Friday, December 24, 2010
Thursday, December 23, 2010
(Yonhap) N. Korea's latest IRBM believed to be able to carry nuclear warhead: expert
N. Korea's latest IRBM believed to be able to carry nuclear warhead: expert
SEOUL, Dec. 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's latest intermediate-range ballistic missile, which appeared in Pyongyang's military parade in October, is believed to be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon, a South Korean researcher said Thursday.
Han Sang-soon, a senior researcher at the Defense Agency for Technology and Quality, said in a report made public Thursday that the missile, known as the BM-25 Musudan, is estimated to be able to carry a payload weighing between 1-1.2 tons and that its "circular error probability," an accuracy indicator, is believed to be 1.6 kilometers.
"This means that it can carry a nuclear warhead," he said in the report.
North Korea completed development of the Musudan in 2005 based on the design of the former Soviet Union's R-27 (SS-N-6) short-range missile. The Musudan has a range of between 3,000-4,000 kilometers, and about 50 missiles of the type were deployed in the North as of last year.
In October, the North showed off Musudan missiles during a massive military parade held in Pyongyang to mark the 65th anniversary of the ruling Workers' Party.
North Korea's missile program has long been a security concern in the region, along with its nuclear programs. The country's Taepodong-2 long-range ballistic missile is believed to be capable of reaching as far as Alaska, according to defense experts.
Experts also believe that the North has some 700 Scud short-range missiles and about 200 Rodong medium-range missiles.
(END)
SEOUL, Dec. 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's latest intermediate-range ballistic missile, which appeared in Pyongyang's military parade in October, is believed to be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon, a South Korean researcher said Thursday.
Han Sang-soon, a senior researcher at the Defense Agency for Technology and Quality, said in a report made public Thursday that the missile, known as the BM-25 Musudan, is estimated to be able to carry a payload weighing between 1-1.2 tons and that its "circular error probability," an accuracy indicator, is believed to be 1.6 kilometers.
"This means that it can carry a nuclear warhead," he said in the report.
North Korea completed development of the Musudan in 2005 based on the design of the former Soviet Union's R-27 (SS-N-6) short-range missile. The Musudan has a range of between 3,000-4,000 kilometers, and about 50 missiles of the type were deployed in the North as of last year.
In October, the North showed off Musudan missiles during a massive military parade held in Pyongyang to mark the 65th anniversary of the ruling Workers' Party.
North Korea's missile program has long been a security concern in the region, along with its nuclear programs. The country's Taepodong-2 long-range ballistic missile is believed to be capable of reaching as far as Alaska, according to defense experts.
Experts also believe that the North has some 700 Scud short-range missiles and about 200 Rodong medium-range missiles.
(END)
Monday, December 20, 2010
My latest story for Asia Times Online (Japan gets tough with new defense policy)
Japan gets tough with new defense policy
Japan has announced plans to adopt a new, more aggressive defense posture over the next 10 years. The policy shift comes amid rising regional tensions, triggered by Sino-Japanese territorial disputes, the sinking of a South Korean warship in March and North Korea's bombardment of a South Korean island last month. - Kosuke Takahashi (Dec 20, '10)
Japan gets tough with new defense policy
By Kosuke Takahashi
TOKYO - Faced with increasingly territorial belligerence from China and warmongering from North Korea, Japan has decided to adopt a new defense policy that aims to bolster more proactive, flexible and quick responses in the sea, land and air during the next decade - a big departure from a previous passive and pacifist defense posture.
The Japanese government on December 17 announced the new defense policy, officially called the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), that will define the country's basic security policy for the next 10 years. The guidelines have drawn close attention from the international community, as they are the first defense policy that the center-left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has formulated since ousting the pro-US Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) last year.
This posture has also captured public attention because it was mapped out amid rising regional tensions, triggered by territorial disputes between China and Japan, the sinking of a South Korean warship in March and North Korea's bombardment of a South Korean island in November.
The new policy includes a proactive concept called the "Dynamic Defense Force" that aims to "increase the credibility of Japan's deterrent capability by promoting timely and active operations." This supersedes the previous, passive "Basic Defense Force Concept", built around the idea of "static deterrence". The guidelines see military modernization by China and its insufficient transparency as a "concern for the regional and global community." They also point to North Korea's nuclear and missile development programs as "immediate and grave destabilizing factors for regional security."
"For Japan, North Korea is an immediate threat," said Hideshi Takesada, professor and executive director at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. "Meanwhile, China is Japan's medium to long-term concern, as it is boosting its submarine forces and anti-satellite weapons programs. China also has outer-space capacity to attack a US carrier by using a GPS (Global Positioning System)."
Departure from the Cold War-era posture
The new defense policy calls for a reorganization of Japanese troops. While reducing Cold War-era equipment and organizations, especially Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) personnel in Hokkaido prefecture, the northernmost part of Japan facing Russia, it stresses the necessity to boost security around the Nansei Islands in Okinawa prefecture in the country's south, and in the East China Sea near China and Taiwan, a move that is apparently aimed at countering China's growing naval power. The JGSDF will also deploy coastal monitoring troops in some of the Nansei Islands, the nation's remotest area.
The quota for JGSDF personnel was reduced to 154,000 in 10 years from the current 155,000, the new NDPG showed.
As part of Japan's efforts to step up vigilance in the sea around Japan, The Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) decided to increase the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) submarine fleet to 22 from the current 16 by extending the working life of existing submarines. It will also increase the number of its Aegis-equipped destroyers, which carry the US/Japanese-developed Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) anti-ballistic-missile system, to six from the current four. Specifically, a ministry official said it would upgrade JDS Atago (DDG-177) and JS Ashigara (DDG-178).
As for air defense, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) Naha Base in Okinawa will add one more JASDF Tactical Fighter Squadron for a total of two. The JASDF will also boost its deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor missiles to six air-defense groups across Japan from the current three, to counter the threat of North Korean and Chinese ballistic missiles, and enhance the performance of Aegis destroyers.
The national defense budget for the next five years will be around 23.49 trillion yen (US$279 billion), down by 750 billion yen from fiscal 2005-2009 due to Japan’s increasing budget deficit.
The new NDPG also calls for Japan to strengthen its defense cooperation with those countries with which it shares democratic values, like South Korea, Australia and India, in addition to its key ally, the United States, with whom it will also work to counter cyber attacks.
The defense guidelines said Japan "will study measures to follow the international trend of defense equipment," but did not clearly mention a review of Japan's longstanding arms-export ban due to protests by opposition lawmakers, whose support the government and ruling bloc cannot afford to lose as it seeks to pass key bills for fiscal 2011. But the door is still open for a possible future lifting of the export ban, a politically sensitive issue given Tokyo's pacifist constitution.
The guidelines also detailed a plan to create a Japanese version of the US National Security Council, aimed at dealing more effectively with diplomatic and security policies, without any sectionalism among related ministries.
China's response
Beijing has accused Tokyo of making irresponsible remarks in its new defense guidelines targeting China.
"The fact is that China's development since the reform and opening up has brought great opportunities for common prosperity to other countries in the world, including Japan," Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said on December 17. "This is widely recognized and the international community will have a fair opinion on this. A certain individual country has no right to represent the international community and make irresponsible remarks on China's development."
Singaporean Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew said that Japanese naval power was stronger than China’s, but he saw the tide reversed in 10 years.
"Normally you [Japan] have better ships than they have. But they will build an aircraft carrier. So in 10 years they will have a bigger fleet than you, so you have to factor that into your calculations. These are the realities of power," he told the Strait Times in late September.
Kosuke Takahashi is a Tokyo-based correspondent.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Japan gets tough with new defense policy
By Kosuke Takahashi
TOKYO - Faced with increasingly territorial belligerence from China and warmongering from North Korea, Japan has decided to adopt a new defense policy that aims to bolster more proactive, flexible and quick responses in the sea, land and air during the next decade - a big departure from a previous passive and pacifist defense posture.
The Japanese government on December 17 announced the new defense policy, officially called the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), that will define the country's basic security policy for the next 10 years. The guidelines have drawn close attention from the international community, as they are the first defense policy that the center-left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has formulated since ousting the pro-US Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) last year.
This posture has also captured public attention because it was mapped out amid rising regional tensions, triggered by territorial disputes between China and Japan, the sinking of a South Korean warship in March and North Korea's bombardment of a South Korean island in November.
The new policy includes a proactive concept called the "Dynamic Defense Force" that aims to "increase the credibility of Japan's deterrent capability by promoting timely and active operations." This supersedes the previous, passive "Basic Defense Force Concept", built around the idea of "static deterrence". The guidelines see military modernization by China and its insufficient transparency as a "concern for the regional and global community." They also point to North Korea's nuclear and missile development programs as "immediate and grave destabilizing factors for regional security."
"For Japan, North Korea is an immediate threat," said Hideshi Takesada, professor and executive director at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. "Meanwhile, China is Japan's medium to long-term concern, as it is boosting its submarine forces and anti-satellite weapons programs. China also has outer-space capacity to attack a US carrier by using a GPS (Global Positioning System)."
Departure from the Cold War-era posture
The new defense policy calls for a reorganization of Japanese troops. While reducing Cold War-era equipment and organizations, especially Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) personnel in Hokkaido prefecture, the northernmost part of Japan facing Russia, it stresses the necessity to boost security around the Nansei Islands in Okinawa prefecture in the country's south, and in the East China Sea near China and Taiwan, a move that is apparently aimed at countering China's growing naval power. The JGSDF will also deploy coastal monitoring troops in some of the Nansei Islands, the nation's remotest area.
The quota for JGSDF personnel was reduced to 154,000 in 10 years from the current 155,000, the new NDPG showed.
As part of Japan's efforts to step up vigilance in the sea around Japan, The Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) decided to increase the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) submarine fleet to 22 from the current 16 by extending the working life of existing submarines. It will also increase the number of its Aegis-equipped destroyers, which carry the US/Japanese-developed Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) anti-ballistic-missile system, to six from the current four. Specifically, a ministry official said it would upgrade JDS Atago (DDG-177) and JS Ashigara (DDG-178).
As for air defense, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) Naha Base in Okinawa will add one more JASDF Tactical Fighter Squadron for a total of two. The JASDF will also boost its deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor missiles to six air-defense groups across Japan from the current three, to counter the threat of North Korean and Chinese ballistic missiles, and enhance the performance of Aegis destroyers.
The national defense budget for the next five years will be around 23.49 trillion yen (US$279 billion), down by 750 billion yen from fiscal 2005-2009 due to Japan’s increasing budget deficit.
The new NDPG also calls for Japan to strengthen its defense cooperation with those countries with which it shares democratic values, like South Korea, Australia and India, in addition to its key ally, the United States, with whom it will also work to counter cyber attacks.
The defense guidelines said Japan "will study measures to follow the international trend of defense equipment," but did not clearly mention a review of Japan's longstanding arms-export ban due to protests by opposition lawmakers, whose support the government and ruling bloc cannot afford to lose as it seeks to pass key bills for fiscal 2011. But the door is still open for a possible future lifting of the export ban, a politically sensitive issue given Tokyo's pacifist constitution.
The guidelines also detailed a plan to create a Japanese version of the US National Security Council, aimed at dealing more effectively with diplomatic and security policies, without any sectionalism among related ministries.
China's response
Beijing has accused Tokyo of making irresponsible remarks in its new defense guidelines targeting China.
"The fact is that China's development since the reform and opening up has brought great opportunities for common prosperity to other countries in the world, including Japan," Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said on December 17. "This is widely recognized and the international community will have a fair opinion on this. A certain individual country has no right to represent the international community and make irresponsible remarks on China's development."
Singaporean Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew said that Japanese naval power was stronger than China’s, but he saw the tide reversed in 10 years.
"Normally you [Japan] have better ships than they have. But they will build an aircraft carrier. So in 10 years they will have a bigger fleet than you, so you have to factor that into your calculations. These are the realities of power," he told the Strait Times in late September.
Kosuke Takahashi is a Tokyo-based correspondent.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
My latest stories for Jane's Defence Weekly
Here are my latest stories for Jane's Defence Weekly. I wrote about Japan's new defense policy and Japan's 'sympathy budget' towards the US, or the nation's financial support for the US troops based in the nation.
Japan to adopt a proactive defence policy
Kosuke Takahashi
JDW Correspondent
Tokyo
Additional reporting by Jon Grevatt
Asia-Pacific Reporter
Bangkok
Key Points
Japan's defence policy during the next decade will be based on a doctrine of proactive, flexible and quick responses to threats facing the country in what is a major departure from its previous policy of "static deterrence".
The National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) released on 17 December show a Japan concerned over China's emergence as a global and regional superpower and North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes. The policy guideline, which will define the country's basic security policy for the next 10 years, is the first formulated by the centre-left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government since it replaced the pro-US Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) last year.
The guideline includes a new concept called "Dynamic Defence Force" that supercedes the passive "Basic Defence Force Concept" and aims to "increase the credibility of Japan's deterrent capability by promoting timely and active operations". The publication of the guideline was accompanied by the approval of a mid-term defence programme by the Cabinet of Prime Minister Naoto Kan.
China's military modernisation and its lack of transparency are called a "concern for the regional and global community", while North Korea's nuclear and missile development programmes are "immediate and grave destabilising factors to the regional security".
Cold War-era equipment, organisations and forces structures will be reorganised. The number of Japan Ground Self-Defence Force (JGSDF) personnel in Hokkaido, which faces Russia, will be reduced - taking the total number of JGSDF personnel to 154,000 from the current 155,000, and coastal monitoring troops will be deployed to some of the Nansei Islands in the East China Sea to counter China's growing naval power.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) submarine fleet will increase to 22 from the current 16 by extending the working life of existing submarines. The number of Aegis-equipped destroyers, which carry the US/Japanese-developed Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA anti-ballistic missile system, will increase to six from the current four. Specially, the Ministry of Defence said it will upgrade JDS Atago (DDG-177) and JS A shigara (DDG-178).
The Japan Air Self-Defence Force (JASDF) will increase the number of tactical fighter squadrons based at Naha Base in Okinawa to two from the current one. The JASDF will also deploy Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor missiles to six air defence missile groups from the current three to counter the threat of North Korea's and China's ballistic missiles.
The NDPG made no specific reference to the Three Principles policy banning defence exports after opposition parties indicated that they would block the government's budget bill were it to push ahead with lifting the longstanding policy.
Instead, the NDPG says "measures" should be considered in the "global environment" where joint programmes to develop military equipment have become the norm. The NDPG highlights the benefits of increased co-operation in military development programmes as necessary to respond to rising costs. It adds that Japan should discuss such "major changes" to strategies in order to enhance local industry.
An official from Nippon Keidanren - the Japan Business Federation - told Jane's that, despite the fall in defence expenditure and the retention of the Three Principles policy, the NDPG was good news for Japan's defence industry, which has shrunk considerably during the past five years as companies seek alternative streams of revenue.
Satoshi Mukuta, a director of international affairs at Nippon Keidanren and secretary general of the organisation's defence production committee, said: "The NDPG said nothing about the Three Principles, but, on the other hand, the government stated that they will try to make it possible for the Japanese defence industry to join international development and production programmes."
He added: "The defence budget [outlined in the policy] will only be very slightly less than in recent years, so we can say that overall the policy is progress. The government is trying to ease Japanese industry's participation into international programmes to improve our industrial and technological base. This means that the new NDPG is an important step forward."
Copyright © IHS Global Limited, 2010
Japan to adopt a proactive defence policy
Kosuke Takahashi
JDW Correspondent
Tokyo
Asia-Pacific Reporter
Bangkok
- Japan has published a defence guideline that repositions its forces to counter emerging Chinese activities in the East China Sea
- Naval forces are being strengthened, but the ban on defence exports remains
Japan and US agree to maintain current cost of 'sympathy budget'
Kosuke Takahashi
JDW Correspondent
Tokyo
Japan and the US have agreed that Japan's financial support for the US troops based in the country will stay at current levels for the next five years from Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) starting in April.
Under the five-year agreement between the two countries, Japan will earmark the existing annual amount of JPY188.1 billion (USD2.3 billion) for five years from FY11, the Japanese Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced on 14 December.
Measures were made to reduce the burden on Japan. The number of local support staff, whose work on US bases includes entertainment facilities such as bars and golf courses and whose personnel costs are covered by the Japanese government, will be cut by 430 to 22,625. The share of Japan's contribution towards US utility bills is also to be reduced from 76 per cent to 72 per cent.
The US had requested more money, claiming that its presence had proven to be a stabilising influence in the region and that the bilateral alliance was increasingly significant in view of recent strategic and military moves by North Korea and China.
With government debt approaching nearly 200 per cent of GDP, Japan has sought to reduce the cost of supporting US troops since the "sympathy budget", as it is known in Tokyo, peaked in FY99 at JPY275.6 billion.
US Forces Japan comprises 36,000 personnel from all three branches of the military, 43,000 dependents and 5,000 Department of Defense civilian employees across 85 facilities.
Copyright © IHS Global Limited, 2010
Kosuke Takahashi
JDW Correspondent
Tokyo
Japan and the US have agreed that Japan's financial support for the US troops based in the country will stay at current levels for the next five years from Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) starting in April.
Under the five-year agreement between the two countries, Japan will earmark the existing annual amount of JPY188.1 billion (USD2.3 billion) for five years from FY11, the Japanese Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced on 14 December.
Measures were made to reduce the burden on Japan. The number of local support staff, whose work on US bases includes entertainment facilities such as bars and golf courses and whose personnel costs are covered by the Japanese government, will be cut by 430 to 22,625. The share of Japan's contribution towards US utility bills is also to be reduced from 76 per cent to 72 per cent.
The US had requested more money, claiming that its presence had proven to be a stabilising influence in the region and that the bilateral alliance was increasingly significant in view of recent strategic and military moves by North Korea and China.
With government debt approaching nearly 200 per cent of GDP, Japan has sought to reduce the cost of supporting US troops since the "sympathy budget", as it is known in Tokyo, peaked in FY99 at JPY275.6 billion.
US Forces Japan comprises 36,000 personnel from all three branches of the military, 43,000 dependents and 5,000 Department of Defense civilian employees across 85 facilities.
Copyright © IHS Global Limited, 2010
Friday, December 10, 2010
My latest stories for Jane's Defence Weekly
Here are my latest stories for Jane's Defence Weekly.
If you get time, please go over the followings.
Thanks and regards,
Kosuke
Largest joint US-Japan naval drills start
US asked Japan to ease export ban for SM-3 sales, WikiLeaks claims
US sends aircraft carrier to Yellow Sea following North Korean attacks
Japan mulls Afghan medic mission
Japan opts for UH-60J SAR upgrade
Japan's ruling party adds voice to lifting arms export ban
Security concerns top of Clinton, Maehara meeting agenda
Japan to boost submarine fleet in response to China moves
Japanese White Paper highlights concerns over China's maritime activities
If you get time, please go over the followings.
Thanks and regards,
Kosuke
Largest joint US-Japan naval drills start
US asked Japan to ease export ban for SM-3 sales, WikiLeaks claims
US sends aircraft carrier to Yellow Sea following North Korean attacks
Japan mulls Afghan medic mission
Japan opts for UH-60J SAR upgrade
Japan's ruling party adds voice to lifting arms export ban
Security concerns top of Clinton, Maehara meeting agenda
Japan to boost submarine fleet in response to China moves
Japanese White Paper highlights concerns over China's maritime activities
Thursday, December 9, 2010
Thursday, December 2, 2010
Monday, November 8, 2010
The Australian quotes my comments on Japanese-Russo relations
The Australian, Australia's national daily newspaper, quoted my comments on Japanese-Russo relations. Thanks much again, The Australian! Cheers, Kosuke
Russia inflames islands dispute
Rick Wallace, Tokyo correspondent
The Australian November 02, 2010 12:00AM
JAPAN is embroiled in another territorial row after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made a provocative visit to a chain of disputed islands north of Hokkaido.
Mr Medvedev became the first leader from Russia or the former Soviet Union to set foot on any of the islands off Hokkaido, which Russia calls the Southern Kurils and Japan the Northern Territories.
The Russian leader travelled to Kunashiri Island yesterday ignoring Tokyo's warning that a visit would harm bilateral ties.
Japan, still wrestling with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the South China Sea, was quick to criticise the move.
Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara said the visit "hurts Japanese public sentiment" and summoned the Russian ambassador to the ministry to protest.
Prime Minister Naoto Kan said the islands were Japanese territory and the visit was "extremely deplorable".
The Russian Foreign Ministry professed bewilderment. "We don't understand the reaction of the Japanese side. The Russian position on this issue remains in force, and has not undergone any changes," a source said.
Kosuke Takahashi, Tokyo correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly, told The Australian that Russia was seizing on the diplomatic weaknesses exposed in Japan by the Senkaku dispute.
"Russian-Sino relations are getting better and I think Russia and China know that Japanese diplomatic power is declining and they are becoming more aggressive on territorial issues," he said. He said Russia had offered to give up two of the four islands in the past, but their offer was snubbed by Tokyo.
The islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan as well as the Habomai islet group were seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The ensuing dispute has prevented Japan and Russia from signing a post-war peace treaty.
The residents of the islands are now all Russians, but many Japanese families who retreated to Hokkaido after the war have their ancestors' tombs on the island and some wish to return.
Russia inflames islands dispute
Rick Wallace, Tokyo correspondent
The Australian November 02, 2010 12:00AM
JAPAN is embroiled in another territorial row after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made a provocative visit to a chain of disputed islands north of Hokkaido.
Mr Medvedev became the first leader from Russia or the former Soviet Union to set foot on any of the islands off Hokkaido, which Russia calls the Southern Kurils and Japan the Northern Territories.
The Russian leader travelled to Kunashiri Island yesterday ignoring Tokyo's warning that a visit would harm bilateral ties.
Japan, still wrestling with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the South China Sea, was quick to criticise the move.
Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara said the visit "hurts Japanese public sentiment" and summoned the Russian ambassador to the ministry to protest.
Prime Minister Naoto Kan said the islands were Japanese territory and the visit was "extremely deplorable".
The Russian Foreign Ministry professed bewilderment. "We don't understand the reaction of the Japanese side. The Russian position on this issue remains in force, and has not undergone any changes," a source said.
Kosuke Takahashi, Tokyo correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly, told The Australian that Russia was seizing on the diplomatic weaknesses exposed in Japan by the Senkaku dispute.
"Russian-Sino relations are getting better and I think Russia and China know that Japanese diplomatic power is declining and they are becoming more aggressive on territorial issues," he said. He said Russia had offered to give up two of the four islands in the past, but their offer was snubbed by Tokyo.
The islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan as well as the Habomai islet group were seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The ensuing dispute has prevented Japan and Russia from signing a post-war peace treaty.
The residents of the islands are now all Russians, but many Japanese families who retreated to Hokkaido after the war have their ancestors' tombs on the island and some wish to return.
Sunday, October 24, 2010
(JDW) Japan considers extra submarines in defence review
I wrote a story for Jane's Defence Weekly about Japan's plan to boost the size of its submarine force, which is only available to subscribers. My colleague at JDW also wrote about it. Cheers, Kosuke
(My story)
*Japan to boost submarine fleet in response to China moves
By Kosuke Takahashi
22-Oct-2010
The Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) plans to increase the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) submarine fleet to more than 20 from the current ...
(My colleague's story)
Non-Subscriber Extract
Japan considers extra submarines in defence review
By Jon Grevatt
22 October 2010
China's increasing maritime activities in waters off Japan may prompt Tokyo to procure additional diesel-electric attack submarines or extend the life of existing platforms.
The moves are being considered as part of the Japanese Ministry of Defence's (MoD's) continuing review of its National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which is scheduled to be completed towards the end of this year.
A spokeswoman from the MoD told Jane's on 21 October: "Whether the number of submarines will be increased or not will be considered as part of the deliberations [over the NDPG]. The revision of the submarine force by life extension could be considered as one of the options."
The MoD spokeswoman did not confirm or deny reports by Japanese news agency Kyodo that the MoD plans to increase the size of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's (JMSDF's) fleet of submarines from 16 to 22. Citing MoD officials, the news agency said that the NDPG review had determined that a bigger submarine fleet was necessary to reinforce vigilance in nearby waters.
167 of 389 words
Copyright © IHS (Global) Limited, 2010
End of non-subscriber extract
Here is also a nice blog article on this topic.
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3af69cd6f7-b8ac-4630-a720-d5b4a1e35e25&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest
(My story)
*Japan to boost submarine fleet in response to China moves
By Kosuke Takahashi
22-Oct-2010
The Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) plans to increase the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) submarine fleet to more than 20 from the current ...
(My colleague's story)
Non-Subscriber Extract
Japan considers extra submarines in defence review
By Jon Grevatt
22 October 2010
China's increasing maritime activities in waters off Japan may prompt Tokyo to procure additional diesel-electric attack submarines or extend the life of existing platforms.
The moves are being considered as part of the Japanese Ministry of Defence's (MoD's) continuing review of its National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which is scheduled to be completed towards the end of this year.
A spokeswoman from the MoD told Jane's on 21 October: "Whether the number of submarines will be increased or not will be considered as part of the deliberations [over the NDPG]. The revision of the submarine force by life extension could be considered as one of the options."
The MoD spokeswoman did not confirm or deny reports by Japanese news agency Kyodo that the MoD plans to increase the size of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's (JMSDF's) fleet of submarines from 16 to 22. Citing MoD officials, the news agency said that the NDPG review had determined that a bigger submarine fleet was necessary to reinforce vigilance in nearby waters.
167 of 389 words
Copyright © IHS (Global) Limited, 2010
End of non-subscriber extract
Here is also a nice blog article on this topic.
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3af69cd6f7-b8ac-4630-a720-d5b4a1e35e25&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest
Friday, October 22, 2010
My latest story for Asia Times Online: China scholars enter Okinawa fray
More than a few Chinese scholars and anti-Japanese protesters are beginning to claim Okinawa as Chinese land. I wrote about it. Cheers, Kosuke
China scholars enter Okinawa fray
By Kosuke Takahashi
TOKYO - To much of the world, the Japanese island of Okinawa is synonymous with vast United States military bases and the troubled relationship between servicemen and locals who want the Americans out. In recent years, however, the specter of anti-Chinese sentiment is also in the air.
Powerful Chinese interests now laying claim to sovereignty of the Okanawa islands - which is located halfway between Kyushu and Taiwan - may increase the antagonism over the disputed Senkaku Islands (known by China as the Diaoyu Islands), which are also administered as part of Okinawa prefecture.
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan is high after Beijing's recent display of territorial belligerence over the sovereignty of the islands in the East China Sea spooked Tokyo. Neighboring nations, especially South Korea and Vietnam - once China's tribute states - have already been made to feel more nervous in their disputes with China over island territories. This is because Beijing has expressed Asian waters as a "core interest" to counter United States moves to gain more influence in the region as a counter to China's rise. China's claims of primacy over the sovereignty of its near waters are encouraging increased discussion among its neighbors regarding naval collaboration.
''It is a bit surprising to see such a move,'' Kurayoshi Takara, professor of the University of the Ryukyus in Okinawa, told Asia Times Online. ''Those who claim Okinawa land may reflect increased national prestige and chauvinistic voices in China. Or they may see their chance to claim it, as Japan-US relations have been strained by a row over the relocation of a US Marine base in Okinawa.''
Beijing's recent diplomacy against Norway over the Nobel committee awarding the 2010 Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, shows signs of Beijing further asserting itself on the world stage. China's control of the distribution of rare-earth minerals that play essential roles in numerous industrial processes, including high-technology and military industries, presents another reason why Japan is leery - even as Beijing denied a New York Times report that it was halting exports of the minerals to Japan, the United States and Europe.
Japan-China relations deteriorated to their lowest point in years in the wake of a dispute over Japan's arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain in early September over a collision with the Japanese Coast Guard near the Senkaku islands. Chinese media reported last week that a fisheries patrol boat set sail for waters near the islands to protect Chinese fishing boats.
Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan, who was damaged politically by his handling of the detention of the trawler skipper, came to power this year after his predecessor, Yukio Hatoyama, reneged on an election promise to enter negotiations with the United States to move the American bases off Okinawa.
Chinese scholar affirms Okinawa claim
More than a few Chinese scholars are beginning to claim Okinawa as Chinese land by writing numerous academic papers in Chinese journals, though they are still in a minority among historians.
Xu Yong, noted professor of history at the Beijing University, is among scholars whose work presents the Chinese case. Xu was a member of the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee, set up in 2006 under an agreement between then-prime minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Hu Jintao. This was an attempt to salvage bilateral relations that dived during the time of Abe's predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, and his regular visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine memorializing Japan's war dead (including Class A war criminals such as Hideki Tojo).
Xu has said in research papers and recent symposiums that the issue of sovereignty over Okinawa is unsettled because the Qing Dynasty of China did not approve when Japan abolished the Kingdom of Ryukyu and set up Okinawa Prefecture in 1879.
The US put Okinawa under its control after World War II on the Potsdam Declaration without any legitimate basis in international law, Xu has said. He has claimed that the abolition of the kingdom by the Meiji government in 1879, US control over Okinawa even after the war and Okinawa's reversion to Japanese sovereignty from US occupation in 1972, were all illegitimate, which in return affirmed China's right to claim Okinawa.
Anti-Japan protesters also claim Okinawa
Chinese scholars are not alone in staking claims for Okinawa. Recent anti-Japan protesters in Chinese cities have made the same claim. For example, a Reuters photo taken on September 16 in Chengdu showed that young anti-Japanese marchers brandished a big Chinese-language banner reading ''Restore Ryukyu! Liberate Okinawa''.
Most Japanese experts on China see the Chinese authorities approval of anti-Japanese protests as an outlet for Chinese people's frustrations toward their society, as they struggle to express freedom of speech, find jobs and buy affordable homes.
A common view of the modern history of Okinawa among Japanese scholars goes like this: Okinawa flourished as an independent trading nation, the Kingdom of Ryukyu, over several centuries, until 1609, when the Shimazu family, feudal lords of the Satsuma domain - today's Kagoshima Prefecture of Kyushu Island - conquered the Ryukyus.
But the Edo government allowed the Ryukyus to trade with the Qing Dynasty of China for its own profit and to collect information on China. In this sense, the Ryukyus were tribute states towards both Japan and China.
But in 1879, the Meiji government formally abolished the Ryukyus and established Okinawa Prefecture, sending a big shock to the Qing Dynasty. Fifteen years later, Japan was victorious in the Sino-Japanese War, and gained control over the Korean Peninsula. Towards the end of World War II, Okinawa became the biggest and most crucial battlefield between the US and Japan.
In his Pulitzer-prize-winning book Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, American scholar Herbert Bix wrote that the Okinawa battle "cost an estimated 94,000 to 120,000 Japanese combatants and 150,000 to 170,000 non-combatants, including more than 700 Okinawans whom the Japanese army forced to commit collective suicide. American combat losses were approximately 12,500 killed and more than 33,000 wounded; among these casualties were more than 7,000 sailors, reflecting the toll taken by kamikaze [airplane suicide] attacks."
''If the claims by anti-Japanese protesters were justified, the whole modern world order would collapse,'' Takara of the University of the Ryukyus said. ''They have no legitimate argument. And most of all, unlike Tibetans and people in the Hsinchiang Uighur Autonomous Region, we Okinawans have never asserted our independence from Japan. It's really strange to see Chinese people discussing Okinawa independence by ignoring our own opinions.''
Kosuke Takahashi is a Tokyo-based journalist. Besides Asia Times Online, he also writes for Jane's Defence Weekly as Tokyo correspondent.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
China scholars enter Okinawa fray
By Kosuke Takahashi
TOKYO - To much of the world, the Japanese island of Okinawa is synonymous with vast United States military bases and the troubled relationship between servicemen and locals who want the Americans out. In recent years, however, the specter of anti-Chinese sentiment is also in the air.
Powerful Chinese interests now laying claim to sovereignty of the Okanawa islands - which is located halfway between Kyushu and Taiwan - may increase the antagonism over the disputed Senkaku Islands (known by China as the Diaoyu Islands), which are also administered as part of Okinawa prefecture.
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan is high after Beijing's recent display of territorial belligerence over the sovereignty of the islands in the East China Sea spooked Tokyo. Neighboring nations, especially South Korea and Vietnam - once China's tribute states - have already been made to feel more nervous in their disputes with China over island territories. This is because Beijing has expressed Asian waters as a "core interest" to counter United States moves to gain more influence in the region as a counter to China's rise. China's claims of primacy over the sovereignty of its near waters are encouraging increased discussion among its neighbors regarding naval collaboration.
''It is a bit surprising to see such a move,'' Kurayoshi Takara, professor of the University of the Ryukyus in Okinawa, told Asia Times Online. ''Those who claim Okinawa land may reflect increased national prestige and chauvinistic voices in China. Or they may see their chance to claim it, as Japan-US relations have been strained by a row over the relocation of a US Marine base in Okinawa.''
Beijing's recent diplomacy against Norway over the Nobel committee awarding the 2010 Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, shows signs of Beijing further asserting itself on the world stage. China's control of the distribution of rare-earth minerals that play essential roles in numerous industrial processes, including high-technology and military industries, presents another reason why Japan is leery - even as Beijing denied a New York Times report that it was halting exports of the minerals to Japan, the United States and Europe.
Japan-China relations deteriorated to their lowest point in years in the wake of a dispute over Japan's arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain in early September over a collision with the Japanese Coast Guard near the Senkaku islands. Chinese media reported last week that a fisheries patrol boat set sail for waters near the islands to protect Chinese fishing boats.
Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan, who was damaged politically by his handling of the detention of the trawler skipper, came to power this year after his predecessor, Yukio Hatoyama, reneged on an election promise to enter negotiations with the United States to move the American bases off Okinawa.
Chinese scholar affirms Okinawa claim
More than a few Chinese scholars are beginning to claim Okinawa as Chinese land by writing numerous academic papers in Chinese journals, though they are still in a minority among historians.
Xu Yong, noted professor of history at the Beijing University, is among scholars whose work presents the Chinese case. Xu was a member of the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee, set up in 2006 under an agreement between then-prime minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Hu Jintao. This was an attempt to salvage bilateral relations that dived during the time of Abe's predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, and his regular visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine memorializing Japan's war dead (including Class A war criminals such as Hideki Tojo).
Xu has said in research papers and recent symposiums that the issue of sovereignty over Okinawa is unsettled because the Qing Dynasty of China did not approve when Japan abolished the Kingdom of Ryukyu and set up Okinawa Prefecture in 1879.
The US put Okinawa under its control after World War II on the Potsdam Declaration without any legitimate basis in international law, Xu has said. He has claimed that the abolition of the kingdom by the Meiji government in 1879, US control over Okinawa even after the war and Okinawa's reversion to Japanese sovereignty from US occupation in 1972, were all illegitimate, which in return affirmed China's right to claim Okinawa.
Anti-Japan protesters also claim Okinawa
Chinese scholars are not alone in staking claims for Okinawa. Recent anti-Japan protesters in Chinese cities have made the same claim. For example, a Reuters photo taken on September 16 in Chengdu showed that young anti-Japanese marchers brandished a big Chinese-language banner reading ''Restore Ryukyu! Liberate Okinawa''.
Most Japanese experts on China see the Chinese authorities approval of anti-Japanese protests as an outlet for Chinese people's frustrations toward their society, as they struggle to express freedom of speech, find jobs and buy affordable homes.
A common view of the modern history of Okinawa among Japanese scholars goes like this: Okinawa flourished as an independent trading nation, the Kingdom of Ryukyu, over several centuries, until 1609, when the Shimazu family, feudal lords of the Satsuma domain - today's Kagoshima Prefecture of Kyushu Island - conquered the Ryukyus.
But the Edo government allowed the Ryukyus to trade with the Qing Dynasty of China for its own profit and to collect information on China. In this sense, the Ryukyus were tribute states towards both Japan and China.
But in 1879, the Meiji government formally abolished the Ryukyus and established Okinawa Prefecture, sending a big shock to the Qing Dynasty. Fifteen years later, Japan was victorious in the Sino-Japanese War, and gained control over the Korean Peninsula. Towards the end of World War II, Okinawa became the biggest and most crucial battlefield between the US and Japan.
In his Pulitzer-prize-winning book Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, American scholar Herbert Bix wrote that the Okinawa battle "cost an estimated 94,000 to 120,000 Japanese combatants and 150,000 to 170,000 non-combatants, including more than 700 Okinawans whom the Japanese army forced to commit collective suicide. American combat losses were approximately 12,500 killed and more than 33,000 wounded; among these casualties were more than 7,000 sailors, reflecting the toll taken by kamikaze [airplane suicide] attacks."
''If the claims by anti-Japanese protesters were justified, the whole modern world order would collapse,'' Takara of the University of the Ryukyus said. ''They have no legitimate argument. And most of all, unlike Tibetans and people in the Hsinchiang Uighur Autonomous Region, we Okinawans have never asserted our independence from Japan. It's really strange to see Chinese people discussing Okinawa independence by ignoring our own opinions.''
Kosuke Takahashi is a Tokyo-based journalist. Besides Asia Times Online, he also writes for Jane's Defence Weekly as Tokyo correspondent.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
The Australian, Australia's national daily newspaper, quoted me again.
Thanks much, Rick Wallace-san! Cheers, Kosuke
China fear sees Japan rush for submarines
Rick Wallace, Tokyo correspondent
The Australian October 22, 2010 12:00AM
SPOOKED by China's recent territorial belligerence, Tokyo plans to increase the size of its submarine fleet by six to 22.
Japanese Defence Ministry officials detailed the plans yesterday, saying their defence forces should have a greater capacity for vigilance in nearby waters, especially the East China Sea.
The recent dispute between Beijing and Tokyo was sparked by the arrest of a Chinese trawler skipper who Japan suspected of fishing illegally near the disputed Senkaku Islands last month.
The two Asian powers have been squabbling over these East China Sea islands for decades, after China tried to claim them when a substantial oil and gas reserve was found in nearby waters.
Japan's plan to expand the submarine fleet is expected to be included in the country's new defence program running from next year to 2015.
It has a huge public sector debt level, and will continue buying submarines at the rate of about one a year while delaying the decommissioning of existing subs in order to build the fleet.
Local media reported the ministry was considering eliminating some minesweepers and other vessels to save money.
Kosuke Takahashi, a Tokyo correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly, told The Australian the bigger fleet was about providing insurance in case China developed an aircraft carrier.
It was also designed to stop (or at least keep track of) increasing incursions into Japanese waters by Chinese submarines.
The Chinese navy is also reported to be expanding its 60-strong submarine fleet.
China fear sees Japan rush for submarines
Rick Wallace, Tokyo correspondent
The Australian October 22, 2010 12:00AM
SPOOKED by China's recent territorial belligerence, Tokyo plans to increase the size of its submarine fleet by six to 22.
Japanese Defence Ministry officials detailed the plans yesterday, saying their defence forces should have a greater capacity for vigilance in nearby waters, especially the East China Sea.
The recent dispute between Beijing and Tokyo was sparked by the arrest of a Chinese trawler skipper who Japan suspected of fishing illegally near the disputed Senkaku Islands last month.
The two Asian powers have been squabbling over these East China Sea islands for decades, after China tried to claim them when a substantial oil and gas reserve was found in nearby waters.
Japan's plan to expand the submarine fleet is expected to be included in the country's new defence program running from next year to 2015.
It has a huge public sector debt level, and will continue buying submarines at the rate of about one a year while delaying the decommissioning of existing subs in order to build the fleet.
Local media reported the ministry was considering eliminating some minesweepers and other vessels to save money.
Kosuke Takahashi, a Tokyo correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly, told The Australian the bigger fleet was about providing insurance in case China developed an aircraft carrier.
It was also designed to stop (or at least keep track of) increasing incursions into Japanese waters by Chinese submarines.
The Chinese navy is also reported to be expanding its 60-strong submarine fleet.
Friday, October 8, 2010
(AP) US, China defense chiefs to meet amid thaw in ties
U.S.-Chinese relations are already inescapably-tied to each other. Cheers, Kosuke
US, China defense chiefs to meet amid thaw in ties
The Associated Press
BEIJING -- China's defense minister will meet his U.S. counterpart at an international gathering in Vietnam next week as the two nations move to end an eight-month freeze on military exchanges, state media said Wednesday.
Gen. Liang Guanglie will meet Defense Secretary Robert Gates at a gathering of defense chiefs from the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations that starts Tuesday in the Vietnamese capital of Hanoi, Xinhua News Agency quoted Defense Ministry spokesman Guan Youfei as saying.
Xinhua quoted Guan as saying the meeting between the two men would be "short but significant."
China suspended such contacts in January to protest a $6.4 billion U.S. arms package for Taiwan, the self-governing island that China claims as its own territory. Beijing pointedly refused to invite Gates to visit during his trip to the region in June, leading U.S. officials to complain that the Chinese military was ignoring the importance of such contacts.
China signaled an end to the freeze last week when the Defense Ministry's head of foreign affairs, Maj. Gen. Qian Lihua, told visiting U.S. Assistant Deputy Defense Secretary Michael Schiffer that regular dialogue and exchanges on military safety at sea and other issues would be resumed.
Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said Tuesday the two nations are looking for a mutually convenient time for Gates' long-delayed visit - probably early in 2011.
The last significant exchange took place late last year when Gates invited Gen. Xu Caihou to the United States for a tour of the Pentagon and U.S. military installations. As one of two vice chairmen of the Communist Party committee that controls the military, Xu technically ranks higher than Liang, who is merely one of the 11-strong committee's eight ordinary members.
Regional tensions and heated rhetoric have underscored the importance of regular contacts between the two militaries, much to the frustration of U.S. officers who complain of the lack of access to their Chinese counterparts.
China has been especially strident about U.S. involvement in territorial disputes in the South China Sea - which Beijing claims in its entirety - along with joint U.S.-South Korean anti-submarine drills in the Yellow Sea, part of which lies within Chinese sovereign waters.
Beijing has also angered Seoul by refusing to verify the findings of a study blaming North Korea for the sinking a South Korean navy ship in March that ratcheted up tensions across northeast Asia.
While U.S.-China military exchanges appear to be on the mend, they could soon face further Taiwan-related challenges.
A Taiwanese Defense Ministry spokesman said Wednesday the island was allocating money for possible U.S. help to upgrade its fleet of F-16 fighter jets. The statement came amid Taiwanese media reports that the Obama administration has agreed to upgrade the island's fleet of American-made 146 F-16A/Bs, which it received more than a decade ago.
Taiwan is also hoping to buy an entirely new version of the F-16, the more advanced C/Ds, because the aircraft better suits Taiwan's strategy for defending against Chinese threats to use force if necessary to bring the island under its control.
US, China defense chiefs to meet amid thaw in ties
The Associated Press
BEIJING -- China's defense minister will meet his U.S. counterpart at an international gathering in Vietnam next week as the two nations move to end an eight-month freeze on military exchanges, state media said Wednesday.
Gen. Liang Guanglie will meet Defense Secretary Robert Gates at a gathering of defense chiefs from the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations that starts Tuesday in the Vietnamese capital of Hanoi, Xinhua News Agency quoted Defense Ministry spokesman Guan Youfei as saying.
Xinhua quoted Guan as saying the meeting between the two men would be "short but significant."
China suspended such contacts in January to protest a $6.4 billion U.S. arms package for Taiwan, the self-governing island that China claims as its own territory. Beijing pointedly refused to invite Gates to visit during his trip to the region in June, leading U.S. officials to complain that the Chinese military was ignoring the importance of such contacts.
China signaled an end to the freeze last week when the Defense Ministry's head of foreign affairs, Maj. Gen. Qian Lihua, told visiting U.S. Assistant Deputy Defense Secretary Michael Schiffer that regular dialogue and exchanges on military safety at sea and other issues would be resumed.
Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said Tuesday the two nations are looking for a mutually convenient time for Gates' long-delayed visit - probably early in 2011.
The last significant exchange took place late last year when Gates invited Gen. Xu Caihou to the United States for a tour of the Pentagon and U.S. military installations. As one of two vice chairmen of the Communist Party committee that controls the military, Xu technically ranks higher than Liang, who is merely one of the 11-strong committee's eight ordinary members.
Regional tensions and heated rhetoric have underscored the importance of regular contacts between the two militaries, much to the frustration of U.S. officers who complain of the lack of access to their Chinese counterparts.
China has been especially strident about U.S. involvement in territorial disputes in the South China Sea - which Beijing claims in its entirety - along with joint U.S.-South Korean anti-submarine drills in the Yellow Sea, part of which lies within Chinese sovereign waters.
Beijing has also angered Seoul by refusing to verify the findings of a study blaming North Korea for the sinking a South Korean navy ship in March that ratcheted up tensions across northeast Asia.
While U.S.-China military exchanges appear to be on the mend, they could soon face further Taiwan-related challenges.
A Taiwanese Defense Ministry spokesman said Wednesday the island was allocating money for possible U.S. help to upgrade its fleet of F-16 fighter jets. The statement came amid Taiwanese media reports that the Obama administration has agreed to upgrade the island's fleet of American-made 146 F-16A/Bs, which it received more than a decade ago.
Taiwan is also hoping to buy an entirely new version of the F-16, the more advanced C/Ds, because the aircraft better suits Taiwan's strategy for defending against Chinese threats to use force if necessary to bring the island under its control.
Thursday, October 7, 2010
(IHT) U.S. tries to forge closer military ties with China
The International Herald Tribune carried an excellent article on thaw in US-China military ties. Cheers, Kosuke
U.S. tries to forge closer military ties with China;
Pentagon reaching out to a generation of officers who see it as the enemy
BY MICHAEL WINES
BEIJING
(ABSTRACT)
One reason the Pentagon has persistently sought closer relations with the People's Liberation Army is that it does not want U.S. forces to remain unknown to their up-and-coming Chinese counterparts.
(FULL TEXT)
The United States pronounced its military relationship with China ''back on track'' last week after a meeting here between ranking officials of the Pentagon and the People's Liberation Army.
Tell that, however, to Lt. Cmdr. Tony Cao.
Commander Cao is an officer of the People's Liberation Army Navy. Days before the Pentagon's top Asia official arrived for talks last week in Beijing, Commander Cao was aboard a frigate in the Yellow Sea, conducting China's first-ever war games with the Australian Navy - and noting, pointedly, that the Americans were not invited. Nor are they likely to be, he told Australian journalists in slightly bent English, until ''the United States stops selling the weapons to Taiwan and stopping spying us with the air or the surface.''
As the often-frigid relations between the U.S. and Chinese militaries again warm ever so slightly, it is officers like Commander Cao, rising through the ranks of China's armed forces, who are drawing new attention from Washington.
While China's top military leaders are known quantities, its future leaders remain unknowns. One reason the Pentagon has persistently sought closer relations with the People's Liberation Army, often in the face of rebuffs, is that it does not want U.S. forces to remain unknown to their up-and-coming Chinese counterparts.
Older P.L.A. officers may remember a time, before the Tiananmen Square protests set relations back, when the U.S. and Chinese forces made common cause against the former Soviet Union. Younger officers have only known an anti-U.S. military.
''The P.L.A. combines an odd combination of deep admiration for the U.S. armed forces as a military, but equally harbors a deep suspicion of U.S. military deployments and intentions towards China,'' David Shambaugh, a leading expert on the Chinese military at George Washington University in Washington, said in an e-mail.
The stakes rise as China's armed forces, once a fairly ragtag group, steadily become more capable and take on bigger tasks. The navy, the centerpiece of China's military expansion, has added dozens of surface ships and submarines in the last decade and is widely reported to be planning construction of an aircraft carrier, the most potent weapon in the naval arsenal. The maneuvers with Australia in the Yellow Sea last month were but the most recent in a series of Chinese excursions to places as diverse as New Zealand, Britain and Spain.
China is also reported to be building an anti-ship ballistic missile base in the southern province of Guangdong, with missiles capable of reaching the Philippines and Vietnam. The base is regarded as an effort to enforce China's territorial claims to vast areas of the South China Sea claimed by other nations - and to threaten U.S. aircraft carriers that now patrol the area unmolested.
Even improved Chinese forces pose little threat to a far more capable U.S. military. But their increasing range and ability - and the certainty that they will strengthen further - make it crucial to help lower-level officers become more familiar with the Americans, experts say, before a chance encounter blossoms into a crisis.
''These past few years are part of a process where a group of young officers in China are beginning to rise up to a more senior position,'' said Huang Jing, a scholar of China's military and leadership at the National University of Singapore. ''All militaries need a straw man, a perceived enemy, for solidarity. And as a young officer or soldier, you always take the strongest of straw men to maximize the effect. Chinese military men, from the soldiers and platoon captains all the way up to the army commanders, were always taught that America would be their enemy.''
From the Chinese military's view, this year has offered ample evidence of the United States' ill will.
The Chinese effectively suspended official military relations early this year after President Barack Obama held a meeting with the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan religious leader, and approved a $6.7 billion arms sale to Taiwan, which China regards as its territory.
Since then, the P.L.A. has bristled as the U.S. State Department offered to mediate disputes between China and its neighbors over ownership of Pacific islands and valuable seabed mineral rights. And when the U.S. Navy conducted war games with South Korea last month in the Yellow Sea, not 640 kilometers, or 400 miles, from Beijing, the rhetoric from senior Chinese officers was apoplectic.
The United States ''is engaging in an increasingly tight encirclement of China and constantly challenging China's core interests,'' Rear Adm. Yang Yi, a naval commander, wrote last month in two hawkish articles in The P.L.A. Daily, the military newspaper. ''Washington will inevitably pay a costly price for its muddled decision.''
In truth, little in the U.S. actions is new. Mr. Obama's predecessor, George W. Bush, not only hosted the Dalai Lama, but awarded him Congress's highest civilian honor in 2007. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were mandated by Congress in 1979 and were a fixture of U.S. policy for years before that. U.S. warships regularly ply the waters off China's coast and frequently practice with South Korean ships.
But a confluence of factors appears to be dictating the P.L.A.'s sharp response.
One is the impending change of China's government leaders in 2012. In the jockeying for advantage before that turnover, no politician is willing to be seen as weak, and the military has gained new leeway to publicly push its more aggressive views on foreign policy.
Another is the new assertiveness that has followed China's rise to global prominence.
''Why do you sell arms to Taiwan? We don't sell arms to Hawaii,'' said Liu Mingfu, a professor at National Defense University in Beijing and the author of ''The China Dream,'' a nationalistic call to succeed the United States as the world's leading power.
''In the past China simply tolerated this silently for the sake of the overall situation of U.S.-China relations,'' Mr. Liu said. ''But now times have moved on, the world is more civilized, and China is stronger. The Chinese people have a higher requirement for national dignity and demand more respect. Americans should understand this.''
That official military relations are resuming despite the P.L.A.'s sharp language is likely a function of international diplomacy. President Hu Jintao of China is scheduled to visit Washington soon, perhaps as early as January, and U.S. experts had predicted that China would resume military ties as part of a general effort to smooth over rough spots before the state visit.
Chinese military leaders, who earlier this year snubbed a proposal by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to visit Beijing, signaled last week that that visit would be scheduled soon. And Wednesday, the state-run news agency, Xinhua, said Defense Minister Liang Guanglie would meet with Mr. Gates next week at a security conference in Hanoi.
None of that seems to signal any basic change in the Chinese military view of the Pentagon.
A leading Chinese expert on international security, Zhu Feng of Peking University, said that the Chinese military's hostility toward the United States was not new, just more open. And that, he said, was not only the result of China's new assertiveness, but its military's inexperience on the world stage.
China's military has had a strictly domestic mission - until now. ''Chinese officers' international exposure remains very limited,'' Mr. Zhu said.
October 7, 2010
U.S. tries to forge closer military ties with China;
Pentagon reaching out to a generation of officers who see it as the enemy
BY MICHAEL WINES
BEIJING
(ABSTRACT)
One reason the Pentagon has persistently sought closer relations with the People's Liberation Army is that it does not want U.S. forces to remain unknown to their up-and-coming Chinese counterparts.
(FULL TEXT)
The United States pronounced its military relationship with China ''back on track'' last week after a meeting here between ranking officials of the Pentagon and the People's Liberation Army.
Tell that, however, to Lt. Cmdr. Tony Cao.
Commander Cao is an officer of the People's Liberation Army Navy. Days before the Pentagon's top Asia official arrived for talks last week in Beijing, Commander Cao was aboard a frigate in the Yellow Sea, conducting China's first-ever war games with the Australian Navy - and noting, pointedly, that the Americans were not invited. Nor are they likely to be, he told Australian journalists in slightly bent English, until ''the United States stops selling the weapons to Taiwan and stopping spying us with the air or the surface.''
As the often-frigid relations between the U.S. and Chinese militaries again warm ever so slightly, it is officers like Commander Cao, rising through the ranks of China's armed forces, who are drawing new attention from Washington.
While China's top military leaders are known quantities, its future leaders remain unknowns. One reason the Pentagon has persistently sought closer relations with the People's Liberation Army, often in the face of rebuffs, is that it does not want U.S. forces to remain unknown to their up-and-coming Chinese counterparts.
Older P.L.A. officers may remember a time, before the Tiananmen Square protests set relations back, when the U.S. and Chinese forces made common cause against the former Soviet Union. Younger officers have only known an anti-U.S. military.
''The P.L.A. combines an odd combination of deep admiration for the U.S. armed forces as a military, but equally harbors a deep suspicion of U.S. military deployments and intentions towards China,'' David Shambaugh, a leading expert on the Chinese military at George Washington University in Washington, said in an e-mail.
The stakes rise as China's armed forces, once a fairly ragtag group, steadily become more capable and take on bigger tasks. The navy, the centerpiece of China's military expansion, has added dozens of surface ships and submarines in the last decade and is widely reported to be planning construction of an aircraft carrier, the most potent weapon in the naval arsenal. The maneuvers with Australia in the Yellow Sea last month were but the most recent in a series of Chinese excursions to places as diverse as New Zealand, Britain and Spain.
China is also reported to be building an anti-ship ballistic missile base in the southern province of Guangdong, with missiles capable of reaching the Philippines and Vietnam. The base is regarded as an effort to enforce China's territorial claims to vast areas of the South China Sea claimed by other nations - and to threaten U.S. aircraft carriers that now patrol the area unmolested.
Even improved Chinese forces pose little threat to a far more capable U.S. military. But their increasing range and ability - and the certainty that they will strengthen further - make it crucial to help lower-level officers become more familiar with the Americans, experts say, before a chance encounter blossoms into a crisis.
''These past few years are part of a process where a group of young officers in China are beginning to rise up to a more senior position,'' said Huang Jing, a scholar of China's military and leadership at the National University of Singapore. ''All militaries need a straw man, a perceived enemy, for solidarity. And as a young officer or soldier, you always take the strongest of straw men to maximize the effect. Chinese military men, from the soldiers and platoon captains all the way up to the army commanders, were always taught that America would be their enemy.''
From the Chinese military's view, this year has offered ample evidence of the United States' ill will.
The Chinese effectively suspended official military relations early this year after President Barack Obama held a meeting with the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan religious leader, and approved a $6.7 billion arms sale to Taiwan, which China regards as its territory.
Since then, the P.L.A. has bristled as the U.S. State Department offered to mediate disputes between China and its neighbors over ownership of Pacific islands and valuable seabed mineral rights. And when the U.S. Navy conducted war games with South Korea last month in the Yellow Sea, not 640 kilometers, or 400 miles, from Beijing, the rhetoric from senior Chinese officers was apoplectic.
The United States ''is engaging in an increasingly tight encirclement of China and constantly challenging China's core interests,'' Rear Adm. Yang Yi, a naval commander, wrote last month in two hawkish articles in The P.L.A. Daily, the military newspaper. ''Washington will inevitably pay a costly price for its muddled decision.''
In truth, little in the U.S. actions is new. Mr. Obama's predecessor, George W. Bush, not only hosted the Dalai Lama, but awarded him Congress's highest civilian honor in 2007. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were mandated by Congress in 1979 and were a fixture of U.S. policy for years before that. U.S. warships regularly ply the waters off China's coast and frequently practice with South Korean ships.
But a confluence of factors appears to be dictating the P.L.A.'s sharp response.
One is the impending change of China's government leaders in 2012. In the jockeying for advantage before that turnover, no politician is willing to be seen as weak, and the military has gained new leeway to publicly push its more aggressive views on foreign policy.
Another is the new assertiveness that has followed China's rise to global prominence.
''Why do you sell arms to Taiwan? We don't sell arms to Hawaii,'' said Liu Mingfu, a professor at National Defense University in Beijing and the author of ''The China Dream,'' a nationalistic call to succeed the United States as the world's leading power.
''In the past China simply tolerated this silently for the sake of the overall situation of U.S.-China relations,'' Mr. Liu said. ''But now times have moved on, the world is more civilized, and China is stronger. The Chinese people have a higher requirement for national dignity and demand more respect. Americans should understand this.''
That official military relations are resuming despite the P.L.A.'s sharp language is likely a function of international diplomacy. President Hu Jintao of China is scheduled to visit Washington soon, perhaps as early as January, and U.S. experts had predicted that China would resume military ties as part of a general effort to smooth over rough spots before the state visit.
Chinese military leaders, who earlier this year snubbed a proposal by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to visit Beijing, signaled last week that that visit would be scheduled soon. And Wednesday, the state-run news agency, Xinhua, said Defense Minister Liang Guanglie would meet with Mr. Gates next week at a security conference in Hanoi.
None of that seems to signal any basic change in the Chinese military view of the Pentagon.
A leading Chinese expert on international security, Zhu Feng of Peking University, said that the Chinese military's hostility toward the United States was not new, just more open. And that, he said, was not only the result of China's new assertiveness, but its military's inexperience on the world stage.
China's military has had a strictly domestic mission - until now. ''Chinese officers' international exposure remains very limited,'' Mr. Zhu said.
October 7, 2010
The Australian quotes my comments on Sino-Japanese relations
The Australian, Australia's national daily newspaper, quoted my comments on Sino-Japanese relations. Thanks much, The Australian! Cheers, Kosuke
US, Asia unite against Chinese provocation
By Rick Wallace and Michael Sainsbury
The Australian October 02, 2010
OKINAWA Governor Hirokazu Nakaima announced this week he planned to visit the uninhabited and rocky Senkaku Islands.
The outcrops have been the subject of the bitter recriminations between Tokyo and Beijing.
His provocative trip is best seen as populist domestic politics from a man who is facing re-election. The trouble is, the visit could reignite the bitter clash between China and Japan that has seen an icy tension spread throughout East Asia these past two weeks.
The long disputed rocky islets 400km west of Okinawa shot to prominence on September 8 when Japan arrested a Chinese skipper caught fishing illegally in nearby waters.
China, which also lays claim to the islands, exploded over the arrest, ratcheting the pressure on Japan up to unspecified threats of "further action" from Premier Wen Jiabao, which eventually secured the captain's release by a cowed Japanese government.
But while China rejoiced in a successful display of its increasing strength, the spat has given the US and its allies a clear picture of the kind of belligerence it can expect from Beijing.
Kosuke Takahashi, a correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly and specialist on Sino-Japanese security issues, said China's reaction was excessive and Japan's capitulation was weak.
But he said the net result was that while China won the domestic battle, Japan got the better of the dispute in the international sense because it had established a fresh anti-China consensus in the Asia Pacific.
"If you look at the editorials in Southeast Asia and the US in major newspapers, you can see China overreacted," he said. "South Korea also has issues with China over the Socotra Rock. The Philippines and Vietnam have territorial issues with China. Those countries look at the Chinese reaction and they are worried."
Mr Takahashi said China's move would also draw the US and Japan closer together. He said Japan could not afford to increase defence spending and China's aggression over the Senkaku Islands had effectively guaranteed the presence of US troops on Okinawa despite local resistance.
China estimates the trough basin under the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea holds nearly 17.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 20 million barrels of oil. Talks on joint development of the resource have broken down.
The head of the East Asia program at the Lowy Institute, Malcolm Cook, said China's disproportionate response was part of a broader pattern of behaviour.
"It's certainly given an example of China's actions that don't fit a 'peaceful rise' narrative or a 'harmonious world' one," he said.
Dr Cook said the change in China's posture could also be seen in the Yellow Sea, where Beijing criticised US-South Korean exercises and conducted its own war games, and in the South China Sea, where it continues to press a hard line in a territorial dispute with Vietnam. He agreed it would boost ties among US allies in the Asia Pacific.
University of NSW professor Carl Thayer wrote in Southeast Asia: Patterns of Defence, a paper released this week, that China's emergence as a great power could make it a potential strategic competitor of the US across the Asia Pacific and in Southeast Asia. "The dynamics of Sino-American relations will have a major impact on the security environment in Southeast Asia," he wrote.
Mr Nakaima's proposed visit will again test the mettle of both sides.
Additional reporting: AFP
US, Asia unite against Chinese provocation
By Rick Wallace and Michael Sainsbury
The Australian October 02, 2010
OKINAWA Governor Hirokazu Nakaima announced this week he planned to visit the uninhabited and rocky Senkaku Islands.
The outcrops have been the subject of the bitter recriminations between Tokyo and Beijing.
His provocative trip is best seen as populist domestic politics from a man who is facing re-election. The trouble is, the visit could reignite the bitter clash between China and Japan that has seen an icy tension spread throughout East Asia these past two weeks.
The long disputed rocky islets 400km west of Okinawa shot to prominence on September 8 when Japan arrested a Chinese skipper caught fishing illegally in nearby waters.
China, which also lays claim to the islands, exploded over the arrest, ratcheting the pressure on Japan up to unspecified threats of "further action" from Premier Wen Jiabao, which eventually secured the captain's release by a cowed Japanese government.
But while China rejoiced in a successful display of its increasing strength, the spat has given the US and its allies a clear picture of the kind of belligerence it can expect from Beijing.
Kosuke Takahashi, a correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly and specialist on Sino-Japanese security issues, said China's reaction was excessive and Japan's capitulation was weak.
But he said the net result was that while China won the domestic battle, Japan got the better of the dispute in the international sense because it had established a fresh anti-China consensus in the Asia Pacific.
"If you look at the editorials in Southeast Asia and the US in major newspapers, you can see China overreacted," he said. "South Korea also has issues with China over the Socotra Rock. The Philippines and Vietnam have territorial issues with China. Those countries look at the Chinese reaction and they are worried."
Mr Takahashi said China's move would also draw the US and Japan closer together. He said Japan could not afford to increase defence spending and China's aggression over the Senkaku Islands had effectively guaranteed the presence of US troops on Okinawa despite local resistance.
China estimates the trough basin under the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea holds nearly 17.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 20 million barrels of oil. Talks on joint development of the resource have broken down.
The head of the East Asia program at the Lowy Institute, Malcolm Cook, said China's disproportionate response was part of a broader pattern of behaviour.
"It's certainly given an example of China's actions that don't fit a 'peaceful rise' narrative or a 'harmonious world' one," he said.
Dr Cook said the change in China's posture could also be seen in the Yellow Sea, where Beijing criticised US-South Korean exercises and conducted its own war games, and in the South China Sea, where it continues to press a hard line in a territorial dispute with Vietnam. He agreed it would boost ties among US allies in the Asia Pacific.
University of NSW professor Carl Thayer wrote in Southeast Asia: Patterns of Defence, a paper released this week, that China's emergence as a great power could make it a potential strategic competitor of the US across the Asia Pacific and in Southeast Asia. "The dynamics of Sino-American relations will have a major impact on the security environment in Southeast Asia," he wrote.
Mr Nakaima's proposed visit will again test the mettle of both sides.
Additional reporting: AFP
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
(Korea Times) China as a superpower
Here is also an excellent article about China. Cheers, Kosuke
China as a superpower
By Joschka Fischer
YALTA ― Given its rapid and successful development, there can be no doubt that the People’s Republic of China will become one of the dominant global powers of the 21st century. Indeed, despite the massive problems that the country is confronting, it could even emerge as the global power.
But it would be a mistake to assume that the reemergence of so-called “XXL powers” like China and India will simply bring a continuation of Western traditions. We will have to deal with a different type of superpower.
Ever since the European powers set sail at the end of the 15th century to conquer the world, historiography and international politics have become accustomed to a certain pattern: military, economic, and technological power is translated into the exercise of influence over other countries, conquest, and even global dominance and empire.
This was particularly true in the 20th century, when, in the wake of two world wars, the United States and the Soviet Union replaced the European world powers on the global stage. The Cold War and the period of U.S. global dominance after 1989/1990 followed this pattern as well.
But China’s rise to global power, I believe, will not, owing to its massive population of 1.2 billion people, which threatens to overstretch the structures of any kind of government system and its decision-makers. This is all the more true in times of rapid fundamental change, as is occurring in China now.
The permanent danger of overstretching the country’s internal political structures is unlikely to permit any imperial foreign-policy role. Insofar as this is true, the United States won’t be replaced as the dominant power unless and until it abdicates that role. This may sound simple, but it will have far-reaching consequences for the coming century’s international order.
The vital interests guiding Chinese policy are internal modernization, the ruling regime’s political stability and survival, and the country’s unity (which includes Taiwan). These interests are unlikely to change for a long time.
As a result, China will become a largely inward-looking superpower, which ― precisely for that reason ― will pursue its foreign-policy interests in a completely unsentimental manner. Militarily, China will focus primarily on its regional supremacy, because the country’s unity depends on it. Otherwise, though, the transformation of China’s economy and society will be all-important, because the regime’s stability depends on it.
For the Chinese leadership, this means that a growth rate of about 10 percent per year will be essential for a long time. Otherwise, the rapid and fundamental transformation of the country from a largely agrarian to an ultra-modern industrialized society could not proceed without destabilizing the system.
But this focus on internal growth will have massive political consequences, both domestically and in foreign-policy terms. Domestically, China will be the first country that, due to its sheer size and required GDP growth, is forced to pursue a “green” economy. Otherwise, China would quickly reach its “limits to growth,” with disastrous ecological and, as a result, political consequences.
Since China will be the most important market of the future, it will be decisive in determining not only what we produce and consume, but how. Consider the transition from the traditional automobile to electric transport.
Despite European illusions to the contrary, this will be decided in China, not in the West. All that will be decided by the West’s globally dominant automobile industry is whether it will adapt and have a chance to survive or go the way of other old Western industries: to the developing world.
In foreign-policy terms, China will attempt to protect its domestic transformation by securing resources and access to foreign markets. Sooner or later, though, China’s government will come to realize that America’s role as a global regulator is indispensible for China’s vital foreign-policy interests, because China is unable to assume that role, other global players aren’t available, and the only alternative to the U.S. would be a breakdown of order.
This U.S.-Chinese tandem will run far from smoothly, and will do little but ameliorate crises and periods of serious economic and political confrontation, like that which is currently looming over the bilateral trade imbalance.
Strategically, however, China and the U.S. will have to rely on one another for a long time. This co-dependency will, at some point, also take shape politically, probably to the chagrin of all other international players, particularly the Europeans.
Europe could change the course of this development only if it presented itself as a serious player and stood up for its interests on the global stage. The “G-2” of China and the U.S. would probably be happy about that. But Europe is too weak and too divided to be effective globally, with its leaders unwilling to pursue a common policy based on their countries’ own strategic interests.
Joschka Fischer, a leading member of Germany’s Green Party for almost 20 years, was Germany’s foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 until 2005. For more information and stories, visit Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.org).
China as a superpower
By Joschka Fischer
YALTA ― Given its rapid and successful development, there can be no doubt that the People’s Republic of China will become one of the dominant global powers of the 21st century. Indeed, despite the massive problems that the country is confronting, it could even emerge as the global power.
But it would be a mistake to assume that the reemergence of so-called “XXL powers” like China and India will simply bring a continuation of Western traditions. We will have to deal with a different type of superpower.
Ever since the European powers set sail at the end of the 15th century to conquer the world, historiography and international politics have become accustomed to a certain pattern: military, economic, and technological power is translated into the exercise of influence over other countries, conquest, and even global dominance and empire.
This was particularly true in the 20th century, when, in the wake of two world wars, the United States and the Soviet Union replaced the European world powers on the global stage. The Cold War and the period of U.S. global dominance after 1989/1990 followed this pattern as well.
But China’s rise to global power, I believe, will not, owing to its massive population of 1.2 billion people, which threatens to overstretch the structures of any kind of government system and its decision-makers. This is all the more true in times of rapid fundamental change, as is occurring in China now.
The permanent danger of overstretching the country’s internal political structures is unlikely to permit any imperial foreign-policy role. Insofar as this is true, the United States won’t be replaced as the dominant power unless and until it abdicates that role. This may sound simple, but it will have far-reaching consequences for the coming century’s international order.
The vital interests guiding Chinese policy are internal modernization, the ruling regime’s political stability and survival, and the country’s unity (which includes Taiwan). These interests are unlikely to change for a long time.
As a result, China will become a largely inward-looking superpower, which ― precisely for that reason ― will pursue its foreign-policy interests in a completely unsentimental manner. Militarily, China will focus primarily on its regional supremacy, because the country’s unity depends on it. Otherwise, though, the transformation of China’s economy and society will be all-important, because the regime’s stability depends on it.
For the Chinese leadership, this means that a growth rate of about 10 percent per year will be essential for a long time. Otherwise, the rapid and fundamental transformation of the country from a largely agrarian to an ultra-modern industrialized society could not proceed without destabilizing the system.
But this focus on internal growth will have massive political consequences, both domestically and in foreign-policy terms. Domestically, China will be the first country that, due to its sheer size and required GDP growth, is forced to pursue a “green” economy. Otherwise, China would quickly reach its “limits to growth,” with disastrous ecological and, as a result, political consequences.
Since China will be the most important market of the future, it will be decisive in determining not only what we produce and consume, but how. Consider the transition from the traditional automobile to electric transport.
Despite European illusions to the contrary, this will be decided in China, not in the West. All that will be decided by the West’s globally dominant automobile industry is whether it will adapt and have a chance to survive or go the way of other old Western industries: to the developing world.
In foreign-policy terms, China will attempt to protect its domestic transformation by securing resources and access to foreign markets. Sooner or later, though, China’s government will come to realize that America’s role as a global regulator is indispensible for China’s vital foreign-policy interests, because China is unable to assume that role, other global players aren’t available, and the only alternative to the U.S. would be a breakdown of order.
This U.S.-Chinese tandem will run far from smoothly, and will do little but ameliorate crises and periods of serious economic and political confrontation, like that which is currently looming over the bilateral trade imbalance.
Strategically, however, China and the U.S. will have to rely on one another for a long time. This co-dependency will, at some point, also take shape politically, probably to the chagrin of all other international players, particularly the Europeans.
Europe could change the course of this development only if it presented itself as a serious player and stood up for its interests on the global stage. The “G-2” of China and the U.S. would probably be happy about that. But Europe is too weak and too divided to be effective globally, with its leaders unwilling to pursue a common policy based on their countries’ own strategic interests.
Joschka Fischer, a leading member of Germany’s Green Party for almost 20 years, was Germany’s foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 until 2005. For more information and stories, visit Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.org).
(Taipei Times) ANALYSIS: Politics and the military blur in China
Nice story on the PLA's assertive move. Cheers, Kosuke
ANALYSIS: Politics and the military blur in China
RISING POWER:：The eyes of the world are on China as it continues its rise, however, analysts are divided on whether the military is becoming more or less powerful
By Ko Shu-ling / Staff Reporter
Tue, Oct 05, 2010
The rise of China’s power is not limited to its economy: It also involves its military, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) making significant advances in the past decade in technology, training and strategic planning.
These developments include a massive buildup of missiles across the Taiwan Strait designed to discourage any move toward de jure independence for Taiwan. They also include the expansion of the Pacific Fleet, complete with new operation bases, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines with first-strike capabilities.
All this raises concerns about Beijing’s true intentions as it tries to reassure the international community that it’s rise is peaceful. However, these concerns have been heightened by two recent developments.
One is China’s growing aggressiveness in pressing territorial disputes with neighbors such as Japan and India.
The other is emerging signs that the PLA may be increasing its influence over state affairs. When US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was denied a request to visit Beijing in June, he blamed elements within the PLA for blocking the invitation, which he said the civilian leadership had likely wanted to make.
The Gates snub also followed a three-minute “rant” in May by Rear Admiral Guan Youfei (關友飛) to 65 visiting US officials in Beijing, in which he said that US arms sales to Taiwan proved that Washington viewed China as an enemy.
US diplomats attempted to portray Guan’s remarks as at odds with the thinking of the rest of the Chinese government. However, some said his comments represented mainstream views within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
What, then, lies behind the mixed signals from the Chinese military and civilian leadership?
One thing commentators agree on when discussing the often -mysterious relations between the CCP and one of the world’s largest military forces is that they exhibit none of the instability witnessed in Latin American and Africa in the last century as authoritarian regimes repeatedly fell victim to military coups. Indeed, the CCP and the PLA have shown a remarkable similarity of purpose over the years.
York Chen (陳文政), a former senior adviser at the National Security Council in Taipei, said the relationship between the CCP and the PLA was unique.
The two are so intermingled, Chen said, that senior military leaders are party representatives and party officials are members of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
In Latin America, though, the military banked on different political parties depending on their interests, he said.
Though there might be factional differences between the CCP and the PLA, they never escalated into open confrontation, Chen said.
Kou Chien-wen (寇健文), a professor of political science at the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University, said the relationship between the PLA and the CCP was similar to that between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Republic of China troops in the old days.
“The military is an interest group living on the party,” he said.
The PLA remains loyal to the CCP for three reasons, Kou said.
The first is the unique relationship developed when the revolution started. Political and military leaders were “dual elites,” he said, meaning they had the identity of both soldier and civilian.
While some early political leaders such as Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) had combat experience, soldiers were later appointed administrative positions. It took between 40 and 50 years to see the older generation retire, during which time the military developed the habit of submitting to the party, Kou said.
The second reason is that the party controls the appointments and dismissals of military positions. Finally, the CCP uses defense budgets to buy allegiance as long as the military promises not to challenge the political authorities, he said.
There have been exceptions, of course, including former minister of defense Peng Dehuai (彭德懷) and former CCP vice chairman Lin Biao (林彪).
Peng and several other leaders expressed concern over Mao’s Great Leap Forward campaign and reported the truth about the famine to Mao during the Lushan Conference in 1959. Peng’s candor, however, was considered an action beyond his authority. He was put under house arrest for 16 years and later persecuted during the Cultural Revolution.
Lin staged a failed coup to oust Mao, but some analysts saw it more as Lin’s personal attempt rather than a concerted group action. Lin died in a mysterious plane crash in Mongolia in 1971.
Rumors of dissent have also been played down by the party and the military. As one PLA general who spoke on condition of anonymity told the Washington Post recently, it is silly to talk about factions when it comes to relations with the US.
“The army follows the party,” the general was quoted as saying. “Do you really think that Guan did this unilaterally?”
Liu Shih-chung (劉世忠), a -research fellow at Taiwan Brain Trust, said he suspected the CCP and the PLA were playing “good cop, bad cop” when it came to foreign and cross-strait affairs.
“The CCP and the PLA might have different approaches, but they share the same mentality,” he said.
Little is known about factions in the CCP and the PLA because of the lack of transparency, but analysts say the public can still piece together bits of information to get a glimpse of the power struggle between the two.
The Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989 saw an alleged division between the party and the military, Kuo said, adding that although no one could confirm whether the military refused to back military action in the first place, senior officers were later transferred.
The functions of the PLA have changed over the years, Kuo said. The 1991 Gulf War played a significant role in making the PLA more professional than political, he said, adding that the modern technology used in the operation made the PLA realize that it must spend more time training than involved in political infighting.
Nowadays, the PLA has a simpler job description, Kuo said. It is in charge of military matters, army building, foreign affairs, Taiwan -affairs and disaster relief.
Chen said it was not surprising to see the Chinese government call in outside troops to suppress student demonstrators in 1989 after the military purportedly did not show immediate backing for military action.
Chen said he did not think the military disobeyed orders from the civilian leadership, but instead the CCP made the decision to pre-empt a possible mutiny.
Chi Mao-chi (齊茂吉), director of the Graduate Institute of History at National Central University, said things took a dramatic turn in 1996 when the military botched its attempt to scare Taiwanese ahead of the first free presidential election.
“The incident was a turning point for the PLA, which considered it a significant humiliation,” he said. “Not only did [former president] Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) win by a landslide, but the US also got involved by sending two aircraft carrier fleets to patrol the Taiwan Strait.”
Since then, the number of soldiers at the CCP’s Political Bureau has gradually dwindled, he said, and so has the military’s influence on politics.
However, former Democratic Progressive Party legislator Lin Cho-shui (林濁水) disagreed, saying the PLA had been gaining more power since 1996 and that there was no indication that this would change in the near future.
While it is true that the party and military used to enjoy a close and often friendly relationship, Lin Cho-shui said, after the Chinese Civil War they have gradually grown apart, with the party retreating from the military and the army developing into an independent — and increasingly influential — faction.
Now as the only civilian official sitting on the CMC, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) must spend time building up loyalty to have real influence over the military, which Lin said had no problem setting the political agenda.
One example was Beijing’s recent claim that the South China Sea was its core national interest, which ran counter to the civilian government’s “good neighbor” policy, Lin Cho-shui said.
Beijing has also planned to establish a body similar to the US’ National Security Council, where the civilian government and the military could jointly formulate policies on foreign affairs and national security, but the proposal was emphatically rejected by the military, Lin Cho-shui said.
Published on Taipei Times :
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/10/05/2003484611
Copyright © 1999-2010 The Taipei Times. All rights reserved.
ANALYSIS: Politics and the military blur in China
RISING POWER:：The eyes of the world are on China as it continues its rise, however, analysts are divided on whether the military is becoming more or less powerful
By Ko Shu-ling / Staff Reporter
Tue, Oct 05, 2010
The rise of China’s power is not limited to its economy: It also involves its military, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) making significant advances in the past decade in technology, training and strategic planning.
These developments include a massive buildup of missiles across the Taiwan Strait designed to discourage any move toward de jure independence for Taiwan. They also include the expansion of the Pacific Fleet, complete with new operation bases, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines with first-strike capabilities.
All this raises concerns about Beijing’s true intentions as it tries to reassure the international community that it’s rise is peaceful. However, these concerns have been heightened by two recent developments.
One is China’s growing aggressiveness in pressing territorial disputes with neighbors such as Japan and India.
The other is emerging signs that the PLA may be increasing its influence over state affairs. When US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was denied a request to visit Beijing in June, he blamed elements within the PLA for blocking the invitation, which he said the civilian leadership had likely wanted to make.
The Gates snub also followed a three-minute “rant” in May by Rear Admiral Guan Youfei (關友飛) to 65 visiting US officials in Beijing, in which he said that US arms sales to Taiwan proved that Washington viewed China as an enemy.
US diplomats attempted to portray Guan’s remarks as at odds with the thinking of the rest of the Chinese government. However, some said his comments represented mainstream views within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
What, then, lies behind the mixed signals from the Chinese military and civilian leadership?
One thing commentators agree on when discussing the often -mysterious relations between the CCP and one of the world’s largest military forces is that they exhibit none of the instability witnessed in Latin American and Africa in the last century as authoritarian regimes repeatedly fell victim to military coups. Indeed, the CCP and the PLA have shown a remarkable similarity of purpose over the years.
York Chen (陳文政), a former senior adviser at the National Security Council in Taipei, said the relationship between the CCP and the PLA was unique.
The two are so intermingled, Chen said, that senior military leaders are party representatives and party officials are members of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
In Latin America, though, the military banked on different political parties depending on their interests, he said.
Though there might be factional differences between the CCP and the PLA, they never escalated into open confrontation, Chen said.
Kou Chien-wen (寇健文), a professor of political science at the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University, said the relationship between the PLA and the CCP was similar to that between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Republic of China troops in the old days.
“The military is an interest group living on the party,” he said.
The PLA remains loyal to the CCP for three reasons, Kou said.
The first is the unique relationship developed when the revolution started. Political and military leaders were “dual elites,” he said, meaning they had the identity of both soldier and civilian.
While some early political leaders such as Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) had combat experience, soldiers were later appointed administrative positions. It took between 40 and 50 years to see the older generation retire, during which time the military developed the habit of submitting to the party, Kou said.
The second reason is that the party controls the appointments and dismissals of military positions. Finally, the CCP uses defense budgets to buy allegiance as long as the military promises not to challenge the political authorities, he said.
There have been exceptions, of course, including former minister of defense Peng Dehuai (彭德懷) and former CCP vice chairman Lin Biao (林彪).
Peng and several other leaders expressed concern over Mao’s Great Leap Forward campaign and reported the truth about the famine to Mao during the Lushan Conference in 1959. Peng’s candor, however, was considered an action beyond his authority. He was put under house arrest for 16 years and later persecuted during the Cultural Revolution.
Lin staged a failed coup to oust Mao, but some analysts saw it more as Lin’s personal attempt rather than a concerted group action. Lin died in a mysterious plane crash in Mongolia in 1971.
Rumors of dissent have also been played down by the party and the military. As one PLA general who spoke on condition of anonymity told the Washington Post recently, it is silly to talk about factions when it comes to relations with the US.
“The army follows the party,” the general was quoted as saying. “Do you really think that Guan did this unilaterally?”
Liu Shih-chung (劉世忠), a -research fellow at Taiwan Brain Trust, said he suspected the CCP and the PLA were playing “good cop, bad cop” when it came to foreign and cross-strait affairs.
“The CCP and the PLA might have different approaches, but they share the same mentality,” he said.
Little is known about factions in the CCP and the PLA because of the lack of transparency, but analysts say the public can still piece together bits of information to get a glimpse of the power struggle between the two.
The Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989 saw an alleged division between the party and the military, Kuo said, adding that although no one could confirm whether the military refused to back military action in the first place, senior officers were later transferred.
The functions of the PLA have changed over the years, Kuo said. The 1991 Gulf War played a significant role in making the PLA more professional than political, he said, adding that the modern technology used in the operation made the PLA realize that it must spend more time training than involved in political infighting.
Nowadays, the PLA has a simpler job description, Kuo said. It is in charge of military matters, army building, foreign affairs, Taiwan -affairs and disaster relief.
Chen said it was not surprising to see the Chinese government call in outside troops to suppress student demonstrators in 1989 after the military purportedly did not show immediate backing for military action.
Chen said he did not think the military disobeyed orders from the civilian leadership, but instead the CCP made the decision to pre-empt a possible mutiny.
Chi Mao-chi (齊茂吉), director of the Graduate Institute of History at National Central University, said things took a dramatic turn in 1996 when the military botched its attempt to scare Taiwanese ahead of the first free presidential election.
“The incident was a turning point for the PLA, which considered it a significant humiliation,” he said. “Not only did [former president] Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) win by a landslide, but the US also got involved by sending two aircraft carrier fleets to patrol the Taiwan Strait.”
Since then, the number of soldiers at the CCP’s Political Bureau has gradually dwindled, he said, and so has the military’s influence on politics.
However, former Democratic Progressive Party legislator Lin Cho-shui (林濁水) disagreed, saying the PLA had been gaining more power since 1996 and that there was no indication that this would change in the near future.
While it is true that the party and military used to enjoy a close and often friendly relationship, Lin Cho-shui said, after the Chinese Civil War they have gradually grown apart, with the party retreating from the military and the army developing into an independent — and increasingly influential — faction.
Now as the only civilian official sitting on the CMC, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) must spend time building up loyalty to have real influence over the military, which Lin said had no problem setting the political agenda.
One example was Beijing’s recent claim that the South China Sea was its core national interest, which ran counter to the civilian government’s “good neighbor” policy, Lin Cho-shui said.
Beijing has also planned to establish a body similar to the US’ National Security Council, where the civilian government and the military could jointly formulate policies on foreign affairs and national security, but the proposal was emphatically rejected by the military, Lin Cho-shui said.
Published on Taipei Times :
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/10/05/2003484611
Copyright © 1999-2010 The Taipei Times. All rights reserved.
Monday, October 4, 2010
My latest story for Asia Times. Chinese signal V for victory
Chinese signal V for victory
The Chinese media have raved about a diplomatic victory in the dispute with Japan over the arrest and eventual release of a Chinese fishing-boat captain near disputed islands in the East China Sea. But the story is far from over. Beijing's frightening of Tokyo into submission with economic threats has led other Asian nations to regard China as a hegemon reverting to old ways. - Kosuke Takahashi (Oct 4, '10)
China signals V for victory
By Kosuke Takahashi
TOKYO - The flare-up between China and Japan over the arrest and dramatic release of a Chinese fishing-boat captain detained near disputed islands in the East China Sea symbolizes the rise and fall of Asia's two most powerful countries.
Chinese fishing boat captain Zhan Qixiong, 41, arrived at an airport in Fuzhou City of Fujian province, his birthplace, on September 25, and descended the stairs of a Chinese government-chartered airplane with both hands raised in the air making V signs. He became a national hero in the Chinese media, and his release was lauded as a significant victory for Chinese diplomacy as Japan bowed to Beijing's relentless demands to end his detention.
Beijing frightened Tokyo into submission via a de facto ban imposed by China, according to Japan - and denied by Beijing - on the export of rare-earths, metals essential to numerous industrial processes and whose supply is at present largely in Chinese control. China's tourism authorities discouraged Chinese citizens from traveling to Japan. China was, in a sense, successful in appealing to the international community the fact that there is a territorial dispute between the two nations, while Japan claimed there is no territorial dispute over the islands, known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China.
The incident and its conclusion touched off a fierce political firestorm in Tokyo, with the media and opposition hammering and accusing Prime Minister Naoto Kan and his administration's handling of the incident as ''weak-kneed'' and a display of ''cowardice''. The politically damaged Kan is highly likely to struggle to clear through the legislature its 4.8 trillion yen (US$57 billion) supplementary budget, which to spur the deflation-driven, sluggish economy. The government is expected to compile its proposals for the budget this week.
Reflecting increased tensions between the two nations, more than 10 vehicles of Japanese right-wing campaigners surrounded a line of motorcoachs carrying about 1,300 Chinese tourists in Fukuoka City on September 29. No one was injured, the Japanese media reported.
Japan's mistakes
Japan seems to have made a couple of mistakes in dealing with the Chinese fishing boat, which Tokyo claims had illegally entered Japanese territorial waters and crashed with Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels near the Senkaku Islands on September 7.
It's first mistake was in how it dealt with the fishing boat captain. Japan could have deported him to China immediately without judiciary proceedings. Tokyo has a precedent in the recent past. Junichiro Koizumi, a former prime minister, deported seven Chinese activists, who landed on Uotsuri Jima in the Senkaku Islands.
The Kan administration did eventually release the captain, but in a half-hearted manner. It should have released him much earlier before having to succumb to pressure from Beijing. Contrast this with when Koizumi was in power. As prime minister, Koizumi was hawkish enough to provoke fierce protests from Japan's neighbors, particularly China, by regularly visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine memorializing the war dead (including Class A war criminals such as Hideki Tojo), but he also was well aware of how severely Sino-Japanese relations would deteriorate further without the forced repatriation of seven men.
Japan's second mistake was in not immediately releasing the video of when the Japan Coast Guard patrol arrested the captain. Although little known among domestic and foreign observers, in June 2008 Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels and a Taiwanese leisure fishing boat collided with each other near the Senkaku Islands. At first, the coast guard claimed the Taiwanese boat bumped into the Japanese patrol ship. Later, because one Taiwanese fisherman aboard happened to shoot the scene in which the coast guard could be seen bumping the other vessel, the Japanese government was forced to pay about NT$10 million (US$311,000) as compensation.
From the start of the more recent incident, Japan should have released the video in order to justify its own claim as soon as possible, not least before four employees of a Japanese construction company, Fujita Corp, were held in China on September 20 for allegedly entering a military zone without permission and videotaping facilities there. The Japanese government is now reluctant to release the Japan Coast Guard's video as this could whip up anti-Japanese feeling in China at a time that one Fujita employee is still being held in Chinese custody.
The story is far from over
Although Chinese media has raved about the Chinese diplomatic victory, the story is far from over. Other nations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and South Korea as well as the United States and European nations are beginning to voice concerns about the perceived Chinese "threat" - vehemently denied by Beijing. By looking at Beijing's strong-handed diplomacy against Tokyo, they have become very cautious about China's recent aggressive diplomacy and military activities to expand its ocean interests at a time when the economic powerhouse already exceeds Japan as the world's second-largest economy.
China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all claim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, yet another potential tinder box in the region. South Korea is also conscious of Beijing's intentional display of its diplomatic and economic power. JoongAng Ilbo, one of South Korea's major newspaper wrote on September 25:
China has been eyeing the territorial right over Leo Island in the Yellow Sea, which South Korea claims is its territory, and the Exclusive Economic Zone could become the next hot potato. The Leo Island dispute and the economic zone are the reasons why Korea cannot sit back and watch the discord between China and Japan comfortably.
We need to have firm determination to proudly defend Korea's national interests, using all possible and available means and measures.
The South China Morning Post has also pointed out that China is taking a harder stance than before. ''First there was Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, and then the South China Sea. Now the Diaoyu Islands have become the latest addition to China's 'core interests' when it comes to territorial integrity,'' the Hong Kong newspaper reported on October 2.
Western companies are beginning to dislike the ''China Risk'', as Beijing can easily block the export of rare earth minerals that industries throughout the world need, leading companies to suffer since China accounts for more than 90% of the global production of such minerals.
Middle Kingdom
Chinese characters also show the potential for stability and instability that has persisted in Asia historically. In Chinese characters commonly used in East Asia, China means "central nation" or "middle kingdom". The characters imply that the Chinese empire is the center of the world and that other nations are tributary states. That situation for neighboring states was long true until the middle of the 19th century, when the Qing Dynasty, the last imperial dynasty of China, suffered under foreign aggression and occupation.
From the standpoint of China, the late 19th and 20th centuries were exceptional times, with what Chinese call "small Japan” beating and invading the middle kingdom and reigning as the No 1 nation in the region. The 21st century may well be high time for China to recover ''lost territories''.
Japan, meanwhile, experienced great changes during and after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, when the emperor proclaimed a cultural awakening to "catch up" with Western nations. Two victories against China in the Japanese-Sino War, 1894-1895, and against Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, 1905, made Japan a world power. The main character on the Asian stage thus changed rapidly in the early 21th century.
In a sense, Asia is in the process of normalization, with China coming back as the Asian hegemon after a century and a half. But at the same time, the world is in a process of "abnormalization", with the global economy's center of gravity shifting from the West to the East, led by China's rising economic and corresponding political power.
The world needs to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder among the international community, not to become a big nation that bullies neighboring countries.
Kosuke Takahashi is a Tokyo-based journalist.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Monday, September 20, 2010
My latest story for Asia Times: Ten-yen stores capture deflation dilemma
Here is my latest story for Asia Times published today. If you have time, please go over this.
Ten-yen stores capture deflation dilemma
As the United States flirts with deflation, economists point to Japan for examples of the damage falling prices can inflict on society. Yet Japanese chain store Recycle Garden shows how profits can be made in such dire circumstances - at least for a short while. - Kosuke Takahashi
Ten-yen stores capture deflation dilemma
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
My latest story for Jane's Defence Weekly
Here is my latest story for Jane's Defence Weekly published on September 10.
Japanese White Paper highlights concerns over China's maritime activities
Kosuke Takahashi JDW Correspondent
Tokyo
China's intensifying maritime activities in the sea around Japan and the lack of transparency of its national defence policies are a matter of concern for the region and the international community, Japan's new defence White Paper has cautioned.
The 2010 White Paper, released by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on 10 September, said that China does not disclose a clear, specific future vision of its military modernisation and that it has been intensifying its maritime activities, including those in waters near Japan. The paper also noted Japan required prudent analysis on current developments in the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).
The White Paper - which Japan releases annually to take account of any changes in the defence and security environment - included the PLA Navy's activities in the sea off Japan, particularly those of the past two years. It cited a series of incidents that have occurred since 2004, involving Chinese flotillas that have sailed through the Miyako Strait near Okinawa and voyaged to waters near Okinotorishima in the Pacific Ocean, thus intruding into Japan's exclusive economic zone.
The paper said those flotillas were each comprised of between two and 10 vessels, centred on a Luzhou-class guidedmissile destroyer - a vessel armed with an advanced air-defence system - or a Russian-built Sovremenny-class guidedmissile destroyer and/or a 'Kilo'-class diesel-electric-powered submarine. It also cited the incident of a Chinese Hanclass nuclear submarine that intruded into Japanese territorial waters in November 2004.
In a move to counter China's growing naval presence, the paper highlighted Japan's ongoing security efforts in the Nansei Islands - an island chain stretching southwestward from the Japanese island of Kyushu to Taiwan - noting that, on the basis of the security environment surrounding Japan, the MoD is reviewing how to defend the islands by taking into account the deployment of new corps.
North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles were another area of focus. The paper said that North Korea's nuclear tests, along with the build-up of ballistic missile capabilities that could become a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction, would never be acceptable. The tests posed a grave threat to the security of Japan and seriously damaged the peace and stability of Northeast Asia as well as the international community, it stated.
MoD press secretary Satoshi Maeda told reporters ahead of the formal release of the paper on 9 September that countries such as the US and India are also concerned about the lack of transparency of China's national defence
policies and increasing naval activities, including those in waters near Japan.
Asked about Japan's original efforts to demand transparency in China's strengthening of military power, Maeda said: "We have been promoting mutual understanding between Japan and China through security dialogues and defence exchanges in recent years. The promotion of mutual understanding is very important."
Copyright © IHS Global Limited, 2010
Japanese White Paper highlights concerns over China's maritime activities
Kosuke Takahashi JDW Correspondent
Tokyo
China's intensifying maritime activities in the sea around Japan and the lack of transparency of its national defence policies are a matter of concern for the region and the international community, Japan's new defence White Paper has cautioned.
The 2010 White Paper, released by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on 10 September, said that China does not disclose a clear, specific future vision of its military modernisation and that it has been intensifying its maritime activities, including those in waters near Japan. The paper also noted Japan required prudent analysis on current developments in the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).
The White Paper - which Japan releases annually to take account of any changes in the defence and security environment - included the PLA Navy's activities in the sea off Japan, particularly those of the past two years. It cited a series of incidents that have occurred since 2004, involving Chinese flotillas that have sailed through the Miyako Strait near Okinawa and voyaged to waters near Okinotorishima in the Pacific Ocean, thus intruding into Japan's exclusive economic zone.
The paper said those flotillas were each comprised of between two and 10 vessels, centred on a Luzhou-class guidedmissile destroyer - a vessel armed with an advanced air-defence system - or a Russian-built Sovremenny-class guidedmissile destroyer and/or a 'Kilo'-class diesel-electric-powered submarine. It also cited the incident of a Chinese Hanclass nuclear submarine that intruded into Japanese territorial waters in November 2004.
In a move to counter China's growing naval presence, the paper highlighted Japan's ongoing security efforts in the Nansei Islands - an island chain stretching southwestward from the Japanese island of Kyushu to Taiwan - noting that, on the basis of the security environment surrounding Japan, the MoD is reviewing how to defend the islands by taking into account the deployment of new corps.
North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles were another area of focus. The paper said that North Korea's nuclear tests, along with the build-up of ballistic missile capabilities that could become a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction, would never be acceptable. The tests posed a grave threat to the security of Japan and seriously damaged the peace and stability of Northeast Asia as well as the international community, it stated.
MoD press secretary Satoshi Maeda told reporters ahead of the formal release of the paper on 9 September that countries such as the US and India are also concerned about the lack of transparency of China's national defence
policies and increasing naval activities, including those in waters near Japan.
Asked about Japan's original efforts to demand transparency in China's strengthening of military power, Maeda said: "We have been promoting mutual understanding between Japan and China through security dialogues and defence exchanges in recent years. The promotion of mutual understanding is very important."
Copyright © IHS Global Limited, 2010
Thursday, September 2, 2010
(Foreign Affairs) The Pyongyang Playbook
This is a very nice analytical article on North Korea's diplomacy.
The author said, “Based on this trajectory, North Korea will likely conduct another nuclear test in the coming months, tempting the Obama administration -- which has yet to yield to Pyongyang’s playbook -- to start afresh with negotiations early next year. Possible dates for the test include September 8, the eve of North Korea's National Foundation Day, and October 10, Party Founding Day. ” Let's watch out for the DPRK with “strategic patience”!
The Pyongyang Playbook
Sung-Yoon Lee
SUNG-YOON LEE is Adjunct Assistant Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
One persistent misperception about North Korea is that its provocative international behavior is unpredictable. In the last two years alone, North Korea has held four U.S. citizens hostage; fired a long-range missile over Japan; conducted further nuclear testing; and, most recently, torpedoed the South Korean warship Cheonan, killing 46 sailors on board.
In fact, Pyongyang's methods have been remarkably consistent since the early 1960s, when Kim Il Sung, the nation’s founding dictator and its current leader’s father, purged all potential rivals and consolidated power. Its strategy has been to lash out at its enemies when it perceives them to be weak or distracted, up the ante in the face of international condemnation (while blaming external scapegoats), and then negotiate for concessions in return for an illusory promise of peace. Incapable of competing with economically flourishing South Korea, the North can rely only on military and political brinkmanship to make up ground. This has been a stunningly successful game plan for the isolated, impoverished nation that sits amidst the world’s most powerful status quo states, including China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.
North Korea's policy toward the Obama administration has closely followed this time-tested strategy. The United States has a long and undistinguished history of playing into the North’s game plan. However, the Obama administration has deviated from this pattern and adopted a policy that U.S. officials have dubbed “strategic patience.” The White House has attempted to remain calm in the face of North Korean provocations and has resisted making deals with Pyongyang merely for the sake of defusing tension. In view of the North Korean regime’s strategic outlook, it is the right approach.
The North has long chosen to confront its adversaries when they are weak. In 1968, as the political tide was turning against the United States in Vietnam, North Korea dispatched a 31-man commando team to kill South Korean President Park Chung Hee. Although South Korea thwarted the raid, Pyongyang continued its offensive two days later, when its forces captured the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo in international waters off the coast of the Korean peninsula. One U.S. sailor was killed in the seizure; the remaining 82 crewmembers were held captive under torturous conditions for 11 months until they were released following an apology by the Lyndon Johnson administration.
After enduring international condemnation, North Korea often decides to stay the course and even increase political tensions. During the Pueblo standoff, North Korea carried out commando raids against South Korea, sending more than 120 soldiers that October and additional troops the following year. The South Korean military quelled the raids, but Pyongyang, emboldened by continued U.S. difficulties in Vietnam, soon greeted the new Nixon administration with further violence. On April 15, 1969, on the occasion of Kim Il Sung's birthday, a North Korean jet shot down a U.S. reconnaissance plane, killing all 31 U.S. servicemen aboard.
The United States attempted to manage these crises in the 1960s by responding with conciliatory gestures aimed at alleviating tensions. North Korea learned that it could provoke, and even attack, the world’s greatest military power with impunity.
The North has redeployed this tactic in recent years. In 2006, for example, it attempted to capitalize on U.S. difficulties in Iraq. As Americans were celebrating July 4, North Korea carried out a barrage of missile tests, even firing a long-range missile in the direction of Japan.
This was the prelude to a far more confrontational act: North Korea’s first-ever nuclear test, which occurred on October 9, the eve of the Korean Workers’ Party Founding Day. By demonstrating its nuclear capabilities, North Korea painted the Bush administration into a corner. It also blatantly defied UN Security Council Resolution 1695 -- passed earlier that year in response to the North’s missile tests -- which called on Pyongyang to “abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.”
The October 2006 nuclear test yielded a more strongly worded Security Council resolution (1718), which demanded that North Korea “not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile” and called upon UN member states to “ensure” that funds supporting North Korea’s nuclear program be cut off. More important, it triggered a change of heart in the George W. Bush administration, which chose to abandon its effective policy of financially squeezing North Korean elites' cash flow and instead negotiate a nuclear agreement with North Korea the following February. In return for Pyongyang’s promise to dismantle its nuclear arsenal, Washington sequentially unfroze North Korea’s illicit funds, resumed food and fuel aid, and delisted North Korea from the U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Leaders in North Korea believe that their aggressive behavior can coax such concessions yet again. Thinking that the Obama administration -- coping with two ongoing wars and a serious economic crisis -- would be quick to opt for diplomacy, Pyongyang launched a long-range missile in April 2009, dominating global headlines and diminishing Obama's then high-profile visit to Europe. Pyongyang assumed that Obama could be bullied into seeking conciliatory diplomacy. Such assumptions, however, have yet to be borne out.
After raising the stakes with its opponents, the North often retreats and demands negotiations. It did this in 1972, when, stunned by U.S.-Chinese rapprochement the previous year, it agreed to hold the first-ever high-level talks with the South since the Korean War. Since then, Pyongyang has intermittently launched “peace offensives” at the United States, hoping to sign a treaty that would lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South.
Yet Pyongyang often sues for peace while forging ahead with forbidden activity. Even after it entered negotiations with South Korea in 1972, it continued hostilities against its southern neighbor. North Korean agents kidnapped South Korean fishermen and made another attempt on the life of South Korean President Park Chung Hee in 1974, leading to the death of his wife.
In the Kim Jong Il era, North Korea has consistently applied this approach of illusory concessions to the nuclear issue. In the wake of signing the 1994 Agreed Framework -- a deal in which Pyongyang agreed to freeze its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program in exchange for energy aid -- the North sealed its main nuclear reactor and opened doors to International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. But North Korean leaders quickly flouted the plan. In 2008, Pyongyang drafted an 18,000-page laundry list of nuclear activities while refusing to provide samples from its nuclear complex to outside inspectors on request. Despite its duplicity, North Korea still managed to be removed from the State Department’s terrorism blacklist in October of that year.
In recent weeks, Pyongyang has dangled an olive branch before the Obama administration. Apparently pleased with the weakly worded July 9 UN Security Council presidential statement on the sinking of the Cheonan -- which, despite overwhelming evidence of North Korean culpability, failed to blame the country for the act -- Pyongyang has suggested that it would return to the six-party denuclearization talks. By intimating a willingness to rejoin the multilateral forum, the North is seeking to deflect the negative attention it has received from the Cheonan incident. Once again, the North is presenting an image of reconciliation in the hopes of more political and economic rewards.
While angling for compromise, the North often offers meaningless theatrical gestures. In 2008, it allowed the New York Philharmonic to play in Pyongyang. Later that year, it blew up an old nuclear cooling tower, one that had exhausted its lifespan and could easily be rebuilt. Such dramatic displays are designed to bolster proponents of concessionary diplomacy in the United States and South Korea. They target those who unwittingly take the patronizing view that North Korea, lacking a strategic mindset of its own, merely reacts to positive stimuli -- be they musical overtures or diplomatic civility.
Yet U.S. policymakers should not be deceived. Amidst ongoing talks with Washington this past decade, North Korea has sent nuclear technology to Syria, as revealed in the wake of the Israeli air strike on a North Korean–built nuclear plant, Al Kibar, in eastern Syria in September 2007. In July 2008, North Korean guards killed a South Korean tourist taking a walk along a resort in the North’s eastern coast, a site funded by the South.
Meanwhile, Pyongyang has pressed ahead with drug trafficking, money laundering, and U.S. currency counterfeiting. It has also attempted to export arms in violation of UN resolutions. Last December, for example, a North Korean shipment of rockets and rocket-propelled grenades was seized in Bangkok that, according to Thai officials, was destined for Iran. In a failed plot earlier this year, Pyongyang sent agents posing as defectors into South Korea to assassinate a high-level North Korean defector.
The incitement from Pyongyang is likely to continue. North Korea's artillery barrage on and near the western maritime border with South Korea on August 9 and its seizure, the day before, of a South Korean fishing boat allegedly in North Korea’s eastern exclusive economic zone are just the latest examples of Pyongyang’s predictable game plan.
Based on this trajectory, North Korea will likely conduct another nuclear test in the coming months, tempting the Obama administration -- which has yet to yield to Pyongyang’s playbook -- to start afresh with negotiations early next year. Possible dates for the test include September 8, the eve of North Korea's National Foundation Day, and October 10, Party Founding Day.
Moreover, the political bureau of North Korea’s ruling Communist Party is scheduled to convene a rare meeting in early September where Kim’s heir apparent may be formally introduced. North Korea's intention to implement another father-to-son power transition makes the odds of a nuclear test even more compelling -- if only to bolster the inexperienced inheritor's military credentials. For a nation that professes to pursue “military first” politics, the implementation of another hereditary succession is certain to carry greater legitimacy if it comes on the heels of a dramatic demonstration of military prowess.
The U.S. should maintain its strategic patience with North Korea. It must put sustained pressure on Pyongyang's points of vulnerability -- principally, the cash flow needed to sustain its palace economy. In recent weeks, the Obama administration has repeatedly stated that it would strengthen financial sanctions against the North Korean leadership, targeting its counterfeiting, money laundering, and other illicit activities.
Furthermore, North Korea has shown itself to be sensitive to criticisms of its human rights abuses in the past, categorically denying that it perpetrates human rights violations in its “workers’ paradise.” Thanks to public pressure, the North has reduced its execution rate in recent years while sporadically relaxing prison sentences for border-crossers. Although such changes may be more a function of logistic difficulty than determined policy, the fact that foreign criticisms impel North Korea to cover up its manifold human rights abuses is beyond doubt. The White House should take a firm stand on North Korea's human rights violations, which would not only give hope to the long-suffering North Korean people but also impel, if only incrementally, Pyongyang to relax its crackdown on political prisoners. At the very least, such a principled stance would galvanize international cooperation on reunifying the two Koreas under a democratic government should the North’s regime collapse.
These policies will help the Obama administration avoid getting drawn into a dangerous military conflict with North Korea. Today, the North Korean regime faces the greatest existential threat since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Beset by a perennial economic crisis, increasing information flow into the country, and the uncertainty of another dynastic succession -- while struggling to rein in an ever-increasing number of North Koreans who wish to escape to the South -- Kim Jong Il must confront serious questions of long-term self-preservation. Amidst all this, Kim, who suffered a stroke two years ago, is himself racing against the clock. A dictator for life, he used to enjoy the advantage of outlasting democratically elected leaders. Strategic patience will best exploit his new limitation.
Time is no longer on Pyongyang’s side. The U.S. should avoid chasing North Korea through a revolving door of provocation and deception, unwittingly subscribing to the tactics presented all too plainly in the decades-old Pyongyang playbook.
The author said, “Based on this trajectory, North Korea will likely conduct another nuclear test in the coming months, tempting the Obama administration -- which has yet to yield to Pyongyang’s playbook -- to start afresh with negotiations early next year. Possible dates for the test include September 8, the eve of North Korea's National Foundation Day, and October 10, Party Founding Day. ” Let's watch out for the DPRK with “strategic patience”!
The Pyongyang Playbook
Sung-Yoon Lee
SUNG-YOON LEE is Adjunct Assistant Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
One persistent misperception about North Korea is that its provocative international behavior is unpredictable. In the last two years alone, North Korea has held four U.S. citizens hostage; fired a long-range missile over Japan; conducted further nuclear testing; and, most recently, torpedoed the South Korean warship Cheonan, killing 46 sailors on board.
In fact, Pyongyang's methods have been remarkably consistent since the early 1960s, when Kim Il Sung, the nation’s founding dictator and its current leader’s father, purged all potential rivals and consolidated power. Its strategy has been to lash out at its enemies when it perceives them to be weak or distracted, up the ante in the face of international condemnation (while blaming external scapegoats), and then negotiate for concessions in return for an illusory promise of peace. Incapable of competing with economically flourishing South Korea, the North can rely only on military and political brinkmanship to make up ground. This has been a stunningly successful game plan for the isolated, impoverished nation that sits amidst the world’s most powerful status quo states, including China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.
North Korea's policy toward the Obama administration has closely followed this time-tested strategy. The United States has a long and undistinguished history of playing into the North’s game plan. However, the Obama administration has deviated from this pattern and adopted a policy that U.S. officials have dubbed “strategic patience.” The White House has attempted to remain calm in the face of North Korean provocations and has resisted making deals with Pyongyang merely for the sake of defusing tension. In view of the North Korean regime’s strategic outlook, it is the right approach.
The North has long chosen to confront its adversaries when they are weak. In 1968, as the political tide was turning against the United States in Vietnam, North Korea dispatched a 31-man commando team to kill South Korean President Park Chung Hee. Although South Korea thwarted the raid, Pyongyang continued its offensive two days later, when its forces captured the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo in international waters off the coast of the Korean peninsula. One U.S. sailor was killed in the seizure; the remaining 82 crewmembers were held captive under torturous conditions for 11 months until they were released following an apology by the Lyndon Johnson administration.
After enduring international condemnation, North Korea often decides to stay the course and even increase political tensions. During the Pueblo standoff, North Korea carried out commando raids against South Korea, sending more than 120 soldiers that October and additional troops the following year. The South Korean military quelled the raids, but Pyongyang, emboldened by continued U.S. difficulties in Vietnam, soon greeted the new Nixon administration with further violence. On April 15, 1969, on the occasion of Kim Il Sung's birthday, a North Korean jet shot down a U.S. reconnaissance plane, killing all 31 U.S. servicemen aboard.
The United States attempted to manage these crises in the 1960s by responding with conciliatory gestures aimed at alleviating tensions. North Korea learned that it could provoke, and even attack, the world’s greatest military power with impunity.
The North has redeployed this tactic in recent years. In 2006, for example, it attempted to capitalize on U.S. difficulties in Iraq. As Americans were celebrating July 4, North Korea carried out a barrage of missile tests, even firing a long-range missile in the direction of Japan.
This was the prelude to a far more confrontational act: North Korea’s first-ever nuclear test, which occurred on October 9, the eve of the Korean Workers’ Party Founding Day. By demonstrating its nuclear capabilities, North Korea painted the Bush administration into a corner. It also blatantly defied UN Security Council Resolution 1695 -- passed earlier that year in response to the North’s missile tests -- which called on Pyongyang to “abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.”
The October 2006 nuclear test yielded a more strongly worded Security Council resolution (1718), which demanded that North Korea “not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile” and called upon UN member states to “ensure” that funds supporting North Korea’s nuclear program be cut off. More important, it triggered a change of heart in the George W. Bush administration, which chose to abandon its effective policy of financially squeezing North Korean elites' cash flow and instead negotiate a nuclear agreement with North Korea the following February. In return for Pyongyang’s promise to dismantle its nuclear arsenal, Washington sequentially unfroze North Korea’s illicit funds, resumed food and fuel aid, and delisted North Korea from the U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Leaders in North Korea believe that their aggressive behavior can coax such concessions yet again. Thinking that the Obama administration -- coping with two ongoing wars and a serious economic crisis -- would be quick to opt for diplomacy, Pyongyang launched a long-range missile in April 2009, dominating global headlines and diminishing Obama's then high-profile visit to Europe. Pyongyang assumed that Obama could be bullied into seeking conciliatory diplomacy. Such assumptions, however, have yet to be borne out.
After raising the stakes with its opponents, the North often retreats and demands negotiations. It did this in 1972, when, stunned by U.S.-Chinese rapprochement the previous year, it agreed to hold the first-ever high-level talks with the South since the Korean War. Since then, Pyongyang has intermittently launched “peace offensives” at the United States, hoping to sign a treaty that would lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South.
Yet Pyongyang often sues for peace while forging ahead with forbidden activity. Even after it entered negotiations with South Korea in 1972, it continued hostilities against its southern neighbor. North Korean agents kidnapped South Korean fishermen and made another attempt on the life of South Korean President Park Chung Hee in 1974, leading to the death of his wife.
In the Kim Jong Il era, North Korea has consistently applied this approach of illusory concessions to the nuclear issue. In the wake of signing the 1994 Agreed Framework -- a deal in which Pyongyang agreed to freeze its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program in exchange for energy aid -- the North sealed its main nuclear reactor and opened doors to International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. But North Korean leaders quickly flouted the plan. In 2008, Pyongyang drafted an 18,000-page laundry list of nuclear activities while refusing to provide samples from its nuclear complex to outside inspectors on request. Despite its duplicity, North Korea still managed to be removed from the State Department’s terrorism blacklist in October of that year.
In recent weeks, Pyongyang has dangled an olive branch before the Obama administration. Apparently pleased with the weakly worded July 9 UN Security Council presidential statement on the sinking of the Cheonan -- which, despite overwhelming evidence of North Korean culpability, failed to blame the country for the act -- Pyongyang has suggested that it would return to the six-party denuclearization talks. By intimating a willingness to rejoin the multilateral forum, the North is seeking to deflect the negative attention it has received from the Cheonan incident. Once again, the North is presenting an image of reconciliation in the hopes of more political and economic rewards.
While angling for compromise, the North often offers meaningless theatrical gestures. In 2008, it allowed the New York Philharmonic to play in Pyongyang. Later that year, it blew up an old nuclear cooling tower, one that had exhausted its lifespan and could easily be rebuilt. Such dramatic displays are designed to bolster proponents of concessionary diplomacy in the United States and South Korea. They target those who unwittingly take the patronizing view that North Korea, lacking a strategic mindset of its own, merely reacts to positive stimuli -- be they musical overtures or diplomatic civility.
Yet U.S. policymakers should not be deceived. Amidst ongoing talks with Washington this past decade, North Korea has sent nuclear technology to Syria, as revealed in the wake of the Israeli air strike on a North Korean–built nuclear plant, Al Kibar, in eastern Syria in September 2007. In July 2008, North Korean guards killed a South Korean tourist taking a walk along a resort in the North’s eastern coast, a site funded by the South.
Meanwhile, Pyongyang has pressed ahead with drug trafficking, money laundering, and U.S. currency counterfeiting. It has also attempted to export arms in violation of UN resolutions. Last December, for example, a North Korean shipment of rockets and rocket-propelled grenades was seized in Bangkok that, according to Thai officials, was destined for Iran. In a failed plot earlier this year, Pyongyang sent agents posing as defectors into South Korea to assassinate a high-level North Korean defector.
The incitement from Pyongyang is likely to continue. North Korea's artillery barrage on and near the western maritime border with South Korea on August 9 and its seizure, the day before, of a South Korean fishing boat allegedly in North Korea’s eastern exclusive economic zone are just the latest examples of Pyongyang’s predictable game plan.
Based on this trajectory, North Korea will likely conduct another nuclear test in the coming months, tempting the Obama administration -- which has yet to yield to Pyongyang’s playbook -- to start afresh with negotiations early next year. Possible dates for the test include September 8, the eve of North Korea's National Foundation Day, and October 10, Party Founding Day.
Moreover, the political bureau of North Korea’s ruling Communist Party is scheduled to convene a rare meeting in early September where Kim’s heir apparent may be formally introduced. North Korea's intention to implement another father-to-son power transition makes the odds of a nuclear test even more compelling -- if only to bolster the inexperienced inheritor's military credentials. For a nation that professes to pursue “military first” politics, the implementation of another hereditary succession is certain to carry greater legitimacy if it comes on the heels of a dramatic demonstration of military prowess.
The U.S. should maintain its strategic patience with North Korea. It must put sustained pressure on Pyongyang's points of vulnerability -- principally, the cash flow needed to sustain its palace economy. In recent weeks, the Obama administration has repeatedly stated that it would strengthen financial sanctions against the North Korean leadership, targeting its counterfeiting, money laundering, and other illicit activities.
Furthermore, North Korea has shown itself to be sensitive to criticisms of its human rights abuses in the past, categorically denying that it perpetrates human rights violations in its “workers’ paradise.” Thanks to public pressure, the North has reduced its execution rate in recent years while sporadically relaxing prison sentences for border-crossers. Although such changes may be more a function of logistic difficulty than determined policy, the fact that foreign criticisms impel North Korea to cover up its manifold human rights abuses is beyond doubt. The White House should take a firm stand on North Korea's human rights violations, which would not only give hope to the long-suffering North Korean people but also impel, if only incrementally, Pyongyang to relax its crackdown on political prisoners. At the very least, such a principled stance would galvanize international cooperation on reunifying the two Koreas under a democratic government should the North’s regime collapse.
These policies will help the Obama administration avoid getting drawn into a dangerous military conflict with North Korea. Today, the North Korean regime faces the greatest existential threat since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Beset by a perennial economic crisis, increasing information flow into the country, and the uncertainty of another dynastic succession -- while struggling to rein in an ever-increasing number of North Koreans who wish to escape to the South -- Kim Jong Il must confront serious questions of long-term self-preservation. Amidst all this, Kim, who suffered a stroke two years ago, is himself racing against the clock. A dictator for life, he used to enjoy the advantage of outlasting democratically elected leaders. Strategic patience will best exploit his new limitation.
Time is no longer on Pyongyang’s side. The U.S. should avoid chasing North Korea through a revolving door of provocation and deception, unwittingly subscribing to the tactics presented all too plainly in the decades-old Pyongyang playbook.
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