Chinese policy are internal modernization, the ruling regime’s political stability and survival, and the country’s unity (which includes Taiwan). These interests are unlikely to change for a long time.
As a result, China will become a largely inward-looking superpower, which ― precisely for that reason ― will pursue its foreign-policy interests in a completely unsentimental manner. Militarily, China will focus primarily on its regional supremacy, because the country’s unity depends on it. Otherwise, though, the transformation of China’s economy and society will be all-important, because the regime’s stability depends on it.
For the Chinese leadership, this means that a growth rate of about 10 percent per year will be essential for a long time. Otherwise, the rapid and fundamental transformation of the country from a largely agrarian to an ultra-modern industrialized society could not proceed without destabilizing the system.
But this focus on internal growth will have massive political consequences, both domestically and in foreign-policy terms. Domestically, China will be the first country that, due to its sheer size and required GDP growth, is forced to pursue a “green” economy. Otherwise, China would quickly reach its “limits to growth,” with disastrous ecological and, as a result, political consequences.
Since China will be the most important market of the future, it will be decisive in determining not only what we produce and consume, but how. Consider the transition from the traditional automobile to electric transport.
Despite European illusions to the contrary, this will be decided in China, not in the West. All that will be decided by the West’s globally dominant automobile industry is whether it will adapt and have a chance to survive or go the way of other old Western industries: to the developing world.
In foreign-policy terms, China will attempt to protect its domestic transformation by securing resources and access to foreign markets. Sooner or later, though, China’s government will come to realize that America’s role as a global regulator is indispensible for China’s vital foreign-policy interests, because China is unable to assume that role, other global players aren’t available, and the only alternative to the U.S. would be a breakdown of order.
This U.S.-Chinese tandem will run far from smoothly, and will do little but ameliorate crises and periods of serious economic and political confrontation, like that which is currently looming over the bilateral trade imbalance.
Strategically, however, China and the U.S. will have to rely on one another for a long time. This co-dependency will, at some point, also take shape politically, probably to the chagrin of all other international players, particularly the Europeans.
Europe could change the course of this development only if it presented itself as a serious player and stood up for its interests on the global stage. The “G-2” of China and the U.S. would probably be happy about that. But Europe is too weak and too divided to be effective globally, with its leaders unwilling to pursue a common policy based on their countries’ own strategic interests.
Joschka Fischer, a leading member of Germany’s Green Party for almost 20 years, was Germany’s foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 until 2005. For more information and stories, visit Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.org).
China as a superpower
By Joschka Fischer
YALTA ― Given its rapid and successful development, there can be no doubt that the People’s Republic of China will become one of the dominant global powers of the 21st century. Indeed, despite the massive problems that the country is confronting, it could even emerge as the global power.
But it would be a mistake to assume that the reemergence of so-called “XXL powers” like China and India will simply bring a continuation of Western traditions. We will have to deal with a different type of superpower.
Ever since the European powers set sail at the end of the 15th century to conquer the world, historiography and international politics have become accustomed to a certain pattern: military, economic, and technological power is translated into the exercise of influence over other countries, conquest, and even global dominance and empire.
This was particularly true in the 20th century, when, in the wake of two world wars, the United States and the Soviet Union replaced the European world powers on the global stage. The Cold War and the period of U.S. global dominance after 1989/1990 followed this pattern as well.
But China’s rise to global power, I believe, will not, owing to its massive population of 1.2 billion people, which threatens to overstretch the structures of any kind of government system and its decision-makers. This is all the more true in times of rapid fundamental change, as is occurring in China now.
The permanent danger of overstretching the country’s internal political structures is unlikely to permit any imperial foreign-policy role. Insofar as this is true, the United States won’t be replaced as the dominant power unless and until it abdicates that role. This may sound simple, but it will have far-reaching consequences for the coming century’s international order.
The vital interests guiding Chinese policy are internal modernization, the ruling regime’s political stability and survival, and the country’s unity (which includes Taiwan). These interests are unlikely to change for a long time.
As a result, China will become a largely inward-looking superpower, which ― precisely for that reason ― will pursue its foreign-policy interests in a completely unsentimental manner. Militarily, China will focus primarily on its regional supremacy, because the country’s unity depends on it. Otherwise, though, the transformation of China’s economy and society will be all-important, because the regime’s stability depends on it.
For the Chinese leadership, this means that a growth rate of about 10 percent per year will be essential for a long time. Otherwise, the rapid and fundamental transformation of the country from a largely agrarian to an ultra-modern industrialized society could not proceed without destabilizing the system.
But this focus on internal growth will have massive political consequences, both domestically and in foreign-policy terms. Domestically, China will be the first country that, due to its sheer size and required GDP growth, is forced to pursue a “green” economy. Otherwise, China would quickly reach its “limits to growth,” with disastrous ecological and, as a result, political consequences.
Since China will be the most important market of the future, it will be decisive in determining not only what we produce and consume, but how. Consider the transition from the traditional automobile to electric transport.
Despite European illusions to the contrary, this will be decided in China, not in the West. All that will be decided by the West’s globally dominant automobile industry is whether it will adapt and have a chance to survive or go the way of other old Western industries: to the developing world.
In foreign-policy terms, China will attempt to protect its domestic transformation by securing resources and access to foreign markets. Sooner or later, though, China’s government will come to realize that America’s role as a global regulator is indispensible for China’s vital foreign-policy interests, because China is unable to assume that role, other global players aren’t available, and the only alternative to the U.S. would be a breakdown of order.
This U.S.-Chinese tandem will run far from smoothly, and will do little but ameliorate crises and periods of serious economic and political confrontation, like that which is currently looming over the bilateral trade imbalance.
Strategically, however, China and the U.S. will have to rely on one another for a long time. This co-dependency will, at some point, also take shape politically, probably to the chagrin of all other international players, particularly the Europeans.
Europe could change the course of this development only if it presented itself as a serious player and stood up for its interests on the global stage. The “G-2” of China and the U.S. would probably be happy about that. But Europe is too weak and too divided to be effective globally, with its leaders unwilling to pursue a common policy based on their countries’ own strategic interests.
Joschka Fischer, a leading member of Germany’s Green Party for almost 20 years, was Germany’s foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 until 2005. For more information and stories, visit Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.org).
(Taipei Times) ANALYSIS: Politics and the military blur in China
Nice story on the PLA's assertive move. Cheers, Kosuke
ANALYSIS: Politics and the military blur in China
RISING POWER:：The eyes of the world are on China as it continues its rise, however, analysts are divided on whether the military is becoming more or less powerful
By Ko Shu-ling / Staff Reporter
Tue, Oct 05, 2010
The rise of China’s power is not limited to its economy: It also involves its military, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) making significant advances in the past decade in technology, training and strategic planning.
These developments include a massive buildup of missiles across the Taiwan Strait designed to discourage any move toward de jure independence for Taiwan. They also include the expansion of the Pacific Fleet, complete with new operation bases, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines with first-strike capabilities.
All this raises concerns about Beijing’s true intentions as it tries to reassure the international community that it’s rise is peaceful. However, these concerns have been heightened by two recent developments.
One is China’s growing aggressiveness in pressing territorial disputes with neighbors such as Japan and India.
The other is emerging signs that the PLA may be increasing its influence over state affairs. When US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was denied a request to visit Beijing in June, he blamed elements within the PLA for blocking the invitation, which he said the civilian leadership had likely wanted to make.
The Gates snub also followed a three-minute “rant” in May by Rear Admiral Guan Youfei (關友飛) to 65 visiting US officials in Beijing, in which he said that US arms sales to Taiwan proved that Washington viewed China as an enemy.
US diplomats attempted to portray Guan’s remarks as at odds with the thinking of the rest of the Chinese government. However, some said his comments represented mainstream views within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
What, then, lies behind the mixed signals from the Chinese military and civilian leadership?
One thing commentators agree on when discussing the often -mysterious relations between the CCP and one of the world’s largest military forces is that they exhibit none of the instability witnessed in Latin American and Africa in the last century as authoritarian regimes repeatedly fell victim to military coups. Indeed, the CCP and the PLA have shown a remarkable similarity of purpose over the years.
York Chen (陳文政), a former senior adviser at the National Security Council in Taipei, said the relationship between the CCP and the PLA was unique.
The two are so intermingled, Chen said, that senior military leaders are party representatives and party officials are members of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
In Latin America, though, the military banked on different political parties depending on their interests, he said.
Though there might be factional differences between the CCP and the PLA, they never escalated into open confrontation, Chen said.
Kou Chien-wen (寇健文), a professor of political science at the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University, said the relationship between the PLA and the CCP was similar to that between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Republic of China troops in the old days.
“The military is an interest group living on the party,” he said.
The PLA remains loyal to the CCP for three reasons, Kou said.
The first is the unique relationship developed when the revolution started. Political and military leaders were “dual elites,” he said, meaning they had the identity of both soldier and civilian.
While some early political leaders such as Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) had combat experience, soldiers were later appointed administrative positions. It took between 40 and 50 years to see the older generation retire, during which time the military developed the habit of submitting to the party, Kou said.
The second reason is that the party controls the appointments and dismissals of military positions. Finally, the CCP uses defense budgets to buy allegiance as long as the military promises not to challenge the political authorities, he said.
There have been exceptions, of course, including former minister of defense Peng Dehuai (彭德懷) and former CCP vice chairman Lin Biao (林彪).
Peng and several other leaders expressed concern over Mao’s Great Leap Forward campaign and reported the truth about the famine to Mao during the Lushan Conference in 1959. Peng’s candor, however, was considered an action beyond his authority. He was put under house arrest for 16 years and later persecuted during the Cultural Revolution.
Lin staged a failed coup to oust Mao, but some analysts saw it more as Lin’s personal attempt rather than a concerted group action. Lin died in a mysterious plane crash in Mongolia in 1971.
Rumors of dissent have also been played down by the party and the military. As one PLA general who spoke on condition of anonymity told the Washington Post recently, it is silly to talk about factions when it comes to relations with the US.
“The army follows the party,” the general was quoted as saying. “Do you really think that Guan did this unilaterally?”
Liu Shih-chung (劉世忠), a -research fellow at Taiwan Brain Trust, said he suspected the CCP and the PLA were playing “good cop, bad cop” when it came to foreign and cross-strait affairs.
“The CCP and the PLA might have different approaches, but they share the same mentality,” he said.
Little is known about factions in the CCP and the PLA because of the lack of transparency, but analysts say the public can still piece together bits of information to get a glimpse of the power struggle between the two.
The Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989 saw an alleged division between the party and the military, Kuo said, adding that although no one could confirm whether the military refused to back military action in the first place, senior officers were later transferred.
The functions of the PLA have changed over the years, Kuo said. The 1991 Gulf War played a significant role in making the PLA more professional than political, he said, adding that the modern technology used in the operation made the PLA realize that it must spend more time training than involved in political infighting.
Nowadays, the PLA has a simpler job description, Kuo said. It is in charge of military matters, army building, foreign affairs, Taiwan -affairs and disaster relief.
Chen said it was not surprising to see the Chinese government call in outside troops to suppress student demonstrators in 1989 after the military purportedly did not show immediate backing for military action.
Chen said he did not think the military disobeyed orders from the civilian leadership, but instead the CCP made the decision to pre-empt a possible mutiny.
Chi Mao-chi (齊茂吉), director of the Graduate Institute of History at National Central University, said things took a dramatic turn in 1996 when the military botched its attempt to scare Taiwanese ahead of the first free presidential election.
“The incident was a turning point for the PLA, which considered it a significant humiliation,” he said. “Not only did [former president] Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) win by a landslide, but the US also got involved by sending two aircraft carrier fleets to patrol the Taiwan Strait.”
Since then, the number of soldiers at the CCP’s Political Bureau has gradually dwindled, he said, and so has the military’s influence on politics.
However, former Democratic Progressive Party legislator Lin Cho-shui (林濁水) disagreed, saying the PLA had been gaining more power since 1996 and that there was no indication that this would change in the near future.
While it is true that the party and military used to enjoy a close and often friendly relationship, Lin Cho-shui said, after the Chinese Civil War they have gradually grown apart, with the party retreating from the military and the army developing into an independent — and increasingly influential — faction.
Now as the only civilian official sitting on the CMC, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) must spend time building up loyalty to have real influence over the military, which Lin said had no problem setting the political agenda.
One example was Beijing’s recent claim that the South China Sea was its core national interest, which ran counter to the civilian government’s “good neighbor” policy, Lin Cho-shui said.
Beijing has also planned to establish a body similar to the US’ National Security Council, where the civilian government and the military could jointly formulate policies on foreign affairs and national security, but the proposal was emphatically rejected by the military, Lin Cho-shui said.
Published on Taipei Times :
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/10/05/2003484611
Copyright © 1999-2010 The Taipei Times. All rights reserved.
ANALYSIS: Politics and the military blur in China
RISING POWER:：The eyes of the world are on China as it continues its rise, however, analysts are divided on whether the military is becoming more or less powerful
By Ko Shu-ling / Staff Reporter
Tue, Oct 05, 2010
The rise of China’s power is not limited to its economy: It also involves its military, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) making significant advances in the past decade in technology, training and strategic planning.
These developments include a massive buildup of missiles across the Taiwan Strait designed to discourage any move toward de jure independence for Taiwan. They also include the expansion of the Pacific Fleet, complete with new operation bases, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines with first-strike capabilities.
All this raises concerns about Beijing’s true intentions as it tries to reassure the international community that it’s rise is peaceful. However, these concerns have been heightened by two recent developments.
One is China’s growing aggressiveness in pressing territorial disputes with neighbors such as Japan and India.
The other is emerging signs that the PLA may be increasing its influence over state affairs. When US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was denied a request to visit Beijing in June, he blamed elements within the PLA for blocking the invitation, which he said the civilian leadership had likely wanted to make.
The Gates snub also followed a three-minute “rant” in May by Rear Admiral Guan Youfei (關友飛) to 65 visiting US officials in Beijing, in which he said that US arms sales to Taiwan proved that Washington viewed China as an enemy.
US diplomats attempted to portray Guan’s remarks as at odds with the thinking of the rest of the Chinese government. However, some said his comments represented mainstream views within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
What, then, lies behind the mixed signals from the Chinese military and civilian leadership?
One thing commentators agree on when discussing the often -mysterious relations between the CCP and one of the world’s largest military forces is that they exhibit none of the instability witnessed in Latin American and Africa in the last century as authoritarian regimes repeatedly fell victim to military coups. Indeed, the CCP and the PLA have shown a remarkable similarity of purpose over the years.
York Chen (陳文政), a former senior adviser at the National Security Council in Taipei, said the relationship between the CCP and the PLA was unique.
The two are so intermingled, Chen said, that senior military leaders are party representatives and party officials are members of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
In Latin America, though, the military banked on different political parties depending on their interests, he said.
Though there might be factional differences between the CCP and the PLA, they never escalated into open confrontation, Chen said.
Kou Chien-wen (寇健文), a professor of political science at the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University, said the relationship between the PLA and the CCP was similar to that between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Republic of China troops in the old days.
“The military is an interest group living on the party,” he said.
The PLA remains loyal to the CCP for three reasons, Kou said.
The first is the unique relationship developed when the revolution started. Political and military leaders were “dual elites,” he said, meaning they had the identity of both soldier and civilian.
While some early political leaders such as Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) had combat experience, soldiers were later appointed administrative positions. It took between 40 and 50 years to see the older generation retire, during which time the military developed the habit of submitting to the party, Kou said.
The second reason is that the party controls the appointments and dismissals of military positions. Finally, the CCP uses defense budgets to buy allegiance as long as the military promises not to challenge the political authorities, he said.
There have been exceptions, of course, including former minister of defense Peng Dehuai (彭德懷) and former CCP vice chairman Lin Biao (林彪).
Peng and several other leaders expressed concern over Mao’s Great Leap Forward campaign and reported the truth about the famine to Mao during the Lushan Conference in 1959. Peng’s candor, however, was considered an action beyond his authority. He was put under house arrest for 16 years and later persecuted during the Cultural Revolution.
Lin staged a failed coup to oust Mao, but some analysts saw it more as Lin’s personal attempt rather than a concerted group action. Lin died in a mysterious plane crash in Mongolia in 1971.
Rumors of dissent have also been played down by the party and the military. As one PLA general who spoke on condition of anonymity told the Washington Post recently, it is silly to talk about factions when it comes to relations with the US.
“The army follows the party,” the general was quoted as saying. “Do you really think that Guan did this unilaterally?”
Liu Shih-chung (劉世忠), a -research fellow at Taiwan Brain Trust, said he suspected the CCP and the PLA were playing “good cop, bad cop” when it came to foreign and cross-strait affairs.
“The CCP and the PLA might have different approaches, but they share the same mentality,” he said.
Little is known about factions in the CCP and the PLA because of the lack of transparency, but analysts say the public can still piece together bits of information to get a glimpse of the power struggle between the two.
The Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989 saw an alleged division between the party and the military, Kuo said, adding that although no one could confirm whether the military refused to back military action in the first place, senior officers were later transferred.
The functions of the PLA have changed over the years, Kuo said. The 1991 Gulf War played a significant role in making the PLA more professional than political, he said, adding that the modern technology used in the operation made the PLA realize that it must spend more time training than involved in political infighting.
Nowadays, the PLA has a simpler job description, Kuo said. It is in charge of military matters, army building, foreign affairs, Taiwan -affairs and disaster relief.
Chen said it was not surprising to see the Chinese government call in outside troops to suppress student demonstrators in 1989 after the military purportedly did not show immediate backing for military action.
Chen said he did not think the military disobeyed orders from the civilian leadership, but instead the CCP made the decision to pre-empt a possible mutiny.
Chi Mao-chi (齊茂吉), director of the Graduate Institute of History at National Central University, said things took a dramatic turn in 1996 when the military botched its attempt to scare Taiwanese ahead of the first free presidential election.
“The incident was a turning point for the PLA, which considered it a significant humiliation,” he said. “Not only did [former president] Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) win by a landslide, but the US also got involved by sending two aircraft carrier fleets to patrol the Taiwan Strait.”
Since then, the number of soldiers at the CCP’s Political Bureau has gradually dwindled, he said, and so has the military’s influence on politics.
However, former Democratic Progressive Party legislator Lin Cho-shui (林濁水) disagreed, saying the PLA had been gaining more power since 1996 and that there was no indication that this would change in the near future.
While it is true that the party and military used to enjoy a close and often friendly relationship, Lin Cho-shui said, after the Chinese Civil War they have gradually grown apart, with the party retreating from the military and the army developing into an independent — and increasingly influential — faction.
Now as the only civilian official sitting on the CMC, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) must spend time building up loyalty to have real influence over the military, which Lin said had no problem setting the political agenda.
One example was Beijing’s recent claim that the South China Sea was its core national interest, which ran counter to the civilian government’s “good neighbor” policy, Lin Cho-shui said.
Beijing has also planned to establish a body similar to the US’ National Security Council, where the civilian government and the military could jointly formulate policies on foreign affairs and national security, but the proposal was emphatically rejected by the military, Lin Cho-shui said.
Published on Taipei Times :
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/10/05/2003484611
Copyright © 1999-2010 The Taipei Times. All rights reserved.
Monday, October 4, 2010
My latest story for Asia Times. Chinese signal V for victory
Chinese signal V for victory
The Chinese media have raved about a diplomatic victory in the dispute with Japan over the arrest and eventual release of a Chinese fishing-boat captain near disputed islands in the East China Sea. But the story is far from over. Beijing's frightening of Tokyo into submission with economic threats has led other Asian nations to regard China as a hegemon reverting to old ways. - Kosuke Takahashi (Oct 4, '10)
China signals V for victory
By Kosuke Takahashi
TOKYO - The flare-up between China and Japan over the arrest and dramatic release of a Chinese fishing-boat captain detained near disputed islands in the East China Sea symbolizes the rise and fall of Asia's two most powerful countries.
Chinese fishing boat captain Zhan Qixiong, 41, arrived at an airport in Fuzhou City of Fujian province, his birthplace, on September 25, and descended the stairs of a Chinese government-chartered airplane with both hands raised in the air making V signs. He became a national hero in the Chinese media, and his release was lauded as a significant victory for Chinese diplomacy as Japan bowed to Beijing's relentless demands to end his detention.
Beijing frightened Tokyo into submission via a de facto ban imposed by China, according to Japan - and denied by Beijing - on the export of rare-earths, metals essential to numerous industrial processes and whose supply is at present largely in Chinese control. China's tourism authorities discouraged Chinese citizens from traveling to Japan. China was, in a sense, successful in appealing to the international community the fact that there is a territorial dispute between the two nations, while Japan claimed there is no territorial dispute over the islands, known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China.
The incident and its conclusion touched off a fierce political firestorm in Tokyo, with the media and opposition hammering and accusing Prime Minister Naoto Kan and his administration's handling of the incident as ''weak-kneed'' and a display of ''cowardice''. The politically damaged Kan is highly likely to struggle to clear through the legislature its 4.8 trillion yen (US$57 billion) supplementary budget, which to spur the deflation-driven, sluggish economy. The government is expected to compile its proposals for the budget this week.
Reflecting increased tensions between the two nations, more than 10 vehicles of Japanese right-wing campaigners surrounded a line of motorcoachs carrying about 1,300 Chinese tourists in Fukuoka City on September 29. No one was injured, the Japanese media reported.
Japan's mistakes
Japan seems to have made a couple of mistakes in dealing with the Chinese fishing boat, which Tokyo claims had illegally entered Japanese territorial waters and crashed with Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels near the Senkaku Islands on September 7.
It's first mistake was in how it dealt with the fishing boat captain. Japan could have deported him to China immediately without judiciary proceedings. Tokyo has a precedent in the recent past. Junichiro Koizumi, a former prime minister, deported seven Chinese activists, who landed on Uotsuri Jima in the Senkaku Islands.
The Kan administration did eventually release the captain, but in a half-hearted manner. It should have released him much earlier before having to succumb to pressure from Beijing. Contrast this with when Koizumi was in power. As prime minister, Koizumi was hawkish enough to provoke fierce protests from Japan's neighbors, particularly China, by regularly visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine memorializing the war dead (including Class A war criminals such as Hideki Tojo), but he also was well aware of how severely Sino-Japanese relations would deteriorate further without the forced repatriation of seven men.
Japan's second mistake was in not immediately releasing the video of when the Japan Coast Guard patrol arrested the captain. Although little known among domestic and foreign observers, in June 2008 Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels and a Taiwanese leisure fishing boat collided with each other near the Senkaku Islands. At first, the coast guard claimed the Taiwanese boat bumped into the Japanese patrol ship. Later, because one Taiwanese fisherman aboard happened to shoot the scene in which the coast guard could be seen bumping the other vessel, the Japanese government was forced to pay about NT$10 million (US$311,000) as compensation.
From the start of the more recent incident, Japan should have released the video in order to justify its own claim as soon as possible, not least before four employees of a Japanese construction company, Fujita Corp, were held in China on September 20 for allegedly entering a military zone without permission and videotaping facilities there. The Japanese government is now reluctant to release the Japan Coast Guard's video as this could whip up anti-Japanese feeling in China at a time that one Fujita employee is still being held in Chinese custody.
The story is far from over
Although Chinese media has raved about the Chinese diplomatic victory, the story is far from over. Other nations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and South Korea as well as the United States and European nations are beginning to voice concerns about the perceived Chinese "threat" - vehemently denied by Beijing. By looking at Beijing's strong-handed diplomacy against Tokyo, they have become very cautious about China's recent aggressive diplomacy and military activities to expand its ocean interests at a time when the economic powerhouse already exceeds Japan as the world's second-largest economy.
China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all claim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, yet another potential tinder box in the region. South Korea is also conscious of Beijing's intentional display of its diplomatic and economic power. JoongAng Ilbo, one of South Korea's major newspaper wrote on September 25:
China has been eyeing the territorial right over Leo Island in the Yellow Sea, which South Korea claims is its territory, and the Exclusive Economic Zone could become the next hot potato. The Leo Island dispute and the economic zone are the reasons why Korea cannot sit back and watch the discord between China and Japan comfortably.
We need to have firm determination to proudly defend Korea's national interests, using all possible and available means and measures.
The South China Morning Post has also pointed out that China is taking a harder stance than before. ''First there was Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, and then the South China Sea. Now the Diaoyu Islands have become the latest addition to China's 'core interests' when it comes to territorial integrity,'' the Hong Kong newspaper reported on October 2.
Western companies are beginning to dislike the ''China Risk'', as Beijing can easily block the export of rare earth minerals that industries throughout the world need, leading companies to suffer since China accounts for more than 90% of the global production of such minerals.
Middle Kingdom
Chinese characters also show the potential for stability and instability that has persisted in Asia historically. In Chinese characters commonly used in East Asia, China means "central nation" or "middle kingdom". The characters imply that the Chinese empire is the center of the world and that other nations are tributary states. That situation for neighboring states was long true until the middle of the 19th century, when the Qing Dynasty, the last imperial dynasty of China, suffered under foreign aggression and occupation.
From the standpoint of China, the late 19th and 20th centuries were exceptional times, with what Chinese call "small Japan” beating and invading the middle kingdom and reigning as the No 1 nation in the region. The 21st century may well be high time for China to recover ''lost territories''.
Japan, meanwhile, experienced great changes during and after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, when the emperor proclaimed a cultural awakening to "catch up" with Western nations. Two victories against China in the Japanese-Sino War, 1894-1895, and against Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, 1905, made Japan a world power. The main character on the Asian stage thus changed rapidly in the early 21th century.
In a sense, Asia is in the process of normalization, with China coming back as the Asian hegemon after a century and a half. But at the same time, the world is in a process of "abnormalization", with the global economy's center of gravity shifting from the West to the East, led by China's rising economic and corresponding political power.
The world needs to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder among the international community, not to become a big nation that bullies neighboring countries.
Kosuke Takahashi is a Tokyo-based journalist.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
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