De-fang Pyongyang (FT)

De-fang Pyongyang

Published: May 26 2009 19:57 | Last updated: May 26 2009 19:57

The nuclear club is getting less exclusive by the day. Admittedly, North Korea is not a fully paid-up member yet. In spite of its ­Hiroshima-sized blast this week, it has not yet demonstrated it can make a warhead sufficiently small to mount on a long-range missile. But that day cannot be far off.

We need not have got into this mess. George W. Bush’s first administration wantonly scuppered Bill Clinton’s imperfect, but workable, 1994 framework agreement. Under that deal, Pyongyang froze its nuclear weapons programme in return for food, oil and help with a civilian light-water reactor. But Mr Bush wanted no truck with dictators. He also had evidence that North Korea was running a (tiny) secret uranium enrichment programme in addition to the Yongbyon plutonium facility.

The world is now paying the price for Mr Bush’s refusal to sup with the devil. Worryingly, Pyongyang’s drive towards full nuclear status may no longer be aimed at getting Washington’s attention. Internal dynamics over the succession of Kim Jong-il, the frail dictator, and a diplomatic stand-off with the conservative administration now running South Korea have gathered a momentum of their own.

That leaves the parties that deal directly with North Korea – the US, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia – with almost no room for manoeuvre. The best but diminishing hope is a return to the agreed framework. That would require dialogue in which the west offered incentives – including a security guarantee and possibly civilian nuclear technology – in return for verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s weapons programme.

Nothing can be offered now to reward Pyongyang for its deliberate provocation. In the short term, the US should press for sanctions targeting the regime rather than its people. Here the Bush administration’s freezing of North Korean financial assets – a measure that palpably hurt the regime before – points the way forward. China, which fears a collapsed North Korea even more than a nuclear one, must also be persuaded to join in tightening the noose. Seoul might even consider closing the Kaesong industrial complex, symbol of its wrecked Sunshine policy.

All this would no doubt elicit more bluster from Pyongyang – which might even try to provoke low-level skirmishes with Seoul. But with well-judged sticks and credible carrots, Pyongyang might come back to the table. Then the west should hold its nose and offer to restore what the Bush administration so recklessly took away.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009