Pyongyang shakes up pacifist Japan
The Japanese government, prompted by this week's nuclear and missile tests by North Korea, is finalizing plans that would enable the military to carry out pre-emptive strikes as part of a new defense plan to be presented by the end of the year. The era of Japan's strong pacifism, as enshrined in the United States-imposed "peace constitution", may be coming to an end. - Kosuke Takahashi (May 29,'09)
Pyongyang shakes up pacifist Japan
By Kosuke Takahashi
TOKYO - An increasingly belligerent North Korea is reawaking hawkish sentiments in Japan, still one of the world's most powerful nations and equipped with ultra-modern weaponry.
Prompted by Pyongyang's recent provocations - including an underground nuclear test, short-range missile launches and a long-range missile test - normally pacifist Japan is considering acquiring the capability to make pre-emptive strikes to destroy enemy bases, such as those in North Korea.
More than a few government officials and lawmakers have reservations about making the leap, as it would be a huge departure from Japan's exclusively defense-oriented, post-World War II policy. The strong pacifism enshrined in the United Stated-imposed "peace constitution" would be a thing of the past.
The Japanese government, led by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), is applying the finishing touches to plans that would enable the Japanese military to carry out pre-emptive strikes against enemy states as part of the new National Defense Program Guidelines for fiscal years 2010 to 2014, to be compiled by the end of this year.
The 12-page summary of proposals made by a subcommittee of the LDP's defense policy-making panel on May 26 argue that Japan could use sea-launched cruise missiles in pre-emptive strikes against a hostile nation's missile sites, having first detected launch preparations in that enemy state with surveillance satellites. The proposals are expected to be officially finalized on June 3.
Japan would not be forced to "just sit and wait for its own death", read the document obtained by Asia Times Online. Such measures would have to remain "within the scope of Japan's defense-only policy," it continued, stressing that the pre-emptive strikes could be used to prevent an imminent attack.
In response to a lawmaker's question as to whether Japan has right to launch pre-emptive strikes against missile sites after detecting launch preparations in an enemy state with a spy satellite, Prime Minister Taro Aso said: "As long as it is evident that there are no other measures, striking the enemy's missile bases is guaranteed under the Constitution. It falls within the scope of self-defense. It's different from pre-emptive attacks."
Aso pointed out that the right of self-defense is usually defined as the right to exercise certain forces for self-defense against imminent or real unlawful armed attacks. He stressed that the Japanese government has maintained this view as a basic standpoint.
Aso's remarks suggest that Japan's more assertive stance against North Korea would not require changes to Japan's pacifist constitution. He added, "... the Self-Defense Force [SDF] is unequipped to strike enemy bases" given its current capabilities.
"The nation's right of self-defense is a natural right, and the individual right of self-defense is certainly guaranteed under the Constitution," Japanese military analyst Toshiyuki Shikata told Asia Times Online. "But Japan requires some adjustment with the United States, or Japan's military ally."
Meanwhile, North Korea's Rodong Daily News on Friday carried a commentary branding Aso's and other leaders' recent remarks as revealing the bellicose design of Japan as it seeks to ignite a war of aggression with North Korea. Pyongyang vowed to "wipe out all Japanese militaristic invaders by launching merciless retaliatory attacks" on ground, sea and air assaults, the Rodong Daily News editorial boasted.
The LDP subcommittee's proposals also include changing the government's current interpretation of the Constitution which denies Japan the right to collective defense, preventing the SDF from protecting US warships in joint operations or from intercepting long-range ballistic missiles aimed at US targets.
The proposals also include developing an early warning satellite system to detect the launch of ballistic missiles, for which Japan currently relies on the US. Another proposal is to appoint an SDF officer to the post of secretary to the prime minister. This position has been avoided in the post-World War II period in order to prevent a the return of an unchecked military establishment.
Among other proposals is a bid to review Japan's so-called three principles of banning the export of weapons. Currently, the only exception is for Japanese companies to provide weapons to the US created through joint development projects. This applies solely to the ballistic missile defense (BMD) initiative. The revision of the three principles would allow Japan to export weapons to other nations.
The proposals also suggest establishing a basic law on national security and initiating a Japanese version of the US's National Security Council.
Satoru Miyamoto, research fellow in North Korean military affairs at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, told Asia Times Online on Friday, that the recent argument by the LDP and Aso was "nothing more than words on paper".
"Even if Japan succeeds in attacking enemy bases, it cannot defend itself from counterattacks," Miyamoto said. "Japan does not have such military capabilities. It's quite easy to start a war, but it's very difficult to end it.”
Kosuke Takahashi, a former staff writer at the Asahi Shimbun, is a freelance correspondent based in Tokyo.
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Friday, May 29, 2009
DPRK top leader calls for building powerful, prosperous nation (Xinhua)
DPRK top leader calls for building powerful, prosperous nation
10:33, May 29, 2009
DPRK top leader calls for building powerful, prosperous nation
Kim Jong Il, the top leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), has called on the DPRK people to devote to the course of building a great powerful and prosperous country, the official KCNA news agency reported on Thursday.
The whole country was launching a socialism construction campaign, and the date to "open the gate of a great powerful and prosperous nation" was getting close, Kim said while inspecting a fertilizer plant, which was named "Namhung Youth Chemical Complex," in South Hamgyong Province.
He asked the plant to start fertilizer production as soon as possible, so as to "increase the varieties of chemical goods needed for the country's economic development and the people's living."
The report didn't give the date of the visit.
Source: Xinhua
Copyright by People's Daily Online, All Rights Reserved
10:33, May 29, 2009
DPRK top leader calls for building powerful, prosperous nation
Kim Jong Il, the top leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), has called on the DPRK people to devote to the course of building a great powerful and prosperous country, the official KCNA news agency reported on Thursday.
The whole country was launching a socialism construction campaign, and the date to "open the gate of a great powerful and prosperous nation" was getting close, Kim said while inspecting a fertilizer plant, which was named "Namhung Youth Chemical Complex," in South Hamgyong Province.
He asked the plant to start fertilizer production as soon as possible, so as to "increase the varieties of chemical goods needed for the country's economic development and the people's living."
The report didn't give the date of the visit.
Source: Xinhua
Copyright by People's Daily Online, All Rights Reserved
Thursday, May 28, 2009
De-fang Pyongyang (FT)
De-fang Pyongyang
Published: May 26 2009 19:57 | Last updated: May 26 2009 19:57
The nuclear club is getting less exclusive by the day. Admittedly, North Korea is not a fully paid-up member yet. In spite of its Hiroshima-sized blast this week, it has not yet demonstrated it can make a warhead sufficiently small to mount on a long-range missile. But that day cannot be far off.
We need not have got into this mess. George W. Bush’s first administration wantonly scuppered Bill Clinton’s imperfect, but workable, 1994 framework agreement. Under that deal, Pyongyang froze its nuclear weapons programme in return for food, oil and help with a civilian light-water reactor. But Mr Bush wanted no truck with dictators. He also had evidence that North Korea was running a (tiny) secret uranium enrichment programme in addition to the Yongbyon plutonium facility.
The world is now paying the price for Mr Bush’s refusal to sup with the devil. Worryingly, Pyongyang’s drive towards full nuclear status may no longer be aimed at getting Washington’s attention. Internal dynamics over the succession of Kim Jong-il, the frail dictator, and a diplomatic stand-off with the conservative administration now running South Korea have gathered a momentum of their own.
That leaves the parties that deal directly with North Korea – the US, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia – with almost no room for manoeuvre. The best but diminishing hope is a return to the agreed framework. That would require dialogue in which the west offered incentives – including a security guarantee and possibly civilian nuclear technology – in return for verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s weapons programme.
Nothing can be offered now to reward Pyongyang for its deliberate provocation. In the short term, the US should press for sanctions targeting the regime rather than its people. Here the Bush administration’s freezing of North Korean financial assets – a measure that palpably hurt the regime before – points the way forward. China, which fears a collapsed North Korea even more than a nuclear one, must also be persuaded to join in tightening the noose. Seoul might even consider closing the Kaesong industrial complex, symbol of its wrecked Sunshine policy.
All this would no doubt elicit more bluster from Pyongyang – which might even try to provoke low-level skirmishes with Seoul. But with well-judged sticks and credible carrots, Pyongyang might come back to the table. Then the west should hold its nose and offer to restore what the Bush administration so recklessly took away.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009
Published: May 26 2009 19:57 | Last updated: May 26 2009 19:57
The nuclear club is getting less exclusive by the day. Admittedly, North Korea is not a fully paid-up member yet. In spite of its Hiroshima-sized blast this week, it has not yet demonstrated it can make a warhead sufficiently small to mount on a long-range missile. But that day cannot be far off.
We need not have got into this mess. George W. Bush’s first administration wantonly scuppered Bill Clinton’s imperfect, but workable, 1994 framework agreement. Under that deal, Pyongyang froze its nuclear weapons programme in return for food, oil and help with a civilian light-water reactor. But Mr Bush wanted no truck with dictators. He also had evidence that North Korea was running a (tiny) secret uranium enrichment programme in addition to the Yongbyon plutonium facility.
The world is now paying the price for Mr Bush’s refusal to sup with the devil. Worryingly, Pyongyang’s drive towards full nuclear status may no longer be aimed at getting Washington’s attention. Internal dynamics over the succession of Kim Jong-il, the frail dictator, and a diplomatic stand-off with the conservative administration now running South Korea have gathered a momentum of their own.
That leaves the parties that deal directly with North Korea – the US, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia – with almost no room for manoeuvre. The best but diminishing hope is a return to the agreed framework. That would require dialogue in which the west offered incentives – including a security guarantee and possibly civilian nuclear technology – in return for verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s weapons programme.
Nothing can be offered now to reward Pyongyang for its deliberate provocation. In the short term, the US should press for sanctions targeting the regime rather than its people. Here the Bush administration’s freezing of North Korean financial assets – a measure that palpably hurt the regime before – points the way forward. China, which fears a collapsed North Korea even more than a nuclear one, must also be persuaded to join in tightening the noose. Seoul might even consider closing the Kaesong industrial complex, symbol of its wrecked Sunshine policy.
All this would no doubt elicit more bluster from Pyongyang – which might even try to provoke low-level skirmishes with Seoul. But with well-judged sticks and credible carrots, Pyongyang might come back to the table. Then the west should hold its nose and offer to restore what the Bush administration so recklessly took away.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009
Nuclear Aims By Pakistan, India Prompt U.S. Concern (WP)
Nuclear Aims By Pakistan, India Prompt U.S. Concern
By R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Sometime next year, at a tightly guarded site south of its capital, Pakistan will be ready to start churning out a new stream of plutonium for its nuclear arsenal, which will eventually include warheads for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of being launched from ships, submarines or aircraft.
About 1,000 miles to the southwest, engineers in India are designing cruise missiles to carry nuclear warheads, relying partly on Russian missile-design assistance. India is also trying to equip its Agni ballistic missiles with such warheads and to deploy them on submarines. Its rudimentary missile-defense capability is slated for a major upgrade next year.
The apparent detonation of a North Korean nuclear device on Monday has renewed concerns over that country's efforts to build up its atomic arsenal. At the same time, U.S. and allied officials and experts who have tracked developments in South Asia have grown increasingly worried over the rapid growth of the region's more mature nuclear programs, in part because of the risk that weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists.
India and Pakistan see their nuclear programs as vital points of leverage in an arms race that has begun to take on the pace and diversity, although not the size, of U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition during the Cold War, according to U.S. intelligence and proliferation experts. Pakistani authorities said they are modernizing their facilities, not expanding their program; Indian officials in New Delhi and Washington declined to comment.
"They are both going great guns [on] new systems, new materials; they are doing everything you would imagine," said a former intelligence official who has long studied the region and who spoke on the condition of anonymity. While both India and Pakistan say their actions are defensive, the consequence of their efforts has been to boost the quantity of materials being produced and the number of times they must be moved around, as well as the training of experts in highly sensitive skills, this source and others say.
"More vulnerabilities. More stuff in production. More stuff in transit," when it is more vulnerable to theft, said Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, formerly the CIA's top official on weapons of mass destruction and the Energy Department's director of intelligence during the George W. Bush administration. U.S. experts also worry that as the size of the programs grows, chances increase that a rogue scientist or military officer will attempt to sell nuclear parts or know-how, as now-disgraced Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan did in the 1980s and 1990s.
Former Indian government officials say efforts are underway to improve and test a powerful thermonuclear warhead, even as the country adds to a growing array of aircraft, missiles and submarines that launch them. "Delivery system-wise, India is doing fine," said Bharat Karnad, a former member of India's National Security Advisory Board and a professor of national security studies at New Delhi's Center for Policy Research. India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998; India first detonated an atomic bomb in 1974.
A senior Pakistani official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said his government has refrained from testing missiles that could carry nuclear weapons because officials do not want to antagonize the Indian and U.S. governments.
'A More Global Approach'
U.S. officials say narrow appeals to the two countries to slow their weapons work will probably fail. "We have to think of dealing with the South Asian problem not on a purely regional basis, but in the context of a more global approach," Gary Samore, the senior White House nonproliferation adviser, said after a speech to the Arms Control Association last week.
Samore said the "Pakistani government has always said they will do that in conjunction with India. The Indians have always said, 'We can't take steps unless similar steps are taken by China and the other nuclear states,' and very quickly you end up with a situation where it's hard to make progress."
Some experts worry, however, that the United States may not have the luxury of waiting to negotiate a treaty that would curtail the global production of fissile materials -- a pact that President Obama says he hopes to complete during his first term.
A recent U.S. intelligence report, commissioned by outgoing Bush administration officials, warned of the dangers associated with potential attacks on nuclear weapons-related shipments inside Pakistan, for example.
Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told senators days before his retirement in March that "Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand nuclear weapons stockpiles, and seek more advanced warheads and delivery systems." He added that although Pakistan has "taken important steps to safeguard its nuclear weapons . . . vulnerabilities still exist."
Although Maples did not offer details of the expansion, other experts said he was referring to the expected completion next year of Pakistan's second heavy-water reactor at its Khushab nuclear complex 100 miles southwest of Islamabad, which will produce new spent nuclear fuel containing plutonium for use in nuclear arms.
"When Khushab is done, they'll be able to make a significant number of new bombs," Mowatt-Larssen said. In contrast, "it took them roughly 10 years to double the number of nuclear weapons from roughly 50 to 100." A third heavy-water reactor is also under construction at Khushab, according to David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security.
Before it can be used in weaponry, the plutonium must first be separated from the fuel rods at a highly guarded nuclear facility near Rawalpindi, about 100 miles northeast of Khushab. Satellite images published by Albright's institute show a substantial expansion occurred at the complex between 2002 and 2006, reflecting a long-standing Pakistani desire to replace weapons fueled by enriched uranium with plutonium-based weapons.
Pakistani officials dismiss suggestions that the building represents an acceleration in South Asia's arms race. "If two are sufficient, why build 10?" asked Brig. Gen. Nazir Ahmed Butt, defense attache in Pakistan's embassy in Washington. "We cannot match warhead for warhead. We're not in a numbers game. People should not take a technological upgrade for an expansion."
Details of precautions surrounding Pakistani nuclear shipments are closely held. Abdul Mannan, director of transport and waste safety for Pakistan's nuclear regulatory authority, said in a 2007 presentation to the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington that Pakistani safeguards are "enough to deter and delay a terrorist attack, and any malicious diversion would be protected in early stages." But Mannan also said the government needed to upgrade its security measures, and warned that "a country like Pakistan is not well equipped" to contain radioactive fallout from an attack on a nuclear shipment.
U.S. officials have said they accept Pakistan's assurances that its nuclear stockpile is adequately safeguarded, but intelligence officials have acknowledged contingency plans to dispatch American troops to protect or remove any weapons at imminent risk.
Proximity to Taliban
While Pakistan's nuclear program has lately attracted the most worry, because of the close proximity to the capital of Taliban insurgents, many U.S. experts say that it should not be considered in isolation from India's own nuclear expansion.
Some experts say that a civil nuclear cooperation agreement that Bush signed with India in October benefits the country's weapons programs, because it sanctions India's import of uranium and allows the military to draw on enriched uranium produced by eight reactors that might otherwise be needed for civil power. In a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency last July, Pakistan's ambassador in Vienna warned that the deal would increase "the chances of a nuclear arms race on the sub-continent."
Ken Luongo, a former senior adviser on nonproliferation at the Energy Department who recently returned from meetings with Pakistani officials, said the deal exacerbated Pakistan's fears of losing a technological race; others say that, at the least, it provided a rationalization to keep going.
Feroz Hassan Khan, a retired Pakistani general in charge of arms control, said Pakistan perceives a real risk of a preemptive strike by India. Because of Indian superiority in conventional forces, "Pakistan is compelled to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons to counter the threat," Khan said. "It would be highly foolish not to produce more and better weapons."
Correspondent Rama Lakshmi in New Delhi and staff writer Karen DeYoung and staff researcher Julie Tate in Washington contributed to this report.
By R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Sometime next year, at a tightly guarded site south of its capital, Pakistan will be ready to start churning out a new stream of plutonium for its nuclear arsenal, which will eventually include warheads for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of being launched from ships, submarines or aircraft.
About 1,000 miles to the southwest, engineers in India are designing cruise missiles to carry nuclear warheads, relying partly on Russian missile-design assistance. India is also trying to equip its Agni ballistic missiles with such warheads and to deploy them on submarines. Its rudimentary missile-defense capability is slated for a major upgrade next year.
The apparent detonation of a North Korean nuclear device on Monday has renewed concerns over that country's efforts to build up its atomic arsenal. At the same time, U.S. and allied officials and experts who have tracked developments in South Asia have grown increasingly worried over the rapid growth of the region's more mature nuclear programs, in part because of the risk that weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists.
India and Pakistan see their nuclear programs as vital points of leverage in an arms race that has begun to take on the pace and diversity, although not the size, of U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition during the Cold War, according to U.S. intelligence and proliferation experts. Pakistani authorities said they are modernizing their facilities, not expanding their program; Indian officials in New Delhi and Washington declined to comment.
"They are both going great guns [on] new systems, new materials; they are doing everything you would imagine," said a former intelligence official who has long studied the region and who spoke on the condition of anonymity. While both India and Pakistan say their actions are defensive, the consequence of their efforts has been to boost the quantity of materials being produced and the number of times they must be moved around, as well as the training of experts in highly sensitive skills, this source and others say.
"More vulnerabilities. More stuff in production. More stuff in transit," when it is more vulnerable to theft, said Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, formerly the CIA's top official on weapons of mass destruction and the Energy Department's director of intelligence during the George W. Bush administration. U.S. experts also worry that as the size of the programs grows, chances increase that a rogue scientist or military officer will attempt to sell nuclear parts or know-how, as now-disgraced Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan did in the 1980s and 1990s.
Former Indian government officials say efforts are underway to improve and test a powerful thermonuclear warhead, even as the country adds to a growing array of aircraft, missiles and submarines that launch them. "Delivery system-wise, India is doing fine," said Bharat Karnad, a former member of India's National Security Advisory Board and a professor of national security studies at New Delhi's Center for Policy Research. India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998; India first detonated an atomic bomb in 1974.
A senior Pakistani official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said his government has refrained from testing missiles that could carry nuclear weapons because officials do not want to antagonize the Indian and U.S. governments.
'A More Global Approach'
U.S. officials say narrow appeals to the two countries to slow their weapons work will probably fail. "We have to think of dealing with the South Asian problem not on a purely regional basis, but in the context of a more global approach," Gary Samore, the senior White House nonproliferation adviser, said after a speech to the Arms Control Association last week.
Samore said the "Pakistani government has always said they will do that in conjunction with India. The Indians have always said, 'We can't take steps unless similar steps are taken by China and the other nuclear states,' and very quickly you end up with a situation where it's hard to make progress."
Some experts worry, however, that the United States may not have the luxury of waiting to negotiate a treaty that would curtail the global production of fissile materials -- a pact that President Obama says he hopes to complete during his first term.
A recent U.S. intelligence report, commissioned by outgoing Bush administration officials, warned of the dangers associated with potential attacks on nuclear weapons-related shipments inside Pakistan, for example.
Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told senators days before his retirement in March that "Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand nuclear weapons stockpiles, and seek more advanced warheads and delivery systems." He added that although Pakistan has "taken important steps to safeguard its nuclear weapons . . . vulnerabilities still exist."
Although Maples did not offer details of the expansion, other experts said he was referring to the expected completion next year of Pakistan's second heavy-water reactor at its Khushab nuclear complex 100 miles southwest of Islamabad, which will produce new spent nuclear fuel containing plutonium for use in nuclear arms.
"When Khushab is done, they'll be able to make a significant number of new bombs," Mowatt-Larssen said. In contrast, "it took them roughly 10 years to double the number of nuclear weapons from roughly 50 to 100." A third heavy-water reactor is also under construction at Khushab, according to David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security.
Before it can be used in weaponry, the plutonium must first be separated from the fuel rods at a highly guarded nuclear facility near Rawalpindi, about 100 miles northeast of Khushab. Satellite images published by Albright's institute show a substantial expansion occurred at the complex between 2002 and 2006, reflecting a long-standing Pakistani desire to replace weapons fueled by enriched uranium with plutonium-based weapons.
Pakistani officials dismiss suggestions that the building represents an acceleration in South Asia's arms race. "If two are sufficient, why build 10?" asked Brig. Gen. Nazir Ahmed Butt, defense attache in Pakistan's embassy in Washington. "We cannot match warhead for warhead. We're not in a numbers game. People should not take a technological upgrade for an expansion."
Details of precautions surrounding Pakistani nuclear shipments are closely held. Abdul Mannan, director of transport and waste safety for Pakistan's nuclear regulatory authority, said in a 2007 presentation to the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington that Pakistani safeguards are "enough to deter and delay a terrorist attack, and any malicious diversion would be protected in early stages." But Mannan also said the government needed to upgrade its security measures, and warned that "a country like Pakistan is not well equipped" to contain radioactive fallout from an attack on a nuclear shipment.
U.S. officials have said they accept Pakistan's assurances that its nuclear stockpile is adequately safeguarded, but intelligence officials have acknowledged contingency plans to dispatch American troops to protect or remove any weapons at imminent risk.
Proximity to Taliban
While Pakistan's nuclear program has lately attracted the most worry, because of the close proximity to the capital of Taliban insurgents, many U.S. experts say that it should not be considered in isolation from India's own nuclear expansion.
Some experts say that a civil nuclear cooperation agreement that Bush signed with India in October benefits the country's weapons programs, because it sanctions India's import of uranium and allows the military to draw on enriched uranium produced by eight reactors that might otherwise be needed for civil power. In a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency last July, Pakistan's ambassador in Vienna warned that the deal would increase "the chances of a nuclear arms race on the sub-continent."
Ken Luongo, a former senior adviser on nonproliferation at the Energy Department who recently returned from meetings with Pakistani officials, said the deal exacerbated Pakistan's fears of losing a technological race; others say that, at the least, it provided a rationalization to keep going.
Feroz Hassan Khan, a retired Pakistani general in charge of arms control, said Pakistan perceives a real risk of a preemptive strike by India. Because of Indian superiority in conventional forces, "Pakistan is compelled to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons to counter the threat," Khan said. "It would be highly foolish not to produce more and better weapons."
Correspondent Rama Lakshmi in New Delhi and staff writer Karen DeYoung and staff researcher Julie Tate in Washington contributed to this report.
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
How to Reduce the Nuclear Threat (WSJ)
How to Reduce the Nuclear Threat
North Korea's test is a troubling development
By WILLIAM J. PERRY, BRENT SCOWCROFT and CHARLES D. FERGUSON
Monday's North Korean nuclear test was a dramatic reminder of the challenges to eliminating nuclear weapons world-wide. President Barack Obama has stated that he intends to pursue this goal while maintaining a reliable nuclear deterrent for the United States and its allies. But achieving nuclear abolition will likely require many years.
Indeed, it is difficult to envision the necessary geopolitical conditions that would permit even approaching that goal. Unless the U.S. and its partners re-energize international efforts to lessen the present dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, they will never have the hope of reaching this long-term objective.
An effective strategy to reduce nuclear dangers must build on five pillars: revitalizing strategic dialogue with nuclear-armed powers, particularly Russia and China; strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime; reaffirming the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to our allies; maintaining the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent; and implementing best security practices for nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials worldwide.
With thousands of U.S. and Russian warheads still deployed, the threat of a nuclear war through strategic miscalculation is not entirely removed. Thankfully, Russia has neither shown nor threatened such intent against the U.S. The two nations cooperated through much of the post-Cold War period on reducing nuclear arsenals and curbing nuclear proliferation. But given the recent chill in U.S.-Russia relations -- a result of NATO expansion efforts and missile-defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic -- the relationship faces significant challenges.
In order to "press the reset button" with Russia, in the words of Vice President Joe Biden, the U.S. needs to base strategic dialogue on the common interests of stopping nuclear proliferation, preventing nuclear terrorism, and ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The U.S. and Russia should conduct a joint threat assessment as a prerequisite to renewed arms control. In tandem, the U.S. and China should discuss their threat perceptions and seek greater cooperation on nuclear security and stability.
The spread of weapons-usable nuclear technologies may push the world to a dangerous tipping point. North Korea -- despite nearly universal opposition -- has developed a small nuclear arsenal and on Monday demonstrated its capability with a successful nuclear test. Iran claims to be developing a peaceful nuclear program but this is hard to believe. Partly in response to Iran, other Middle Eastern states, like Turkey and Egypt, are beginning to develop nuclear-power programs.
To prevent further proliferation, the Obama administration needs to leverage the next 12 months in the run-up to the May 2010 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. The U.S. must redouble global efforts to enact the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on nuclear weapons, call for a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons, and provide sustainable resources to the International Atomic Energy Agency -- the world's "nuclear watchdog."
In the meantime, as Mr. Obama has stated, the U.S. should maintain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent for itself and its allies. This deterrent should be adequately funded and staffed with top-notch managers, scientists and engineers. The administration should also decide whether to replace existing nuclear warheads with redesigned warheads or to increase programs to extend their operational lives on a case-by-case basis, weighing heavily recommendations from the weapons lab responsible for the warheads in question.
Another critical concern is the massive global stockpile of weapons-usable fissile material that could fuel thousands of nuclear explosives. The more states that have fissile material, the greater the chances of it falling into the hands of terrorists. Laudably, the Obama administration has committed to work with international partners to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years. This ambitious agenda will require development of much better security practices and a cooperative effort among dozens of countries.
The dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are real and imminent. Any serious effort to combat them will require the leadership of the United States.
Mr. Perry, a former secretary of defense, and Mr. Scowcroft, a former national security adviser, are the co-chairs of the Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Independent Task Force on U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Mr. Ferguson, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the project director.
North Korea's test is a troubling development
By WILLIAM J. PERRY, BRENT SCOWCROFT and CHARLES D. FERGUSON
Monday's North Korean nuclear test was a dramatic reminder of the challenges to eliminating nuclear weapons world-wide. President Barack Obama has stated that he intends to pursue this goal while maintaining a reliable nuclear deterrent for the United States and its allies. But achieving nuclear abolition will likely require many years.
Indeed, it is difficult to envision the necessary geopolitical conditions that would permit even approaching that goal. Unless the U.S. and its partners re-energize international efforts to lessen the present dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, they will never have the hope of reaching this long-term objective.
An effective strategy to reduce nuclear dangers must build on five pillars: revitalizing strategic dialogue with nuclear-armed powers, particularly Russia and China; strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime; reaffirming the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to our allies; maintaining the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent; and implementing best security practices for nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials worldwide.
With thousands of U.S. and Russian warheads still deployed, the threat of a nuclear war through strategic miscalculation is not entirely removed. Thankfully, Russia has neither shown nor threatened such intent against the U.S. The two nations cooperated through much of the post-Cold War period on reducing nuclear arsenals and curbing nuclear proliferation. But given the recent chill in U.S.-Russia relations -- a result of NATO expansion efforts and missile-defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic -- the relationship faces significant challenges.
In order to "press the reset button" with Russia, in the words of Vice President Joe Biden, the U.S. needs to base strategic dialogue on the common interests of stopping nuclear proliferation, preventing nuclear terrorism, and ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The U.S. and Russia should conduct a joint threat assessment as a prerequisite to renewed arms control. In tandem, the U.S. and China should discuss their threat perceptions and seek greater cooperation on nuclear security and stability.
The spread of weapons-usable nuclear technologies may push the world to a dangerous tipping point. North Korea -- despite nearly universal opposition -- has developed a small nuclear arsenal and on Monday demonstrated its capability with a successful nuclear test. Iran claims to be developing a peaceful nuclear program but this is hard to believe. Partly in response to Iran, other Middle Eastern states, like Turkey and Egypt, are beginning to develop nuclear-power programs.
To prevent further proliferation, the Obama administration needs to leverage the next 12 months in the run-up to the May 2010 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. The U.S. must redouble global efforts to enact the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on nuclear weapons, call for a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons, and provide sustainable resources to the International Atomic Energy Agency -- the world's "nuclear watchdog."
In the meantime, as Mr. Obama has stated, the U.S. should maintain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent for itself and its allies. This deterrent should be adequately funded and staffed with top-notch managers, scientists and engineers. The administration should also decide whether to replace existing nuclear warheads with redesigned warheads or to increase programs to extend their operational lives on a case-by-case basis, weighing heavily recommendations from the weapons lab responsible for the warheads in question.
Another critical concern is the massive global stockpile of weapons-usable fissile material that could fuel thousands of nuclear explosives. The more states that have fissile material, the greater the chances of it falling into the hands of terrorists. Laudably, the Obama administration has committed to work with international partners to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years. This ambitious agenda will require development of much better security practices and a cooperative effort among dozens of countries.
The dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are real and imminent. Any serious effort to combat them will require the leadership of the United States.
Mr. Perry, a former secretary of defense, and Mr. Scowcroft, a former national security adviser, are the co-chairs of the Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Independent Task Force on U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Mr. Ferguson, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the project director.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)